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General abstract  
The empirical investigation of free will beliefs is a fascinating and extensive 
field, offering potential insights into the extent and ramifications of free will 
beliefs, but this research is not without its limitations. Many competing 
definitions of free will exist. These competing definitions have informed the 
variety of free will manipulations and measures currently used, often without 
researchers properly addressing the important differences in the 
understandings of free will being operationalised, manipulated and measured. 
These manipulations and measures are also typically broad ranging, also 
including statements targeting determinism, reductionism and other related 
constructs. They therefore lack the focus necessary to identify just what aspect 
of these supposed free will manipulations are actually impacting cognitions, 
beliefs, and behaviours.  
Across 7 studies we address some of these limitations. Study 1 
confirms past findings demonstrating that perceptions of having choice and 
being free from constraints are central to lay understandings of free will. 
Study 1 also tests new single item measures of free will and determinism.  In 
studies 2 and 3 we use our new measure of lay free will, to demonstrate that 
the previously established utility of free will beliefs for predicting subjective 
wellbeing, is due to the perceptions of having control that form the core of 
lay free will beliefs. 
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We then reason that, as pro deterministic/anti free will messages can 
undermine free will beliefs these manipulations may also impact perceived 
control and subsequently indicators of subjective wellbeing.  
Studies 4 and 5 demonstrate that an abridged version of the Crick 
essay (typically used to undermine belief in free will), can undermine 
perceived control. This suggests that past successful manipulations of 
behaviour via the Crick essay, may have been due, at least in part, to 
reductions in perceived control rather than just free will beliefs.  
The Crick essay is a broad ranging, poorly focused manipulation, 
simultaneously championing determinism while undermining the idea of free 
will. We therefore then endeavour to create two new, better focused, 
manipulations of free will/determinism, with reduced demand characteristics. 
In study 6 our TMS manipulation lead to a significant reduction 
between participants’ pre and post manipulation scores but this was also true 
for participants in the neutral condition. These complex findings are explored, 
suggesting that placing participants in an intimidating environment may 
undermine their perceptions of having free will.  
In study 7 our deterministic video manipulation successfully 
undermines free will belief (compared to a non-deterministic video) but does 
not undermine perceived control or self-efficacy. These findings are explored 
further with participants’ agreement with the deterministic or non-
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deterministic video lecture, moderating the impact of condition on 
participants’ ratings of free will, self-efficacy and perceived control. 
When compared to non-determinism, high agreement with determinism was 
associated with lower perceived control and free will belief. By contrast low 
agreement with determinism was associated with higher perceived control 
self-efficacy and free will. 
In study 1 we created a new measure of cheating/dishonesty that can 
be used online. In study 7 we used this new measure of cheating and contrary 
to our predictions, exposure to a deterministic argument led to less cheating 
than exposure to a non-deterministic argument.  
In the general discussion (chapter 9) the various strands of research are 
brought together and their contribution to the literature discussed. The 
limitations of our research are explored with new ideas proposed to address 
those limitations and further our work. Taken together, the research outlined 
in this thesis provides valuable new insight into the nature and implications of 
beliefs relating to free will and determinism, provides a valuable critique of 
research in this field and offers suggestions to improve and extend the 
current literature.  
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Overview of chapters 
Chapter 1: An introduction to research into free will belief and its 
implications 
In this chapter we outline the theoretical background to current 
research into free will belief and delineate the lines of research that this thesis 
will follow. 1) Attempted manipulations of belief in free will that seek to 
modulate socially relevant behaviours. 2) Lay definitions of free will and how 
those understandings contrast the more philosophically based definitions that 
often informs research 3) Research that explores free will beliefs by comparing 
them to other related concepts; in particular perceptions of possessing choice 
and control. 
 
Chapter 2: Challenges, limitations and avenues for improvement 
In this chapter we explore the limitations in methods and theory that 
currently frustrate research in the field of free will beliefs. We critique current 
manipulations and measures, highlighting replication issues relating to studies 
that target behaviour by undermining free will beliefs. Finally, strategies are 
identified that will address the aforementioned limitations and enhance our 
coming studies.  
 
7 
 
Chapter 3: Creating focused measures, a test of cheating and 
challenging the assumption that lay persons always see free will and 
determinism as incompatible 
In this chapter we seek to lay the groundwork for the research to come. 
In Study 1 we confirm past research demonstrating that perceptions of 
possessing choice, in the face of external constraints, are at the heart of 
peoples’ free will beliefs. We commence validation of our single item slider 
measures of free will and determinism. We challenge the assumption that 
participants always see free will and determinism as incompatible (a 
cornerstone of many current free will manipulations). Finally, we test a new 
measure of cheating by providing participants with an opportunity to skip a 
task by making a dishonest claim. This measure demonstrated good baseline 
levels.  
 
Chapter 4: The association between believing in free will and 
subjective well-being Is confounded by a sense of personal control 
In this published chapter we establish that peoples’ sense of 
possessing choice and control underpin the relationship between free will 
beliefs and subjective wellbeing. Across studies 2 and 3 we demonstrate that 
free will beliefs do not predict indicators of subjective wellbeing beyond the 
contribution of the choice and control concepts that lay at the heart of lay 
understandings of free will.   
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Chapter 5: Manipulations designed to undermine belief in free will 
can also undermine perceived control. 
In this chapter, we seek to establish a relationship between belief in 
free will/determinism and participants sense of possessing control. A 
paradigm standard manipulation of free will beliefs (the Crick essay) is tested. 
Although the full version of the Crick essay does not impact control beliefs 
related to possessing mastery and being free from constraints (study 4), a 
modified version of the Crick essay successfully undermines control beliefs 
relating to notions of having control over one’s actions and decisions (study 
5).  This modified version of the Crick essay manipulation still retains some of 
the limitations of the original by lacking focus and directly mentioning free 
will. Clearly, we need to develop a more powerful, better focused yet implicit 
manipulation of belief in free will. 
 
 Chapter 6: Creating a new manipulation of free will beliefs and 
testing its effectiveness against the paradigm standard text-based 
approach.  
In this chapter we outline study 6 in which we compared the Crick 
essay’s capacity to undermine free will beliefs to our new manipulation that 
harnesses Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) to target perceived free 
will by impacting participants’ ability to execute a volitional action. Although 
the TMS manipulation is unsuccessful we explore research findings that hint at 
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the potential for TMS to undermine free will beliefs by making participants 
feel constrained. Participants’ understandings of what the Crick essay means 
to them are probed. The findings demonstrate the unfocused nature of the 
Crick essay and highlighted its potential to induce demand characteristics. 
 
Chapter 7: Belief in hard determinism and its impact on 
perceptions of free will, control self-efficacy and behaviour. 
In this chapter we again endeavour to build a better manipulation, this 
time of deterministic beliefs. In study 7 we build upon studies 1-6, designing 
and testing pro-determinism and determinism-neutral video lectures. This 
new manipulation addresses many of the limitations of the stimuli typically 
used and successfully undermines belief in free will (despite never mentioning 
it). The impact of the manipulation on participants’ perceived self-efficacy is 
explored and the crucial roles of demand characteristics and participant 
reactance are discussed. Surprisingly participants exposed to the non-
deterministic lecture demonstrate significantly more cheating than 
participants exposed to the pro-deterministic lecture. Research broadly in line 
with this finding is discussed. 
 
Chapter 8: General discussion 
In our final chapter we combine and contextualize the findings from 
studies 1-7 and place them with within contemporary theoretical frameworks.  
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Future research is then proposed that will harness the deterministic video 
lectures we created for study 7 while better controlling for participant 
reactance, demand characteristics and affect.  
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Chapter 1  
An introduction to research into free will belief 
 
The next two chapters will outline the key literature that investigates, 
manipulates and measures free will beliefs. Chapter one will provide an 
overview of the current literature. Chapter two will take the form of a critique 
that investigates some of the limitations and challenges that have hampered 
research in this field before outlining strategies for improvement. Our 
endeavours to implement those strategies will form the basis of the research 
in this thesis.  
The effects of free will belief and its manipulation 
We will begin with a brief overview of research that has attempted to 
experimentally manipulate belief in free will in order to either impact socially 
relevant behaviour or explore the neuroscientific markers of the psychological 
processes believed to underpin intentional action. 
Belief in free will and its consequences has only become the subject of 
scientific inquiry in recent years. The majority of this research has focused on 
the experimental manipulation of free will beliefs. Typically, participants’ free 
will beliefs are undermined via exposure to written texts or statements that 
refute traditional philosophical notions of free will, instead championing 
deterministic explanations for human thought and behaviour. The first study 
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to really capture the imagination of public and researchers alike was Vohs and 
Schooler’s (2008) investigation into promoting cheating by reducing 
participants’ belief in free will. Their methodology, described below, 
immediately became the standard.   
In their first experiment Vohs and Schooler (2008) challenged the free 
will beliefs of participants by asking them to read 1 of 2  passages from 
Francis Crick’s book ‘The astonishing hypothesis’ (Crick 1994), either an essay 
on determinism that refutes the existence of free will, or a passage on 
consciousness that did not mention free will.  Participants’ levels of free will 
belief (and related concepts) were measured via the freewill and determinism 
(FAD) scale (Paulhus & Margesson, 1994) (a 28 Item Likert measure) before an 
opportunity to cheat was presented in the form of a computer based maths 
test. Participants were told that the computer had developed a glitch causing 
the answers to the maths questions to also be displayed unless they corrected 
the glitch by pressing the space bar after each maths question was presented.  
Participants exposed to the anti-free will essay pressed the space bar 
less often than participants who read the neutral text. This was interpreted by 
Vohs and Schooler (2008) as demonstrating higher levels of cheating in the 
anti free will condition. A strong negative correlation was observed with 
weaker endorsement of free will beliefs associated with more cheating. When 
free will beliefs and condition were entered simultaneously into a model 
predicting cheating, only free will beliefs emerged as a significant predictor; 
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suggesting that the manipulation had impacted cheating by modulating free 
will beliefs. 
In their second experiment, Vohs and Schooler (2008) utilised a 
dependent measure that required active cheating. Free will beliefs were 
manipulated using a procedure adapted from Velten (1968) that required 
participants to read and consider 1 of 3 sets of 15 statements designed to 
either refute the existence of free will (determinism condition), endorse free 
will (pro free will condition) or avoid the subject entirely (neutral condition). A 
series of comprehension, logic and mathematical questions were then 
presented, and participants were able to claim money from a jar. The amount 
of money they were supposed to take was dependent on how many answers 
they claimed to have answered correctly. Efforts were made to ensure that the 
participants knew that their test results were anonymous. As such, participants 
knew that they could falsely take more money form the jar than they were 
entitled to. In other words they could cheat to take more money than they 
had earnt. Next participants completed the FAD scale (Paulhus & Margesson, 
1994) as a manipulation checker and the PANAS (Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 
1988) a measure of positive and negative affect, in order to rule out any 
confounding role for participants emotional reactions to the stimuli.  
As predicted, participants’ responses on the free will subscale of the 
FAD varied significantly according to the condition, with higher scores in the 
pro free will condition than the neutral condition and lower scores in the 
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determinism condition than the neutral condition. The experimental condition 
was also seen to influence cheating, such that overall participants in the 
deterministic condition claimed more monetary rewards. A strong negative 
correlation indicated that the more participants endorsed free will the less 
they paid themselves. A subsequent ANCOVA was conducted with free will 
beliefs and condition entered simultaneously into the model as predictors of 
cheating. Condition failed to uniquely predict cheating behaviour whereas 
free will beliefs were uniquely associated with increased cheating. Changes in 
participants’ emotional state were not found to have driven these results. 
 This initial research was soon built upon and the impact of 
deterministic stimuli explored in relation to other socially relevant behaviours. 
For example, Baumeister (2009) applied the statement reading task developed 
by Vohs and Schooler (2008), finding that participants exposed to these anti 
free will messages displayed a reduced willingness to help hypothetical 
people in need, when compared to participants exposed to neutral and pro 
free will statements. In a follow up study, participants exposed to the 
deterministic statements displayed more aggression in the form of requiring a 
confederate to eat more of a hot salsa.  
Other behaviours were identified as susceptible to text-based 
manipulations of free will belief. Experimentally diminishing free will beliefs 
has reduced the amount of retributive punishment participants believed that 
a hypothetical murderer should receive (Shariff, Greene, Karremans, Luguri, 
5 
 
Clark, Schooler & Vohs, 2014) and reduced both gratitude for a favour and 
the perception that one’s benefactor was motivated by a sincere intention to 
provide help. In other research, belief that a benefactor was free to choose 
increased the evaluation of the benefactor’s perceived motivational sincerity 
and this in turn increased the gratitude experienced (MacKenzie, Vohs, & 
Baumeister, 2014). This finding suggests that an actor’s perceived capacity for 
choice is fundamental to ascriptions of free will beliefs. 
Challenging FWB via deterministic stimuli has increased racial prejudice 
(Zhao, Liu, Zhang, Shi & Huang, 2014), reduced intuitive cooperation (in some 
circumstances) (Protzko, Ouimette & Schooler, 2015). Belief in free will may 
even have links to learning from past misdeeds. Stillman (2010) found that 
participants exposed to the deterministic stimuli claimed to have learned less 
from a past misdeed than participants in neutral or pro free will conditions. 
However, this effect was only apparent for those participants reporting high 
levels of guilt for the misdeed.  
In one variant on the Velten (1968) style manipulation, introduced by 
Vohs and Schooler (2008), participants were asked to both read and rewrite a 
series of statements that are either pro free will, anti free will/deterministic or 
neutral. Compared to reading and re writing pro free statements, reading and 
re writing deterministic statements caused people to conform more, by 
copying others’ ratings of artworks and product names, rather than 
generating their own as instructed (Alquist, Ainsworth, & Baumeister, 2013). 
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It has not always been a reduction in free will beliefs that has driven changes 
in cognitions and behaviours. For example, participants induced to believe 
more in free will have been shown to generate more counterfactual thoughts 
about how they could have done things differently, after first being asked to 
introspect about a past incident in which they had hurt someone (Alquist, 
Ainsworth, Baumeister, Daly, & Stillman, 2014) 
Findings at the Neuroscientific and cognitive levels 
The research outlined so far in this chapter has explored the impact of text 
based free will challenges on peoples’ moral behaviour and evaluations of 
others’ morally relevant behaviours. Those behavioural level findings have 
been complimented by research exploring the impact of text based free will 
challenges at the neuroscientific and cognitive levels, more specifically on the 
neural and cognitive markers of the psychological processes believed to 
represent intentional action. 
Rigoni and Colleagues (Rigoni, Kühn, Sartori & Brass, 2011; Rigoni, 
Kühn, Gaudino, Sartori & Brass, 2012; Rigoni, Wilquin, Brass & Burle, 2013) 
explored the notion that challenging an individual’s belief in free will reduces 
their belief that they can control their own behaviour, this in turn reduces 
their intentional involvement with tasks. This task disengagement is not 
general but specific in nature. Evidence for this has come from a series of 
studies that highlighted the impact that deterministic free will challenges can 
have on, for instance, the early RP (readiness potential), a correlate of 
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conscious motor preparation believed to be modulated by levels of 
intentional involvement  (Rigoni et al., 2011). In other work, these free will 
challenges have been shown to impact self-control in the form of intentional 
motor inhibition (Rigoni et al., 2012) and action adjustment after an error 
(Rigoni et al., 2013). The involvement of a person’s implicit sense of agency, 
their feelings of having causal ownership of their actions and subsequent 
outcomes has also proven susceptible to these manipulations (Lynn, Muhle-
Karbe, Aarts, & Brass, 2014). The influence of these high-level beliefs have 
been shown to impact self-regulatory engagement during a thermal pain 
stimulation experiment with participants induced to disbelieve in freewill 
slower to act to terminate pain stimuli (Lynn, Van Dessel & Brass, 2013). 
Defining and understanding the concept 
The work so far highlights the effects that challenging free will belief can have 
on socially relevant behaviours and some of the neuroscientific and cognitive 
markers of the processes that may underpin them. But what is free will? What 
is the concept of free will that lay participants hold? Is it the same concept 
that researchers operationalise and manipulate? In other words, what concept 
of free will is actually being challenged in these experimental manipulations? 
Amongst researchers and thinkers, multiple understandings of free will exist 
and different traditions and disciplines have their own unique take on how 
free will should be conceptualised (see Bargh, 2008). Definitions drawn from 
the philosophical tradition, typically define free will in a manner that privileges 
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human consciousness (or the soul) as the true source of decision making and 
thought (Cashmore, 2010; Descartes & Lafleur, 1960; Harris, 2012; Montague, 
2008). Under such an account, for free will to exist our consciousness must be 
distinct from our physical brain, able to act as a first mover, making choices 
without initiation or influence from prior events and demonstrating immunity 
from the causal laws that govern the rest of the physical universe. 
Understanding what is being measured and manipulated in the studies 
described above requires that we first understand what the lay concept of free 
will is. 
Monroe and Malle (2010) attempted to explore laypersons’ definitions of free 
will by directly asking undergraduate students to “please explain in a few lines 
what you think it means to have free will.” This direct referencing of free will by 
Monroe and Malle (2010) is important, because, as we will discuss in the next 
chapter, free will’s vague and contested nature has often required researchers 
in this field to utilise stimuli that either (1) directly reference free will, (2) risk 
tapping into related/overlapping concepts or (3) impose the researches own 
definitions on the concept. 
The free will definitions that emerged from their participants’ 
qualitative responses were almost entirely psychologically based, representing 
an understanding of free will as a choice that fulfils one’s desires and is free 
from internal or external constraints. Monroe and Malle (2010) were able to 
identify few if any even vague references to philosophical notions of non-
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physical souls or non-deterministic causation.  This finding was supported by 
a community sample of older participants that identified much the same 
pattern of definitions but with an added dimension of planning for the future 
(Monroe & Malle, 2014). Monroe, Dillon and Malle (2014) demonstrated that 
free will ascriptions around moral responsibility were largely understood by 
their participants as a capacity for intentionality, choice and being the sole 
cause of an action, with only a small contribution from notions of a soul. This 
notion of a soul also broke apart from free will ascriptions when participants 
were asked about the volitional capacities of a range of hypothetical agents. 
The overarching conclusion from these studies is that laypersons’ 
understandings of free will are based on psychological concepts with little if 
any input from the metaphysical free will definitions rooted in the 
philosophical tradition. This is fortunate as a form of free will that possess the 
capacity to thwart causality would have proven fiendishly difficult to 
investigate via empirical methods reliant on the exploitation of causal 
relationships.  
Free will beliefs and their relationship to other concepts 
We will turn now to research conducted at a broader social level, typically 
exploiting correlational and qualitative methods to examine how free will can 
be understood in terms of its relationships to other concepts. Belief in free will 
appears to be something that is found across human cultures (Sarkissian et al., 
2010), is enduring, often surviving even in environments where physical 
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freedom, personal autonomy and meaningful choice are purposefully 
constrained (Laurene, Rakos, Tisak, Robichaud & Horvath, 2011). Free will is 
associated with conscious thinking (Sheperd, 2012), generating counterfactual 
understandings (Alquist et., 2014) and when explored in an autobiographical 
narrative, linked to moral behaviour, achieving goals, high levels of conscious 
thought, deliberation and positive outcomes (Stillman, Baumeister & Mele, 
2011). Possessing a belief in free will has also been linked to positive life 
outcomes in the form of higher self-reported life satisfaction, meaning in life 
and subjective happiness and reduced negative indicators in the form of 
lower levels of perceived life stress (Crescioni, Baumeister, Ainsworth & 
Lambert, 2015; li et al ., 2017). 
Free will beliefs can also contribute to an individuals’ sense of 
expecting to achieve positive outcomes. Free will beliefs were associated with 
student participants self-reported expected career success, doing so 
independently of and to a greater extent than locus of control (Stillman, 
Baumeister, Vohs, Lambert, Fincham & Brewer, 2010). This relationship went 
beyond self-reported expectations of success, however, with agency workers 
who endorsed belief in free will, evaluated more favourably by their 
supervisors in terms of work effort, consistency in showing up for work and 
their positive social impact on fellow workers. The researchers interpreted this 
as free will beliefs facilitating individuals in exerting control over their actions. 
More recently Feldman, Chandrashekar and Wong (2016) linked belief in free 
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will to academic performance. Higher FWB predicted better performance on 
an academic proofreading task and, in a separate study, higher free will belief 
measured at the beginning of an academic semester predicted better grades 
at its completion. Free will beliefs had a greater capacity to predict 
participants’ academic performance, than their trait self-control (participants 
perceived ability to resist temptation and exercise self-control) and their 
implicit theories (their belief about others capacity for change (Feldman et al., 
2016). 
The concept of free will is strongly linked to notions of moral 
accountability, 
correlating positively with attitudes toward punishment as a form of 
deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution (Rakos, Laurene, Skala & Slane, 
2008). Researches have also attempted to isolate participants’ retributive 
evaluations and study their relationship to free will beliefs. Shariff et al. (2014) 
found that pre-existing free will beliefs were associated with retributive rather 
than consequentialist responses to crimes. In another study, attending 
neuroscience classes (presumed to be a source of deterministic thinking) 
resulted in reduced ratings of retributive punishment for a hypothetical 
offender. Experimentally undermining belief in free will also reduced the level 
of retributive punishment that participants believed a hypothetical offender 
deserved.  Similarly, Krueger, Hoffman, Walter and Grafman (2014) found that 
free will believers rated a hypothetical offender as deserving more 
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punishment than determinists but only for low affect crimes. This suggests 
that when crimes are serious and emotions run hot, the impulse to punish 
may be too strong to be impacted by deterministic beliefs. However that may 
not be the case when the deterministic explanation is specifically linked to the 
offender.  
Carey and Paulhus (2013) explored the link between blame and free 
will belief in regard to a high affect crime in the form of a child molester 
scenario. Although higher belief in free will was associated with higher 
punitive evaluations, hearing about the offenders’ abusive childhood and 
current mental health challenges (deterministic conceptualisations relevant to 
mental processes and perceived choice capacity) significantly reduced 
participants’ punitive evaluations. Others have explored the impact of immoral 
behaviour on free will belief. Reading about the moral breaches of others has 
been shown to increase free will belief, mediated by the desire to 
punish.(Clark, Luguri, Ditto, Knobe, Shariff & Baumeister, 2014). However, it is 
likely that the link between blame and free will beliefs draws less upon free 
will beliefs per se and more on the evaluations of the agents choice capacity 
and intentionally (Monroe, Dillon & Malle, 2014; Monroe, Brady & Malle 2017)   
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Free will belief and choice 
Perceived choice capacity appears to be at the heart of lay concept of free will 
(Monroe & Malle, 2010; 2014) and of many instruments designed to measure 
free will beliefs (Paulhus & Carey, 2011; Rakos, Laurene, Skala & Slane, 2008). 
Feldman, Baumeister and Wong (2014) explored the link between free will and 
choosing, finding that participant’s that expressed greater belief in free will 
reported a greater preference for making choices and perceived themselves 
to be better at choosing. In a second study participants were asked to 
introspect on past activities (such as purchasing electronics), where they had 
to decide on an option. Participants that endorsed free will beliefs more 
strongly, were more likely to perceive actions that involve selecting between 
options, as involving choice, to perceive these selection/choices as less 
difficult, and to report that they were more satisfied with their selection.  In a 
third study Feldman et al. (2014) asked participants to either recall actions or 
list choices and decisions made during the previous day. The participants 
asked to list choices reported higher levels of free will belief. In the final study, 
participants conducted a series of trials.  They were sorted into either a high 
choice condition (choosing between 4 pens), a low choice condition (choosing 
between 2 pens), one of two action conditions, or a control condition (in 
which participants were asked questions about yesterday’s weather).  
Participants’ belief in free will in general was higher in the two choice 
conditions than in the control condition. In terms of belief in personal free will 
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this relationship was only significant for participants in the high choice 
condition.  
Overall then perceptions and cognitions regarding choice lay at the 
heart of understanding of free will.  
Free will belief and the experience of control 
The experience of successfully executing choices would be expected to 
go hand in hand with a feeling of control, after all what is control but the 
successful execution of choices? Experimentally increasing belief in free will 
has been shown to increase the amount and meaningfulness of goal-directed 
content provided by participants during a task in which they were asked to 
describe things that they would like to do Crescioni et al. (2015). Similarly, 
Stillman, Baumeister and Mele (2011) asked participants to generate 
autobiographical accounts of actions that they deemed to be either of, or not 
of, their own free will. The participants in the free will condition generated 
more accounts consistent with their long-term self-interest and goal 
attainment. The link between free will beliefs and the goal acquisition is 
further supported by Crescioni et al. (2015) finding that free will beliefs 
correlate with perceived self-efficacy, a construct that probes and individuals’ 
perceptions that they are able to meet challenges and achieve goals across a 
variety of situations. Free will beliefs appear to be associated with goal 
acquisition a concept conceptually close to sense of control.  
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Despite this apparent overlap between sense of control and free will, 
some previous research has shown that free will belief has predictive utility 
beyond an individual’s sense of control at least when control is measured in 
terms of participants perceived locus of control (Rotter 1966), Locus of control 
(Rotter 1966), describes the degree to which the individual believes that they 
(internal locus of control), rather than outside forces (external locus of 
control), possess control over their life’s outcomes. Stillman et al. (2010) 
explored the relative contribution of free will belief and locus of control for 
predicting expected future job performance. Although both free will belief 
and Locus of control were able to predict expected future job performance, 
free will beliefs had predictive power over and above the contribution of locus 
of control. Paulhus and Carey (2011) found that their free will sub-scale 
correlated strongly but not so strongly as to suggest that both measures draw 
on the same concept. They concluded that locus of control and free will are 
related but distinct concepts. So Free will beliefs are similar to beliefs about 
locus of control yet distinct; more effective at predicting things like life 
satisfaction than locus of control. Similarly Crescioni et al. (2015) outlined the 
unique contribution that free will beliefs have above and beyond that of 
implicit person theory and locus of control (via Duttweiler’s (1984) internal 
control index), for predicting life satisfaction, gratitude, self-efficacy and 
meaning in life. Taken together, these studies suggest that the concept of free 
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will is closely related to the concept of locus of control but possesses unique 
utility to predict a range of important life outcomes. 
It seems reasonable to conclude that free will beliefs overlap with but are not 
identical to possessing an internal locus of control. Free will belief’s dimension 
of possessing choice capacity and freedom from constraints (Monroe & Malle, 
2010) seems like a likely candidate for this potential overlap.  
The evidence described above shows that sense of control seems to 
correlates strongly with free will belief. Other research has suggesting that 
manipulating sense of control, by invoking involuntary actions, can have a 
causal impact on free will beliefs. (Ent, 2013) evoked involuntary eye blink 
responses from participants’ by directing puffs of air into their eyes with a 
bulb syringe. The researcher then triggered the pupillary reflexes of these 
participants by shining a penlight on the outside corner of each eye, then in 
between the eyes. These participants subsequently reported lower belief in 
free will than participants who simply executed a voluntary response by 
bouncing a ball between their dominant and non-dominant hands. This 
suggests that evoking involuntary movements in people, threatens their belief 
in free will. Interestingly, this relationship was only observed for individuals 
low in trait reactance. Reactance (Brehm 1966; Miron & Brehm, 2006) is a 
person’s drive to resist perceived threats to their sense of being a free agent, 
able to behave as they choose. As such, Ent (2013) showed that only 
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individuals that were more willing to accept a threat to their sense of control, 
were influenced by the involuntary actions.  
Similar evidence for the role of bodily control in free will belief comes 
from investigating individuals who suffer from involuntary seizures. Ent and 
Baumeister (2014) identified reduced belief in general free will for people with 
epilepsy and panic disorders, two conditions associated with reduced bodily 
control.  In terms of evaluations of the participants’ personal free will, this 
effect was close to significant for those with epilepsy (p=.053) but not 
significant for individuals with panic disorders. In a second study the 
researchers attempted to link temporary bodily states to perceptions of free 
will. They reasoned that bodily demands in the form of hunger, thirst, 
tiredness, need to urinate and sexual desire might remind the individual that 
they lack complete control over their bodies, undermining their sense of 
possessing free will. People’s belief in their personal free will negatively 
correlated with their need to urinate, their sexual desire and their physical 
tiredness but no significant relationship was found with their level of thirst or 
hunger. A follow up study was conducted to probe the reason for the failure 
to observe a relationship between free will belief and hunger. An interaction 
was observed whereby hunger predicted reduced belief in personal free will 
but only for non-dieters. The researchers argued that for non-dieters, hunger 
acts like the other bodily needs (outlined above) reducing participants 
perceptions of having control and there subsequent sense of personal free 
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will. For dieters feelings of hunger may become associated with the feeling of 
exerting their free will over their bodily needs (Ent & Baumeister, 2014). This 
complex set of results suggests that an individual’s understanding of their 
personal free will may also draw upon their sense of possessing control over 
their bodies. 
Chapter Summary 
Manipulating belief in free will can impact socially relevant cognitions, 
behaviours and some of the neural and cognitive markers of intentional 
action. Complicated free will definitions, drawn from the philosophical 
tradition, have been contrasted by more down to earth lay understandings. 
Belief in free will is widespread and linked to evaluations of moral 
responsibility, blame and a range of important life outcomes: most likely due 
to its close relationship to evaluations/perceptions of choice and control. The 
scientific investigation of free will beliefs has produced a large and fascinating 
literature. However, challenges have arisen. The nature of these challenges 
and how best to tackle them, will be the subject of our next chapter.  
 
End of chapter 1 
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Chapter 2 
Challenges, limitations and avenues for improvement 
 
Chapter one outlined current research into the nature of free will beliefs and 
its consequences. This chapter will explore some of the limitations and 
challenges that have emerged in the field. We will offer strategies to address 
these limitations and challenges and by doing so, lay out the main aims of this 
research project. 
Replication issues 
No area of research is without difficulties. The most significant 
challenges have arisen in the line of research that seeks to manipulate FWB in 
order to influence socially relevant behaviour. Baumeister and Monroe (2014) 
have outlined their failed attempts to successfully replicate Shariff et al’s, 
(2014) finding that deterministic messages reduce participants’ inclinations for 
retributive punishment. Replication issues also struck at the foundation of this 
field when Giner-Sorolla, Embley and Johnson (2015) failed to replicate the 
Vohs and Schooler (2008) study that first reported elevated cheating after an 
anti free will manipulation. Although some attempts to induce cheating by 
manipulating free will beliefs have been successful (for an example see Trager, 
2013), other researchers have failed to manipulate cheating behaviour (van 
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den Brink, 2016; Nadelhoffer, Shepard, Crone, Everett, Earp & Levy, 2019) 
when using methods similar to those reported by Vohs and Schooler (2008). 
Indeed, Schooler, Nadelhoffer, Nahmias and Vohs (2014) have themselves 
reported difficulties with consistently manipulating behaviours via 
deterministic anti free will messages during their attempts to produce more 
finely focused and reliable stimuli. Schooler et al. (2014) concluded that strong 
and multi-faceted manipulations of free will (like the Crick essay) may be 
necessary to modulate belief and behaviour.   
Consistent replications have not been forthcoming and after an initial 
flourish of successful studies, further extensions to the original findings have 
slowed to a crawl. This must be seen as problematic for research that 
manipulates high level beliefs about free will and determinism in order to 
influence socially relevant behaviour. In response to the failed replications, 
Schooler et al. (2014) have pointed out that in their original study (Vohs and 
Schooler, 2008) they used, but failed to report, presenting the text based free 
will manipulations and dependent measures to their participants as two 
completely separate pieces of research. Schooler et al. (2014) conducted a 
series of studies intended to replicate the original findings of Vohs and 
Schooler (2008) and create better focused experimental manipulations. In one 
of these studies they tested the effectiveness of framing effects by either 
presenting the manipulation and dependent measures to participants as part 
of the same study or presenting them as parts of two separate studies. 
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Schooler et al. (2014) found that the Crick essay was only able to impact 
participants’ ratings of free will belief and locus of control, when the 
manipulation and dependent measures were presented separately. However, 
they did not successfully manipulate cheating behaviour in that study even 
when framing the manipulation and depended measures as parts of separate 
studies. There finding provides some support for the argument that framing 
effects can enhance the strength of the manipulation but only in terms of its 
impact on self-reported free will beliefs and locus of control.  
This work appears to have been conducted prior to Giner-Sorolla et 
al’s, (2015) failed replication of Vohs and Schooler (2008). Giner-Sorolla et al. 
(2015) were likely unaware that Vohs and Schooler (2008) had harnessed this 
framing effect by presenting their manipulation and depended measures as 
parts of separate studies. It could be argued that the lack of framing effects 
contributed to Giner-Sorolla et al’s. (2015) failure to replicate Vohs and 
Schooler (2008). However, Nadelhoffer et al’s. (2019) attempted replication of 
Vohs and Schooler (2008) also failed to successfully evoke cheating behaviour 
by manipulating free will beliefs despite including framing effects by 
presenting the manipulation and dependent measures as part of two separate 
studies. Nadelhoffer et al. (2019) conducted their manipulation online rather 
than in the lab as with Vohs and Schooler (2008) and it may be that the 
attempt to frame the manipulation and dependent measures as parts of 
separate studies, was far less convincing when conducted online. As 
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mentioned above Schooler et al. (2014) concluded that multiple factors may 
be necessary to successfully manipulate belief in free will and impact 
behaviour. These factors include framing effects and strong and multi-faceted 
manipulations. However, broad ranging, multi-faceted manipulations, may 
introduce as many issues as they solve.   
Broad unfocused Manipulators   
In chapter one we outlined the study by (Vohs, & Schooler, 2008) that 
introduced the (Crick, 1995) and Velten (1968) style manipulations. These 
manipulations have since been used in the majority of studies that have 
attempted to manipulate free will belief, attitudes, cognitions and behaviours. 
Despite replication issues described above, the Crick essay manipulation has 
since been used successfully in many studies (Lynn, et al., 2014; MacKenzie et 
al., 2014; Rigoni et al ., 2011; Rigoni et al., 2013; Vohs & Schooler, 2008). 
However, Rigoni, and Brass (2014), amongst others, have pointed out that 
these stimuli are broad ranging, potentially manipulating a variety of concepts 
related to free will. For example, the passages taken from Crick (1995) include 
arguments likely to enhance belief in neuro reductionist thinking, evolution 
and scientific determinism, while simultaneously challenging potentially 
precious beliefs regarding religion, the soul, the afterlife and participants’ 
perceived capacity for choice. Crick presents complex concepts often using 
low frequency words that may intimidate or disinterest participants, especially 
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when Crick implies that to disagree with him demonstrates a lack of 
education. Below are examples taken from the Crick essay.  
 
“In addition to scientists, many educated people also share the belief that 
the soul is a metaphor and that there is no personal life either before 
conception or after death” 
 
“You,” your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, 
your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the 
behaviour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated 
molecules. Who you are is nothing but a pack of neurons. 
 
“So, although we appear to have free will, in fact, our choices have 
already been predetermined for us and we cannot change that”. 
 
    Francis Crick. A Postscript on Free Will 
(1995) 
 
 
The Velten (1968) style manipulation is the most widely used FWB 
manipulation  (Alquist, Ainsworth & Baumeister, 2013; Baumeister, 
Masicampo & DeWall, 2009; Rigoni, Kühn, Gaudino, Sartori & Brass, 2012; 
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Vohs & Schooler, 2008; Crescioni, Baumeister, Ainsworth, Ent, & Lambert, 
2016; Stillman & Baumeister, 2010; Schrag, Tremea, Lagger Ohana & Mohr,  
2016; Monroe, Brady & Malle, 2017) and is equally broad ranging. The Velten 
(1968) style manipulation consists of 3 conditions each containing 15 
statements that participants are required to read, consider and on some 
occasions rewrite in their own words. 
The determinism condition is comprised of 4 statements attacking the 
idea of  free will (e.g “science has demonstrated that free will is an illusion”) 
and 11 statements encouraging belief in scientific determinism (e.g Every 
action that a person takes is caused by a specific pattern of neural firings in 
the brain), 7 of which reference biological determinants, neurons, biology, 
genetics etc.  
In the pro freewill condition 4 statements encourage free will belief (e.g 
“I demonstrate my free will every day when I make decisions”, 5 act to lower 
belief in scientific determinism (e.g “our actions and thoughts are not simply 
the result of prior experiences”.) and 5 statements encourage moral 
responsibility (e.g I have feelings of regret when I make bad decisions because 
I know that ultimately I am responsible for my actions”). Additionally, 1 
statement references control.  
In addition to manipulating a broad range of different concepts, both 
the Crick essay and Veltan manipulators carry with them substantial demand 
characteristics by openly stating that free will does not exist and (in the case 
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of the Crick essay) by suggesting that this is the position that well educated 
people adopt.  
Broad unfocused Measures  
The breadth of the current manipulators is matched by the breadth of the 
tools designed to measure free will beliefs, both as manipulation checkers and 
in correlational research. For example, the free will subscale of the FAD-Plus 
(Paulhus & Carey, 2011) contains 7 sentences, 2 affirming personal control, 1 
affirming control over life goals, 3 suggesting that individuals are morally 
responsible for their misdeeds and 1 claiming that people have free will. Given 
that the free will subscale is comprised predominantly of items referencing 
moral responsibility, with only a single item referencing free will, it is hardly 
surprising that this subscale correlates strongly with participants’ punitive 
judgements in response to a child molester scenario (Carey & Paulhus, 2013).  
The Free Will and Determinism Scale (Rakos, Laurene, Skala & Slane, 
2008) has 22 items spread over its general free will and personal free will 
subscales. Of those items 4 refer to the control of a higher power 6 refer to 
free will, 6 refer to moral responsibility and 6 address matters of choice and 
decision making. 
Both the FAD-Plus and the Free Will and Determinism scale include 
items that tap concepts of choice and control. Perceived freedom to choose is 
one of the core constituents of free will as defined by many in the 
philosophical tradition and also maps well onto the lay definition of free will 
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that sees choice capacity as a key component (Monroe & Malle, 2010). We 
suspect that it is this core component of choice that drives many of the 
findings that sees free will beliefs predict indicators of subjective wellbeing 
(Crescioni et al., 2015) and important life outcomes like job performance 
(Stillman et al., 2010). The role of perceived choice as the central component 
of lay understandings of free will and the component that may predict 
subjective wellbeing, deserves further exploration. 
The assumption of lay incompatibility 
The broad ranging and multi-faceted nature of the manipulators and 
measures outlined over the previous paragraphs are typical of manipulations 
and measures currently used in the field of Free will research. One reason for 
the breadth of the manipulations and measures appears to be their creator’s 
decision to draw upon understandings of free will and determinism form 
philosophical approaches. Although perfectly legitimate, this approach has 
consequences for the nature and breadth of the concepts probed, adding 
elements of moral responsibility to free will subscales and informing the 
nature of the other subscales against which the fee will subscale will be 
contrasted. Further adding to the breadth of current manipulations is their 
creator’s assumption that laypersons consistently and reliably embrace an 
incompatibilist understanding of free will. That is to say that lay participants 
always view belief in free will and belief in scientific determinism as opposite 
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ends of a single continuum, meaning that increasing belief in determiism is 
conceptually identical to decreasing belief in free will.  
Within Condition incompatibilism  
This has led to widely used manipulations (e.g Crick essay and Velten 
statements) containing both anti free will and pro determinism statements in 
the same experimental condition. In other words, the anti free will conditions 
contain both statements championing scientific determinism and statements 
that denying the existence of free will. As a result of this conceptual casserole 
it becomes impossible to discern whether free will or determinism (or both) 
was manipulated, and therefore, what produced any observed modulation of 
the dependent measures. Of course, it is entirely plausible that the anti-free 
will and pro deterministic statements may be consolidated in the minds of 
participants, combining to form a single attack on their perceived choice 
capacity, but consistent reliable lay incompatibility has yet to be established 
empirically. Indeed, researcher’s have found that Lay participants do not 
always see free will and determinism as incompatible (Nahmias, Morris, 
Nadelhoffer & Turner, 2006; Nichols, 2006; Nichols & Knobe, 2007; Murray & 
Nahmias, 2014; Shepherd, 2012). 
Implications of assuming lay incompatibility when combining subscales 
The assumption of lay incompatibility can become compounded in studies 
that use measures of scientific determinism to gauge the impact of an anti 
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free will manipulation (see, e.g., Stillman & Baumeister, 2010) but becomes 
particularly problematic when researchers take the separate subscales from a 
given instrument and combine them to create a supposed ‘global’ measure of 
free will (or intentional control). This strategy typically involves reverse scoring 
the Free Will subscale of the FAD-Plus (Paulhus & Carey, 2011) and combining 
it with the other three subscales (Scientific Determinism, Fatalistic 
Determinism, and Unpredictability) (see Lynn, Van Dessel & Brass, 2013;  
Rigoni, Wilquin, Brass & Burle, 2013 for examples). Similar reversal and 
aggregation strategies have been employed with other measures of free will 
beliefs (Genschow, Rigoni & Brass, 2017).   
The assumption of lay incompatibilism behind these strategies can be 
convincingly challenged.  The creators of the FAD-Plus in particular went to 
great lengths to demonstrate the independence of their free will and scientific 
determinism subscales. Paulhus and Carey (2011), over multiple rounds of 
testing demonstrated that their free will and scientific determinism items 
loaded consistently onto different subscales. These subscales demonstrated 
no reliable positive or negative relationships. The makers of the free will 
inventory did not come to a definitive conclusion about lay incompatibilism 
but did not find that their free will and determinism subscales correlated 
significantly (Nadelhoffer, Shepard, Nahmias, Sripada & Ross, 2014). 
Independently, Feldman et al. (2014) did not report a statistically significant 
correlation between the Scientific determinism subscale of the FAD-Plus 
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(Paulhus & Carey, 2011) and the FW subscale of the FAD-Plus (r = 0) the 
Scientific determinism subscale of the FAD-Plus also failed to correlate 
significantly with either the General free will subscale (r= -.12), or the Personal 
free will subscale (r= -.14), of the FWD (Rakos, 2008).The idea that an increase 
in free will beliefs is conceptually identical to a decrease in scientific 
determinism is not supportable for these measures.  
Summary  
Replication issues have plagued the area of free will research that seeks to 
influence socially relevant behaviour by modulating belief in free will and 
determinism. Schooler et al. (2014) conducted a number of studies aimed at 
separating out and focusing the different influences inherent in their stimuli. It 
was hoped that this would allow for the specific influence responsible for 
impacting moral behaviour, to be identified (if indeed one exists). This work 
met with little success and Schooler et al. (2014) concluded that high impact, 
broad ranging stimuli may be essential for the successful manipulation of free 
will beliefs and subsequent behaviour. However, we argue that broad ranging 
stimuli (born of philosophical understandings of free will) present 
considerable challenges in terms of identifying what constituent actually 
impacted behaviour. The use of broad ranging post manipulation measures of 
free will and determinism further compounds this issue especially when 
assumptions of lay incompatibility lead to their improper use. These multi-
faceted broad and unfocused measures and manipulations are scattergun 
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instruments that proved invaluable during the initial stages of theory 
development. These instruments now lack the precision to untangle the 
interactions, overlaps and conflations between primary aspects of free will 
belief, like choice capacity (Monroe & Malle, 2010), from probable secondary 
phenomena, like gratitude, most likely predicated on evaluations of the 
benefactors’ choice capacity and subsequent motivational sincerity 
(MacKenzie et al., 2014). Only once these primary and secondary influences of 
FWB are understood can the long term relationship between FWB and life 
outcomes, like academic performance (Feldman et al., 2016), be properly 
understood and exploited.  
Key research aims 
A number of opportunities to develop the field have emerged from our 
analysis of the research literature. Our key aims are as follows: 
 
1. The lack of conceptual focus inherent to many current measures of free 
will belief requires us to develop and use more focused single item 
measures of free will and determinism. These measures will need to 
target only participants belief in a single concept and indeed Feldman 
(2016) and McKenzie (2014) have already successfully used single item 
measures of free will beliefs.  
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2. This research project will test the validity of the assumption of lay 
incompatibility for any new measures/manipulators in order to 
understand the full extent of their breadth. This may also help us 
understand the true implications and limitations of past research. 
 
3. This research project will explore the overlap between free will beliefs 
and the related and potentially underlying concepts of choice and 
control. We will explore whether it is in fact these core elements that 
underlie the relationship between free will beliefs and indicators of 
subjective wellbeing. We will go onto explore whether the 
manipulation of choice and control (encapsulated within 
understandings of determinism) provides a better avenue for the 
fruitful investigation of life outcomes.  
 
4. Replication issues combined with the problems encountered when 
attempting to reduce manipulator breadth Schooler et al. (2014) and 
the lack of focus inherent in the current FW measurement scales, all 
present considerable challenges. This research project will develop 
more targeted stimuli that includes only the conceptually relevant 
aspects of the Crick manipulation and that encapsulates contemporary 
deterministic arguments, while reducing demand characteristics. 
The research conducted to achieve these key aims will be presented in the 
next 5 experimental chapters. 
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Chapter 3 
Study 1 
Creating focused measures, a test of cheating and challenging the 
assumption that lay personals always see free will and determinism as 
incompatible 
 
 
Abstract 
Most manipulations and dependent measures used in free will research were 
constructed assuming that lay participants see free will and determinism as 
incompatible. Manipulations are typically broad ranging and multi-faceted, 
mapping poorly onto the free will concepts of lay participants.  
This study elicited lay participants qualitative free will definitions and gauged 
their belief in free will and scientific determinism via well validated multi item 
measures and our new, more focused single item measures. We then 
presented participants with an opportunity to cheat by falsely claiming to 
have heard of a fictional organisation thus saving themselves from a short 
writing task.  
Our results were in line with past findings (Feldman et al., 2014), 
demonstrating that, lay participants do not necessarily see free will and 
determinism as incompatible.   
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Our attempt to offer initial validation for our new more focused single item 
measures of free will and scientific determinism was successful. Participants 
free will definitions were broadly in line with those observed by Monroe and 
Malle, (2010) focusing on choice capacity and freedom from constraints. Our 
attempt to predict cheating behaviour from participants free will beliefs was 
unsuccessful due to an error with data collection, but we established good 
baseline cheating levels for our new online cheating measure.  
 
Introduction 
As discussed in the introduction, the scientific investigation of free will beliefs 
can be delineated into two main fields. The first is correlation based and 
measures participants’ free will beliefs in order to predict life outcomes 
(Stillman et al., 2010) or indicators of subjective wellbeing (Crescioni et al., 
2015). The second uses text based scripts to manipulate free will beliefs in 
order to impact socially relevant behaviors (Vohs & Schooler, 2008), or 
cognitions linked to individuals’ sense of action control (Rigoni et al., 2011; 
Lynn, et al., 2014). The majority of current manipulations and measures of free 
will beliefs are predicated on the assumptions that lay persons see free will 
and determinism as incompatible 
The most commonly used manipulations are the (Crick, 1994) and the 
Velten (1968) style manipulations made popular by Vohs and Schooler (2008). 
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Both these manipulations were constructed based on the assumption that 
laypersons see belief in free will and belief in determinism as incompatible. 
This assumption presupposes that an increased belief in determinism is 
conceptually identical to a reduced belief in free will (and vice versa). Free will 
and determinism are seen as opposite ends of the same continuum. The 
assumption that laypersons are incompatibilists also has implications for 
studies where a measure of scientific determinism is used to gauge the impact 
of an anti free will manipulation (see, e.g., Stillman and Baumeister, 2010). But 
if this assumption is wrong then manipulations containing both anti free will 
and pro determinism statements are actually manipulating two potentially 
unconnected concepts simultaneously. Furthermore, post manipulation 
measures of determinism shed no light on the relative success of an attempt 
to manipulate free will beliefs. In fact manipulation checks would need to 
measure all the different variables manipulated by multi- faceted 
manipulations.  
The assumption that laypersons are incompatibilists is not based on 
solid empirical evidence when pertaining to many of the instruments currently 
used to measure belief in free will and determinism. For example Feldman et 
al. (2014) could identify no statistically significant correlations between the 
Scientific determinism subscale of the Paulhus and Carey (2011) instrument 
and either the General free will subscale(-.12), or the Personal free will 
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subscale (-.14), of the Rakos (2008) measure or with the FW subscale of the 
FAD-Plus (.00) (Paulhus & Carey, 2011).  
This echoes similar findings during validation studies, demonstrating 
that, as intended, measures of free will and scientific determinism diverge, 
sharing no reliable relationships (see Paulhus & Carey, 2011 & Nadelhoffer, 
Shepard, Nahmias, Sripada & Ross, 2014). This led Paulhus and Carey (2011) 
to conclude that lay persons see free will and determinism as compatible, 
although other researchers claim to be agnostic on the subject of lay 
compatibilism/incompatibilism (Nadelhoffer, Shepard, Nahmias, Sripada, & 
Ross, 2014).  
Research in the field of experimental philosophy also suggests that, 
when context and personal definitions permit, laypersons can be perfectly 
capable of reconciling a belief in free will with an acceptance of determinism 
(e.g., Nichols & Knobe, 2008, Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer & Turner, 2006). 
As discussed above, current theoretical assumptions underpinning the Crick 
(1994) and Velten (1968) style manipulations, presuppose that lay 
understandings of free will and determinism are profoundly incompatibilist. 
They assume that higher levels of deterministic belief always equates to lower 
levels of free will belief (and vice versa); we will see if this holds true for the 
measures we are planning to use over the course of this research project.  
Both the Crick essay (Crick, 1994) and the Velten (1968) style 
manipulations made popular by Vohs and Schooler (2008) contain both anti 
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free will and pro deterministic statements in their anti-free will condition, with 
the majority of the anti free will statements explicitly mentioning free will. But 
what does the term free will mean to participants? In other words, what is 
actually being endorsed or undermined by these manipulations? Across two 
studies Monroe and Malle (2010;2014) demonstrated that lay participants 
view free will as their capacity for making and executing choice and following 
desires, free from internal or external constraints (Monroe & Malle, 2010) with 
an additional element of forethought for a community sample containing 
older participants (Monroe & Malle, 2014). We will utilise a single item 
graphical slider that explicitly references the word free will in order to target 
this specific concept, while also recording participants’ qualitative free will 
definitions. Content analysis of these free will definitions will allow us to 
replicate Monroe and Malle (2014) and explore for ourselves the concepts 
underlying lay belief in free will. 
Participants’ belief in both free will and determinism will be recorded 
via previously well validated multi item measures and our new single item 
graphical sliders. Work on validating these single item measures can initially 
involve their successful comparison to their already validated multi item 
counterparts.    
The main achievement of Vohs and Schooler (2008) was to successfully 
induce cheating behaviour via a manipulation designed to undermine belief in 
free will (although as we have just discussed, the manipulation may have been 
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less focused than intended). Failed replications (Giner-Sorolla et al., 2015) 
suggest that attempts to induce cheating behaviour by manipulating free will 
belief could be at best inconsistent and at worst futile. If a relationship 
between manipulated belief in free will/determinism and cheating exists so 
should a relationship between pre-existing belief in free will/ determinism and 
cheating; at least any relationship that was born of actual belief rather than a 
secondary phenomenon based on having one’s core beliefs challenged. We 
will attempt to demonstrate a link between pre-existing free will/deterministic 
belief and cheating via a new measure of cheating tailored to online 
application.   
Aims 
1. Verify, for our current sample, that participants’ definitions of free will are in 
line with Monroe & Malle, (2014) centring around the capacity for choice 
and the ability to act free from constraints, with an element of forethought. 
2. To begin validation of our single item measures of free will and scientific 
determinism. 
3. To test the assumption that lay participants see free will and determinism 
as incompatible.   
4. Establish whether participants’ free will definitions predict cheating 
behavior.  
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Hypothesis  
H1 That participants’ free will definitions will be in line with the findings 
of Monroe and Malle, (2014) (community sample), in that they will centre 
around a capacity for choice and the ability to act free from constraints, with 
an element of forethought.  
H2 Single item measures of free will and scientific determinism will 
demonstrate statistically significant and strong positive relationships to their 
well validated multi item counterparts. 
H3 No consistent, reliable relationships between measures of free will 
and scientific determinism (both multi item and single item) will be observed.   
H4 That participants’ definitions of free will and their belief in the idea, 
will predict whether they cheat by providing false information on a survey 
task. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were recruited through the Prolific Academic web service (N = 94; 
60% male; Mage = 28.33, SDage = 10.02). Three additional participants were 
excluded for failing to complete at least 80% of the survey.  
Procedure and Materials 
Participants completed the following measures in order: 
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Free will definition. Participants’ individual free will definitions were 
elicited following the procedure successfully used by Monroe and Malle 
(2010). Participants’ open-ended responses to the question “Please explain 
what you think it means to have free will” (adapted from Monroe & Malle, 
2010) were coded independently by the primary author and an independent 
associate. Nine major categories emerged from the qualitative data after an 
initial read through of the first 30 responses. (a) Philosophical (b) Control (c) 
Choice (d) Decide (e) Action (f) Future plans (g) Following desires (h) 
Overcoming constraints (i) Awareness of the Consequences of Actions (see 
Appendix 1 for coding instructions).  In order for a participants’ definition to 
be coded as philosophical they had to refer to decision making that was 
immune to the laws of causation or to act in a manner that was not pre-
determined. To be coded as Control, Choice, Decide or Actions the target 
word simply had to be used. A response was coded as Future Plans when the 
definitions include references to future outcomes. Possible examples would 
be “choose my own course in life” or “bring about the outcomes I want”. 
Responses were coded as Following Desires if they possessed an element of 
self-expression, for example, “doing what you want” or “Freedom to be me”. 
To be coded as Overcoming Constraints the definition had to refer to a 
person’s ability to resist external or internal influences, e.g “not being forced 
by others”. Finally responses coded as Awareness of Consequences to Actions, 
demonstrated participants’ awareness that their actions may lead to 
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consequences e.g be “prepared to accept the consequences”. Inter-rater 
reliability for all coding categories was high (see Table 1) 
Free will relevance. The personal importance of people’s free will 
beliefs were then measured using a single-item, graphical slider scale (“How 
important is the idea of free will to you personally?”). The scale ranged from 0 
(not important) to 100 (very important), and the starting position of the slider 
was set to the mid-point of the scale. This variable is expected to moderate 
the relationship between free will definition and cheating behaviour. 
Free will and scientific determinism.  Participants’ belief in people’s 
capacity for free will and their belief that deterministic forces can influence 
people’s behaviour and life outcomes were measured using the two relevant 
subscales from the FAD-Plus, Paulhus and Carey (2011). The seven free will 
items (e.g., “Criminals are totally responsible for the bad things they do”; 
“People have complete free will”) and the seven scientific determinism items 
(e.g., “People’s biological makeup determines their talents and personality”; 
“Science has shown how your past environment created your current 
intelligence and personality”) were intermixed at presentation. These two 
variables, constructed and validated by Paulhus and Carey (2011), have been 
shown to consistently load onto different factors and demonstrated no 
reliable relationship during validation. Participants indicated their level of 
agreement on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree), with higher scores indicating a greater belief in the concept. 
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Belief in Free Will (slider measure).  We measured participants’ belief 
in free will, this time using a single-item, graphical slider scale (“Please 
indicate the extent to which you believe in free will”). The scale ranged from 0 
(no belief) to 100 (absolute belief), and the starting position of the slider was 
set to the mid-point of the scale. Similar single item measures of free will have 
demonstrated predictive validity (e.g., Feldman, 2016), and single-item scales 
have been shown to be sensitive to experimental manipulations of free will 
beliefs (McKenzie, 2014). 
Belief in Scientific Determinism (slider measure). We measured 
participants’ belief in Scientific Determinism using a single-item, graphical 
slider scale (“Scientific Determinism is the idea that all human behaviour is 
governed by preceding events and scientific causal principles. Please indicate 
the extent to which you believe in Scientific Determinism.”). The scale ranged 
from 0 (no belief) to 100 (absolute belief), and the starting position of the 
slider was set to the mid-point of the scale. 
 Demographics. Participants were asked to report their gender and 
age. 
Cheating opportunity. Participants were then given an opportunity to 
cheat by making a demonstrably false claim. The task instructions read 
“This research has been sponsored by the Rassilion Trust. If you had not 
previously heard of the Rassilion Trust please give us 2 or 3 sentences 
describing how you feel we might better share our research findings with 
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members of the public like you. OR If you had previously heard of 
the Rassilion Trust please just simply write the words 'I had heard' in the box 
below”. The name Rassilion Trust was fictional (no similarly named 
organisation appeared on internet searches). Participants who responded 
“have heard” were therefore coded as cheating.  
 
Results  
Unfortunately, an error occurred on the final page of our online survey. Thirty-
five percent (n=33) of participants who failed to properly close the final page 
left no recorded cheating data. We could not be certain that a participant’s 
disposition towards exiting the survey prematurely was independent of their 
responses on other measures. We therefore felt it inappropriate to test H4 or 
to proceed with any analysis that would use any of our measures to predict 
cheating behavior. Fortunately, this error did not impact the other data as 
these was recorded prior to the point when the error occurred.  
Of the 61 participants who left cheating data, eighteen (29.5%) 
cheated. Thirty-four (55.7%) did not cheat and nine (14.8%) gave non 
appropriate answers that could not be coded as cheating or non cheating. We 
can at least conclude that a baseline cheating rate of approximately 30% does 
suggest that this cheating measure is suitable for further investigation. 
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Lay Definitions of Free Will.  
Category codings for participants’ free will definitions are shown in Table 1. As 
predicted, participants’ definitions of free will were close to those observed by 
Monroe and Malle, (2014), with Choice (50%) and Overcoming Constraints 
(37%) the two largest individual categories. The combined categories also 
followed this pattern. 81% of participants’ responses were coded within the 
combined category (composed of Control, Choice, Decide, Action) of 
Combined Action Plans This category involves making choices and executing 
actions.  
60% of participants responded with definitions that were coded within 
the combined category (composed of Following Desires, Overcoming 
Constraints and Awareness of Consequences) of Combined Constraints. This 
category involves awareness of the constraints to actions that come from 
others.  
The Forethought category (that represented 26% of Monroe and Malle, 
(2014) sample) related to responses that involved weighing the benefits of 
action and described choices as being thoughtful made in consideration of 
the future. In the present study the category Future Plans (8.8%) most closely 
resembles the Forethought category from Monroe and Malle (2014). The 
Desires category represented 38% of Monroe and Malle’s (2014) responses. 
For our study the equivalent category, Following Desires, represented 28.6% 
of responses.  
46 
 
Even when allowing categories to emerge naturally from the qualitative 
data we have supported H1 by demonstrating that our participants free will 
definitions are in line with those observed by Monroe and Malle (2014). Free 
will is seen by lay community participants as essentially their capacity to make 
choices, that fulfils their desires, free from internal or external constraints (with 
an element of forethought). 
Contrary to Monroe and Malle’s, (2014) findings nearly 8% of 
participants responded with free will definitions that were coded as 
philosophical, conceptualising free will in a manner that grants humans the 
capacity for thoughts and actions that have a non-causal origin. As a 
precaution, responses coded as philosophical were searched online to check 
that participants had not copied there free will definitions from the internet. 
None of the responses we coded as philosophical appeared during our online 
search (see appendix 2 for participant responses that were coded as 
philosophical).  
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Table 1 Content coding of lay definitions of free will. 
Coding category Kappa of 
agreement 
Percentage of participants    
mentioning this category. Combined Action Plans  81.3  
Combined Constraints  60.4  
Choice .96 49.5 
Overcoming Constraints .86 37.4 
Decide .91 34.1 
Following Desires .61 28.6 
Actions .90 20.9 
Future Plans .73 8.8 
Philosophical .93 7.7 
Control .90 6.6 
Awareness of Consequences .85 6.6 
Note. Definitions for each coding category are provided in the text and see appendix 1 for 
free will definition coding instructions. All kappa agreements reached significance p<.001. 
Results are ordered from highest to lowest in terms of category inclusion.  
 
Slider validation and the assumption of Incompatibilism 
H2 was supported in that the slider measures of free will and scientific 
determinism demonstrated statistically significant and strong positive 
relationships with their multiple item subscale counterparts. This suggests that 
single item measures may provide adequate measurement of free will and 
scientific determinism.  
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Table 2. Pearson’s correlations for comparisons between single item slider and 
full subscale measures of free will and scientific determinism. 
         FAD-Plus FW        Slider FW FAD-Plus SD 
FAD-Plus FW   (.67)   
Slider FW .460 (p<.001) ---  
FAD-Plus SD 
Slider SD 
.094 (p=.36) 
.118 (p=.26) 
-.236 (p=.02) 
-.073 (p=.49) 
(.58) 
.492 (p<001) 
 
Note. n= 94 or n=93 for the free will slider as 1 score missing. When 
applicable, alpha reliabilities are presented in parentheses along the diagonal.   
 
The relationship between measures of Free Will and Scientific 
Determinism was less clear (see table 2). Of the four possible correlations that 
could have suggested a relationship, only the relationship between the single 
item Free Will measure and the multiple item Scientific Determinism measure 
was significant. H3 was therefore supported in that no consistent, reliable 
relationship was observed across the measures of free will and scientific 
determinism (both multi item and single item). 
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Discussion  
 
This Study confirmed Monroe and Malle’s (2014) findings that free will is seen 
by lay community participants as their capacity to make choices, that fulfil 
their desires, free from internal or external constraints (with an element of 
forethought). We begin validation of our single item measures of free will and 
scientific determinism and demonstrated that lay participants do not always 
see free will and determinism as incompatible. Technical problems meant that 
we were not able to test whether participants’ free will definitions predicted 
cheating behavior, but our cheating measure did demonstrate a good 
baseline level of cheating. 
Confirming H3, participants’ responses on our new single item measures and 
their multiple item counterparts did not support an assumption of lay 
incompatibilism. Consistent reliable relationships were not observed across 
the different measures of free will and scientific determinism. A sensitivity 
power analysis demonstrated that our sample had 80% power to detect a 
moderate correlation of 0.28 or greater (α = 0.05, two-tailed). Our sample may 
therefore have lacked the power to detect small effect sizes. However, Paulhus 
and Carey (2011) found no significant relationship between these free will and 
scientific determinism subscales, with 80% power to detect small correlations 
of 20 and greater (α = 0.05, two-tailed). If a relationship between scientific 
determinism and free will exists, it may lack either sufficient reliability or 
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strength to support experimental methodologies that assume that a 
manipulated change in one variable reliably equates to an equal and opposite 
change in the other. At least not at meaningful effect sizes.  
The free will and scientific determinism sub scales of the FAD-Plus did not 
correlate significantly either when there is 80% power to detect moderate 
correlations (this study) or indeed small correlations (Paulhus & Carey, 2011). 
These findings have implications for research that create global measures of 
free will (or intentional control) by reverse scoring responses on the free will 
subscale and combining it to 2 or 3 of the other subscales of the FAD-Plus 
The potentially bogus assumption that lay participants always see 
belief in free will and determinism as incompatible may have implications for 
current manipulations. Most experimental studies seeking to manipulate free 
will belief, utilize either the Crick (1994) essay or the Velten (1968) style 
manipulations made popular by Vohs and Schooler (2008). Both 
manipulations are built upon the assumption that lay participants are 
incompatibilists, attempting to undermine free will belief (in the anti free will 
condition) by simultaneously promoting determinism and attacking the 
notion of free will. Our findings add to a growing body of research suggesting 
that lay participants are capable of holding beliefs about free will and 
determinism that are independent from one another. (Paulhus & Carey 2011 
& Nadelhoffer, Shepard, Nahmias, Sripada, & Ross, 2014). The assumed 
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incompatibility of belief in free will and determinism may be as tenuous for 
manipulated beliefs is it appears to be for preexisting beliefs. Researchers 
should treat anti free will manipulations that simultaneously attack free will 
while championing determinism, as potentially targeting two distinct 
concepts. One of the aims of this thesis is to create more focused 
manipulations that either undermine belief in free will or champion 
determinism. Similarly, we will avoid using post manipulation measures of 
scientific determinism as proxy measures for belief in free will (and vice versa), 
as many researchers have done in the past.  
Here, we aimed to begin the validation of more focused single item 
measures of free will and scientific determinism. Confirming H2 our single 
item free will slider and our single item scientific determinism slider both 
correlated significantly with their multiple item, well validated counterparts. 
These correlations were respectable and arguably approaching large 
according to the Cohen (1988) convention that views a value of .5 as large. 
However pertinent factors may have reduced the strength of the correlations 
between the single item measures and their multiple item counterparts. When 
comparing measures of scientific determinism we compared our new high 
concept single item measure (that we also defined) to the scientific 
determinism subscale of the FAD-Plus (Paulhus & Carey 2011) a simpler 
concept multiple item measure (with no definitions). This may have muddied 
the relationship between the two measures reducing the correlation.  When 
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comparing measures of free will, we compared our single item measure of 
free will to the multiple item free will subscale of the FAD-Plus (Paulhus & 
Carey 2011). The free will subscale of the FAD-Plus is the most widely used 
measure of free will beliefs. However, as Nadelhoffer et al. (2014) and others 
have pointed out, this subscale contains multiple items relating to moral 
responsibility, a concept that closely overlaps with, but is not identical to, free 
will. The conceptual breadth of the free will subscale of the FAD-Plus may 
have reduced the strength of its correlation with our more focused single item 
measure.  
Our qualitative analysis of participants’ free will definitions confirmed 
H1 and past research, demonstrating that participants view free will as 
essentially their capacity to make choices, that fulfil desires, free from 
constraints (Monroe and Malle (2010) with an element of forethought 
(Monroe & Malle 2014). By contrast the two most widely used multiple item 
measures of free will contain items also relating to control, moral 
responsibility and arguably self-efficacy (Paulhus & Carey, 2011; Rakos, 
Laurene, Skala & Slane, 2008). These broad measures of free will belief, that 
also probe perceived choice, control, moral responsibility and self-efficacy, 
can never be effective tools for exploring the relationships between free will 
belief and perceived choice, control, moral responsibility and self-efficacy. We 
therefore see our single item measure of free will beliefs (which targets only 
participants’ lay concept of free will), as the superior tool for exploring 
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relationships between free will beliefs and notions of control, choice and self-
efficacy. How free will beliefs relate to notions of choice and control and how 
these beliefs influence subjective wellbeing, self-efficacy and moral behavior, 
will be key components of the research outlined in this thesis.  
Limitations 
Our findings diverged slightly from that of Monroe and Malle’s (2010; 
2014), with a small portion of our free will definitions coded as philosophical 
(See appendix 1 for coding instructions and appendix 2 for the participant 
definitions that were coded as philosophical). It is possible our inclusion 
criterion was too broad. For example, by coding responses as philosophical 
when participants state that their choices/behaviours are ‘not predetermined’, 
we may have inflated this category. This phrase could also be harnessed by 
young people who feel their life outcomes are constrained by societal and 
parental demands/expectation. Future research should endeavor to more 
precisely define what is and what is not, a philosophical definition of free will, 
perhaps by probing further and eliciting hypothetical scenarios and examples 
of when free will can and cannot exist. As previously mentioned, technical 
issues prevented us from testing the predictions of hypothesis 4 that 
participants’ free will definitions will predict cheating. We will correct this 
technical issue in future studies.  
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To summarize, our lay participants’ responses to multi and single item 
measures of free will and determinism add to the body of research that 
suggests that people do not always view free will and determinism as 
incompatible. This is problematic for paradigm standard manipulations that 
seek to undermine free will by simultaneously undermining belief in free will 
and championing determinism and for research that seeks to run the various 
FAD-Plus subscales together to create a global measure of free will. A more 
focused manipulation will be developed and used as a part of this research 
project.  Our single item measures of free will and determinism appear 
suitable for further exploration over the coming studies. Our new online 
measure demonstrated a good baseline level of cheating and will be utilized 
as a part of this research project.    
Summary and future directions 
Study 1 confirmed past research by demonstrating that perceptions of 
possessing choice in the face of external constraints (with an element of 
forethought) form the core of lay persons free will beliefs (Monroe & Malle 
2010; 2014). At least in terms of the single item and multiple item sliders 
tested in study 1, participants do not consistently see belief in free will and 
scientific determinism as incompatible, at least at moderate and large effect 
sizes. Our online cheating measure and our single item measures of free will 
and determinism, warrant further testing. Our results and past findings 
(Paulhus & Carey 2011 & Nadelhoffer, Shepard, Nahmias, Sripada, & Ross, 
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2014) suggest that better focused manipulations of free will and determinism 
should be developed.   
Free will beliefs have been linked to indicators of subjective wellbeing 
predicting higher levels of satisfaction with life (Li et al., 2017) and lower levels 
of perceived stress (Crescioni et al., 2015). Yet as study 1 confirmed free will 
beliefs appear to draw largely upon notions of possessing choice (Monroe & 
Malle 2010; 2014) and we would argue, perhaps control. Studies 2 and 3 will 
use our new, more focused, single item measure of free will to establish that it 
is in fact peoples’ sense of possessing choice/control that underpins the 
relationship between free will beliefs and subjective wellbeing.  
 
End of Chapter 3. 
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 Next step 
Study 1 demonstrated initial validity for our better focused single item 
measures of free will and scientific determinism. Lay participants responses to 
these measures indicate that they do not consistently see free will and 
scientific determinism as incompatible, at least at moderate and large effect 
sizes. We broadly replicated the finding of Monroe and Malle (2014), 
demonstrating that lay participants define free will as their ability to make 
choices that fulfil their desires, free from internal or external constraints (with 
an element of forethought). We reasoned that executing a choice to fulfill a 
desire, unconstrained by others, is essentially an act of control. We suspected 
that it was this element of perceived choice/control (central to free will beliefs) 
that underpinned free will beliefs ability to predict important life outcomes. 
We tested for this possibility in chapter 4.  
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A version of this chapter has been published  
Gooding, P. L., Callan, M. J., & Hughes, G. (2018). The association between believing in free 
will and subjective well-being is confounded by a sense of personal control. Frontiers in 
psychology, 9, 623. 
Chapter 4  
The Association Between Believing in Free Will and Subjective Well-
Being Is Confounded by a Sense of Personal Control 
 
Abstract 
The extent to which an individual believes in free will is associated with a 
number of positive life outcomes, including their own subjective well-being. 
However, it is not known whether the belief that one has free will per se is 
uniquely associated with subjective well-being over and above potential 
confounding variables. We examined a sense of personal control as one such 
confound—specifically, whether the association between free will belief (FWB) 
and subjective well-being is based, in part, on the degree to which an 
individual feels a sense of personal control over their life. In Study 2, trait-level 
belief in personal control significantly uniquely predicted satisfaction with life 
and stress, over and above the contribution of FWB. In Study 3, within-person 
daily fluctuations in stress and depression were not significantly predicted by 
daily changes in FWB over and above the contribution of personal 
58 
 
control/choice. The findings provide new insight into the relationship between 
FWB and subjective well-being.  
 
Introduction 
A growing body of evidence has shown that believing in free will is associated 
with a variety of positive life outcomes, including feeling grateful for past 
events (MacKenzie et al., 2014), better job performance (Stillman et al., 2010), 
higher academic achievement (Feldman et al., 2016), passionate love 
(Boudesseul et al., 2016), satisfaction with life (Li et al., 2017), and lower levels 
of perceived stress (Crescioni et al., 2015). 
Nonetheless, the extent to which belief in free will per se is associated 
with positive life outcomes or whether some third variable is driving these 
associations remains to be explored. One possibility is that the relationship 
between free will beliefs (FWBs) and positive life outcomes, such as 
satisfaction with one’s life, might be confounded by a sense of personal 
control. Indeed, it is well-established that a sense of personal control is 
positively associated with many of the same positive life outcomes that relate 
to FWB, including subjective well-being (for reviews, see Myers and Diener, 
1995; Peterson, 1999; Ross and Mirowsky, 2013). Thus, it is unclear whether 
FWB are uniquely associated with indicators of subjective well-being over and 
above a sense of personal control. 
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In their work exploring lay understandings of free will, Monroe and 
Malle (2010, 2014) found that people’s definitions of what it means to have 
free will differed from philosophical understandings that typically view free 
will as the ability for our conscious minds (or a soul) to make decisions, 
regardless of brain states or prior causal events (Harris, 2012). Rather, people 
defined free will as their freedom to make choices and the ability to act 
without constraints—that is, their sense of personal control (see 
also Baumeister and Monroe, 2014). Thus, insofar that our participants’ lay 
concepts of FWB are specifically tied to having a sense of personal control, 
then individual differences in a sense of personal control might better predict 
subjective well-being than individual differences in FWB. Consistent with this 
idea, Monroe et al. (2017) found that people’s beliefs that an agent who 
committed an immoral act had the capacity to choose their actions better 
predicted judgments of their blameworthiness than did their beliefs that the 
agent had free will. We reasoned that the known association between FWB 
and subjective well-being might be confounded by a sense of personal 
control. 
Across two studies, we compared the relative predictive utility of 
perceived control/choice and FWB across various indicators of subjective well-
being. Study 1 investigated the degree to which personal control and FWB 
uniquely predicted satisfaction with life and perceived stress. Study 2 assessed 
how daily changes in perceived choice/control and FWB predicted life stress 
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and depression across a 2-week period. Given the foregoing analysis, we 
predicted that the known associations between FWB and subjective well-
being could be explained, in part, by people’s perceived ability to have choice 
and to control their lives. In Study 2 we also assessed participants’ qualitative 
definitions of free will, to investigate whether they fit with previously reported 
lay conceptions of FWB (cf. Monroe and Malle, 2010). 
Aims 
1. Demonstrate that it is the element of perceived control, that forms the core 
of lay free will concepts, that underpins free will beliefs utility for predicting 
subjective wellbeing. 
Hypotheses for studies 2 and 3  
H1 Both free will beliefs and perceived personal control will predict 
indicators of subjective wellbeing.  
H2 When the predictive utility of free will belief and perceived personal 
control are tested simultaneously. Only perceived personal control will 
significantly predict indicators of subjective wellbeing.  
H3 Participants’ lay free will definitions will be consistent with the 
findings of Monroe and Malle (2010, 2014), centring around the ability to 
decide/choose, doing what one wants, and/or being free of constraints. 
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Study 2 
Method 
Participants 
Participants from the United States were recruited through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (N = 284). Demographic information was not collected (but 
see Levay et al., 2016, for information on the typical demographic 
composition of Mechanical Turk workers). Nineteen additional participants 
were excluded because of duplicate IP addresses (n = 6) or failing a basic 
attention check item (n = 13). A power analysis showed that our sample size 
had 80% power to detect “small-to-medium” effect sizes (f2 = 0.028; α = 0.05, 
two-tailed) in our multiple regression analysis. 
 
 
Procedure and Materials 
Participants were instructed that they would complete a survey about 
their beliefs and opinions. We measured participants’ belief in free will using a 
single-item, graphical slider scale (“Using the slider provided, please indicate 
the extent to which you believe in free will”). The scale ranged from 0 (no 
belief in free will) to 100 (absolute belief in free will), and the starting position 
of the slider was set to the mid-point of the scale. Similar measures have been 
shown to have good convergent (Schooler et al., 2014) and predictive 
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(e.g., Feldman et al., 2016) validity, and single-item free will measures have 
been shown to be sensitive to experimental manipulations of FWBs 
(MacKenzie et al., 2014; Nahmias et al., 2014; Monroe et al., 2017). 
Participants’ sense of personal control was gauged using a five-item 
measure (e.g., “Other people determine most of what I can and cannot do”; 
“There is little I can do to change many of the important things in my life”; “I 
can do just about anything I really set my mind to”; Chou et al., 2016, adapted 
from Lachman and Weaver, 1998). Participants indicated their level of 
agreement on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree). Higher scores indicate a greater sense of personal control. 
Participants’ perceived stress was measured using two items: “In the 
past year, how would you rate the amount of stress in your life (at home and 
at work)?” (1 = no stress to 6 = extreme stress; Littman et al., 2006) and “Stress 
means a situation in which a person feels tense, restless, nervous, or anxious 
or is unable to sleep at night because his/her mind is troubled all the time. Do 
you feel this kind of stress these days?” (1 = not at all to 6 = very much; Elo et 
al., 2003). Responses to the two items were highly correlated (r = 0.73, p < 
0.001) and therefore averaged to form a composite measure of perceived 
stress. 
Participants’ life satisfaction was measured using Diener et al. 
(1985) widely used Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS), which is comprised of 
five items (e.g., “In most ways my life is close to my ideal”; 1 = strongly 
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disagree to 7 = strongly agree). Alpha reliabilities for all measures with more 
than one item are shown in Table 1. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics, alpha reliabilities, and 
correlations among the measures. All of the measures correlated significantly 
in the expected directions. FWB positively correlated with sense of personal 
control, and both correlated positively with SWL and negatively with 
perceived stress. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations among measures in Study 2 
Measures  Mean    (SD) 1. 2.  3.    4. 
1. FWB 82.52    (19.57)    --    
2. Control 3.82      (.83) .426**    (.83)   
3. SWLS 4.20      (1.44) .254**    .510**    (.97)  
4. Stress 3.61      (1.25) -.145*   -.424**   -.409**  (.83) 
Note. SWLS= the Satisfaction With Life Scale.  When applicable, alpha 
reliabilities are presented in parentheses along the diagonal.  * p < .05 ** p < 
.01.  
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A series of regression analyses supported H1 and H2 in that, both sense of 
personal control, b = 0.88, β = 0.51, SE = 0.09, t(281) = 9.94, p < 0.001, sr2= 
0.51, and free will beliefs,  b = 0.02, β = 0.25, SE = 0.004, t(281) = 4.42, p < 
0.001, sr2= 0.25, predicted scores on the SWLS. However when both predictors 
were entered into the model simultaneously personal control, b = 0.85, β = 
0.49, SE = 0.10, t(281) = 8.65, p < 0.001, sr2= 0.44, but not FWB, b = 0.003, β = 
0.05, SE = 0.004, t(281) = 0.81, p = 0.42, sr2 = 0.04, uniquely predicted scores 
on the SWLS.  
Likewise H1 and H2 were supported in that, both sense of personal 
control, b = -.64, β = -0.42, SE = 0.08, t(281) = -7.86, p < 0.001, sr2= -0.42, and 
free will beliefs, b = -.01, β = -0.15, SE = 0.004, t(281) = -2.46, p < 0.05, sr2= -
0.15, predicted perceived stress. However when both predictors were entered 
into the model simultaneously, personal control, b = -0.67, β = -0.44, SE = 
0.09, t(281) = -7.42, p < 0.001, sr2 = -0.40, but not FWB, b = 0.003, β = 
0.04, SE= 0.004, t(281) = 0.73, p = 0.46, sr2 = 0.04, uniquely predicted 
perceived stress.  
These results suggest that the associations between FWB and SWL, and 
FWB and perceived stress are largely due to co-variation between FWB and a 
sense of personal control.  
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Study 3 
Method 
Participants 
The final sample of participants were 88 staff or students from the University 
of Essex (Mage = 24.18, SDage = 6.50; 77% female) who participated in 
exchange for a monetary reward ($1 for an initial session and $1 for every 
daily diary completed) and the chance to win gift cards. Two additional 
participants completed measures during an initial session but did not 
complete any of our focal daily measures. The final sample size was 
determined by how many participants we could recruit within our monetary 
budget and time constraints. 
Procedure and Measures 
Participants attended an initial laboratory session where they completed a 
variety of measures unrelated to the current project. Of relevance here, during 
this initial session participants were asked to respond to an open-ended 
question about their FWBs: “Please explain what you think it means to have 
free will” (Monroe and Malle, 2010). Responses to this question were coded 
by two raters using Monroe and Malle’s (2010) original coding scheme. We 
included this question to replicate Monroe and Malle’s (2010) findings 
surrounding what “free will” means to people. 
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At the end of the initial session, participants were informed that they 
would receive daily emails including a link to a 10-min survey. The daily 
surveys were emailed to participants every day for 14 days at 5:00 PM; they 
had until 3:00 AM to complete the daily surveys. Participants who failed to 
complete more than five daily surveys were removed from the study (i.e., no 
longer sent the email links), but all data from participants who completed at 
least one daily survey were retained for analysis. Along with several questions 
unrelated to the current research interests, participants completed the 
following daily measures: 
We measured participants’ daily FWB using a single-item, graphical 
slider scale (“Using the slider provided, please indicate the extent to which 
you believed you had free will today”). The scale ranged from 0 (no belief in 
free will today) to 100 (absolute belief in free will today). 
We measured participants’ sense that they controlled their actions and 
were free to choose that day using single-item, graphical slider scales (“Using 
the slider provided, please indicate the extent to which you believed you were 
in control of your actions today”; “…you were free to choose whatever you 
wanted to do today”). Scores could range from 0 (no control/no choice at all 
today) to 100 (complete control/complete choice today). Scores on these two 
daily measures were averaged to form a composite control/choice variable 
(within-person reliability = 0.54; see Nezlek, 2017). 
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As our focal criterion variables, we measured participants’ daily stress 
(“Today, I felt stressed”) and daily depression (“Today, I felt depressed”) using 
four-point scales (1 = not at all, 4 = very much). Depression is an element of 
the unpleasant affect component of subjective well-being (Diener et al., 1999). 
 
Results and Discussion 
Lay Definitions of Free Will 
We coded participants’ open-ended responses using Monroe and Malle’s 
(2010) coding scheme. Specifically, we coded the responses the question 
“Please explain what you think it means to have free will” in terms of whether 
participants noted: (a) making decision or choices, (b) doing what they want, 
and (c) acting without internal or external constraints.  
H3 was supported in that participants’ lay definitions of free will were 
consistent with the findings of Monroe and Malle (2010, 2014). Table 2 
demonstrates that the majority of participants’ definitions of free will referred 
to the ability to decide/choose, doing what one wants, and/or being free of 
constraints. During the coding and analysis it was also clear that none of our 
participants defined free will as reliant upon notions of indeterminism, 
magical causation or other qualities needed for the type of free will debated 
by philosophers (see Monroe and Malle, 2010; Baumeister and Monroe, 2014, 
for discussions). 
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Note. Definitions of coding categories were taken from Monroe and Malle (2010) 
 
Daily Stress and Depression 
Given the nested structure of the data (daily responses nested within 
participants), analyses were performed using multilevel modeling (Nezlek, 
2012). Analyses were performed using the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015) in 
R, with maximal but uncorrelated random effects (i.e., random slopes and 
intercepts by participants; including correlations among the random effects 
led to problems with convergence; Barr et al., 2013). All predictors were 
person-centred to control for between-person variance in the predictors. We 
did not model time (days) because we had no theoretical reason to expect 
time to influence daily changes in stress or depression across the 14-days. 
On average participants completed 10.74 (SD = 3.75) of the 14 daily 
surveys (range = 13; total daily surveys completed = 944). Table 3 shows 
Table 2.  Content coding of the folk definitions of free will. 
Coding category 
Percentage 
coder 
Agreement 
Kappa of 
Agreement 
Percentage of 
participants 
mentioning the 
category 
Ability to decide/choose 91%    .81   64%   
Doing what you want  84 %   .69   50%  
Acting without constraints 87%    .72   69%   
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descriptive statistics and the proportion of variance at the within- and 
between-person levels for each of the measures we employed. 
 
Table 3. Means, standard deviations, and proportion of variance in the 
predictors and outcome variables at the within- and between-person levels. 
      M             SD             
Measures         Between      Within 
Choice/Control 75.99 17.06 (60%) 13.84 (40%) 
FWB 75.49 20.75 (61%) 16.73 (39%) 
Stress   2.28   0.63 (38%)   0.79 (62%) 
Depression   1.82   0.64 (44%)   0.72 (56%) 
 
 
As expected, daily fluctuations in choice/control were significantly 
associated with daily fluctuations in participants’ FWB, b = 0.51, SE= 0.07 (95% 
Wald confidence interval [CI]: 0.38, 0.65; here, FWB was the outcome variable 
in the analysis). Table 4 demonstrates that H1 and H2 were supported in that, 
both daily FWBs and daily choice/control beliefs significantly predicted daily 
fluctuations in stress and depression when modeled alone. However, when 
daily FWBs and daily choice/control were modeled together to predict daily 
stress and depression, only daily choice/control emerged as a significant 
predictor. Put differently, at the within-person level, daily changes in FWBs did 
not account for significant variability in daily stress and depression over and 
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above the contributions of daily changes in choice/control. Figure 1 shows the 
means of FWB, choice/control, stress, and depression across the 14 days.  
 
Table 4. Linear mixed effects models predicting daily stress and daily 
depression from daily FWB and daily choice/control (alone and simultaneously). 
 Daily FWB Daily Choice/Control 
 b se Wald 95% CI b se Wald 95% CI 
Daily Stress       
FWB alone -0.007* 0.002 [-0.012, -0.002] -- -- -- 
Choice alone -- -- -- -0.010* 0.003 [-0.015, -0.004] 
FWB & Choice -0.002 0.002 [-0.006, 0.002] -0.009* 0.003 [-0.014, -0.003] 
Daily Depression       
FWB alone -0.008* .003 [-0.013, -0.003] -- -- -- 
Choice alone -- -- -- -0.011* 0.003 [-0.017, -0.007] 
FWB & Choice -0.002 -0.002 [-0.007, 0.002] -0.01* 0.003 [-0.016, -0.005] 
Note. FWB = Free will belief. * p < .05 (based on the Wald 95% confidence 
interval not containing zero). 
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Figure 1, Mean levels of the two main predictor variables (combined 
choice/control and free will beliefs) and the two criterion variables (stress and 
depression) across days. Stress and depression have been rescaled (from 1–4 
to 0–100) for illustration. 
 
These findings are consistent with our trait-level findings reported in Study 1: 
associations between participants’ subjective well-being (in this case, daily 
stress and depression) and FWBs appear to be due to the co-variation 
between FWB and beliefs about having control and being able to choose. 
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General discussion 
Across two studies we investigated the role of personal control and choice in 
the relationship between FWB and subjective well-being. Previous research 
has provided evidence for the predictive value of FWB on such outcomes 
(e.g., Crescioni et al., 2015). Here, we show that this association can be 
explained by perceived control/choice. Study 1 showed that trait-level belief 
in personal control significantly uniquely predicted SWL and stress, whereas 
FWB did not. Study 2 confirmed that within-person daily fluctuations in stress 
and depression are not significantly predicted by daily changes in FWB over 
and above the contribution of personal control/choice. 
Previous research has shown that the association between FWB and 
judgments of others’ morality/blame is due to perceived capacity for choice 
(Monroe et al., 2017). The current studies extend this by showing that like 
judgments of others’ behavior, the relationship between FWB and personal 
life outcomes, relevant to subjective well-being, is also due to co-variation 
with control/choice. Crescioni et al. (2015) showed that although both self-
efficacy and locus of control were correlated with FWB, they did not explain 
the association between FWB and life outcomes (meaning in life and SWL). 
We chose to focus on measures of control/choice that more closely reflected 
the nature of layperson conceptions of free will (Monroe & Malle, 2010). 
Unlike Monroe et al. (2017), who manipulated/measured choice using 
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vignettes, we used a self-report measure of the degree to which participants 
believed in the ability to control their behavior or have the capacity for choice. 
These measures effectively captured the key elements of the lay concepts of 
free will to the extent that they reduced the predictive utility of FWB on 
perceived stress and depression. 
Much recent research has investigated the role of FWBs in a number of 
life outcomes, as well as psychological well-being. Here, we provide evidence 
for the role of personal control/choice in explaining why FWB predicts stress 
and depression. For laypeople, belief in free will fundamentally means having 
the capacity to make choices and control one’s life (Monroe & Malle, 2010), 
and our Study 2 findings of participants’ definitions of free will confirm this. 
This perception of personal control appears to be protective of perceived 
stress and depression such that individuals with strong belief in the degree to 
which they control their lives may be less likely to negatively react to stressful 
life events. We also provide further evidence for the role of perceived control 
in stress and depression. This goes beyond previous research, by utilizing 
measures of control/choice that are closely aligned to high level beliefs in free 
will. Future research should investigate the relative power of these different 
aspects of choice in predicting stress and depression. 
Although we show that the predictive utility of FWB on personal life 
outcomes is abolished when controlling for personal choice, it remains 
possible that FWB does have unique predictive utility in other contexts. 
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Indeed, the modest correlation between FWB and personal control suggests 
that FWB and personal control are not precisely the same thing. Nonetheless, 
recent work (Monroe et al., 2017) shows that the relationship between FBW 
and morality is similarly explained by notions of personal control. As such 
future research should seek to determine which behaviors or outcomes might 
be predicted by FWB over and above personal control. 
Further research should also attempt to identify the direction of these 
relationships. For instance, much research on FWB assumes that belief or 
disbelief in free will drives life outcomes and personal well-being. However, 
while control beliefs influence how someone copes with a stressful event, this 
coping also feeds back into the individual’s sense of personal control 
(Anderson, 1977). As such, while belief in free will/choice may be protective of 
subjective well-being, stressful life events may also lead to a reduction in a 
sense of personal control. 
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Next step 
Study 1 (chapter 3) demonstrated initial validity for our better focused single 
item measures of free will and scientific determinism and added to the 
growing body of evidence suggesting that lay participants do not always see 
belief in free will and scientific determinism as incompatible, at least at non 
trivial effect sizes. We broadly replicated the finding of Monroe and Malle 
(2010; 2014), that lay free will concepts centre around choice capacity.   
Studies 2 and 3 (chapter4) revealed that the documented relationship 
between free will beliefs and indicators of subjective wellbeing (Li et al., 2017; 
Crescioni et al., 2015) are due to the covariation of free will beliefs and sense 
of personal choice/control.  
We reasoned that, as pro deterministic/anti free will messages can 
undermine free will beliefs (Vohs and Schooler, 2008), these manipulations 
may also impact perceived control and subsequently indicators of subjective 
wellbeing. Chapter 5 begins this work by exploring the impact of pro 
determinism/anti free will texts on perceived control. 
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Chapter 5 
Manipulations designed to undermine belief in free will, can also 
undermine perceived control. 
 
 
Abstract 
One of the most common ways to manipulate people’s belief in free will is to 
provide them with a written text, such as a passage from Francis Crick’s 
“Astonishing Hypothesis”, a text that uses a broad ranging deterministic 
argument as part of an attack on the idea that free will exists. Following on 
from the previous chapter, here we examined whether the Crick essay would 
influence measures of perceived control. Such a finding would suggest that, 
like the link between individual differences in free will belief and subjective 
wellbeing explored in the last chapter, any effect of manipulating free will 
using this text may act through sense of personal control. Studies 4 and 5 
demonstrated that although the full version of the Crick manipulation failed 
to manipulate participants’ sense of control in terms of personal mastery and 
freedom from constraints, a more focused version can impact participants’ 
perceived control relating to their capacity to make choices and decide on 
actions.     
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Introduction 
In Study 1 (chapter 3) we broadly replicated the finding of Monroe and Malle 
(2014), demonstrating that lay participants define free will as their ability to 
make choices that fulfil their desires, free from internal or external constraints 
(with an element of forethought). We conceptualize executing a choice to 
fulfill a desire, unconstrained by others, as an act of control.  
Free will beliefs predict indicators of subjective wellbeing with higher 
belief in free will predicting greater satisfaction with life (Li et al., 2017), and 
lower perceived stress (Crescioni et al., 2015). Studies 2 and 3 demonstrated 
that an individual’s sense of control covaries with, and better predicts these 2 
indicators of subjective wellbeing than free will beliefs. It is this element of 
perceived choice and control, inherent to understandings of free will that 
underpins the documented relationship between free will beliefs and 
indicators of subjective wellbeing.  
Free will beliefs can be manipulated via written texts that, dependent 
upon condition, either undermine, support or are neutral concerning the 
existence of free will. Vohs and Schooler (2008) successfully used an essay by 
the Nobel-prize-winning scientist Francis Crick (1996) to undermine 
participants’ belief in free will (relative to a control passage on consciousness). 
This manipulation has since been used successfully in multiple studies to 
undermine belief in free will or bolster belief in determinism (Lynn, Muhle-
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Karbe, Aarts & Brass, 2014; MacKenzie, Vohs & Baumeister, 2014; Rigoni, 
Kühn, Sartori & Brass, 2011; Rigoni, Wilquin, Brass & Burle, 2013; Vohs & 
Schooler, 2008).  
The overlap between belief in free will and perceived control (outlined 
in studies 2 and 3 in chapter 4) has implications for research that uses written 
texts (such as the Crick essay) to manipulate free will beliefs, cognitions 
(Rigoni et al., 2011), attitudes (MacKenzie et al., 2014) and behaviours (Vohs & 
Schooler, 2008).  
Typically a measure of free will or determinism (or both) is used to 
gauge the effectiveness of a free will manipulation (see Mele, 2014 for an 
overview of the literature). The implicit assumption being that the 
manipulation impacted the dependent measure by undermining the 
participants’ free will belief.  However if manipulations like the Crick essay also 
impact perceived control (as well as free will beliefs) then the impact of the 
anti free will manipulation on the dependent measure may operate exclusively 
via perceived control. The apparent association between the manipulation, the 
dependent measure and free will beliefs may merely be spurious.   
Although some researchers highlight that free will beliefs draw upon 
perceptions of control over one’s actions (Lynn et al,. 2014; Rigoni et al., 2011; 
2013) and life outcomes Crescioni eat al., 2016) a finding that the Crick essay 
can impact perceived control would invite a reinterpretation of the current 
literature and a re-examination of previous findings to ascertain the relative 
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contributions of perceived control and free will beliefs for those dependent 
measures. New avenues of research could explore the impact of deterministic 
texts on previously unexplored cognitions behaviours and life outcomes 
related to perceived control. More work would also need to be done to 
understand any unique role of free will beliefs, distinct from its covariation 
with perceived control (see Feldman, 2017 for an example). The first step in 
demonstrating that anti-free will manipulations impact cognitions, attitudes 
and behaviours via perceived control rather than free will beliefs, will be to 
demonstrate that the Crick essay can undermine participants’ perceptions of 
having control.  
Aims 
The aim of studies 4 and 5 was to establish whether reading the Crick essays, 
successfully used in previous research to manipulate belief in free will and 
behavior, can also impact participants’ sense of having control.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Study 4 
Hypothesis  
H1 participants exposed to a pro deterministic/anti free will/anti-religious 
essay will report lower levels of perceived control than participants exposed to 
an essay on consciousness.   
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Method 
Participants 
Participants were 173 U.S. residents (57% male Mage = 34.49, SDage = 11.17) 
who completed an online survey through MTurk. Thirty-three additional 
participants were excluded because of duplicate IP addresses (n = 6) or failing 
a basic attention check items (n = 27). A sensitivity power analysis showed 
that our sample size had 80% power to detect medium effect sizes (d = .42, α 
= 0.05, two-tailed). 
Procedure and Materials 
Participants completed the following measures in order. The first two 
measures listed below (manipulation) were presented in random order 
between participants: 
Manipulation. The Crick essay manipulation is typically used to 
modulate free will belief. Participants read one of two extracts from in The 
Astonishing Hypothesis a book written by Nobel-prize-winning scientist 
Frances Crick (1996). Participants in the deterministic condition read an essay 
that makes the claim that free will does not exist, while putting forward an 
explanation for human decision making based on neuro reductionist scientific 
theories and anti-religious arguments. Participants in the control condition 
read a passage that outlined the challenges of researching human 
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consciousness. This passage did not mention free will and had less neuro 
reductionist content. 
These materials have been shown to manipulate participants’ free will beliefs 
in a manner amenable to measurement via well validated measures of free will 
belief, such as the Fad-plus (Paulhus & Carey 2011) and have been utilised to 
both influence social behaviour (Vohs & Schooler 2008) and explore 
correlational relationships (Crescioni, Baumeister, Ainsworth, Ent & Lambert, 
2015).  
Control. To assess participants’ subjective sense of possessing control, 
we used the 5 item sense of personal control measure used by Chou and 
Parmer (2016) adapted from Lachman and Weaver (1998). This measure was 
comprised of 5 items targeting two distinct aspects of perceived control: one 
measure being people’s sense of personal mastery (2 items, e.g., “I can do just 
about anything I really set my mind to.”; “When I really want to do something, 
I usually find a way to succeed at it”); the other measure being people’s sense 
of being constrained in their intentions (3 items, e.g., “There is little I can do to 
change many of the important things in my life”; “Other people determine 
most of what I can and cannot do”).  Participants indicated their level of 
agreement on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree), with higher scores indicating a greater sense of control (3 items were 
reverse coded). Both higher scores on mastery and lower scores on perceived 
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constraints have been related to better health, greater life satisfaction and 
lower levels of depressive symptoms (Lachman & Weaver 1998). 
Demographics. Participants reported their gender and age. 
Task Engagement. Participants were asked to read four sentences and 
identify the one that summarised the content of the essay or passage that 
they read.  
Results 
Participants who read the neutral text (N=93) reported levels of control 
(M =3.75, SD =0.79) that did not differ significantly from participants (N=80) 
who read the deterministic text (M=3.73, SD = 0.84), t(171) = -.21, p =0.83. 
Study 3 showed that the Crick manipulation of people’s belief in free will and 
determinism did not result in changes to their perceived sense of having 
control.  
Discussion. 
The lack of significant mean differences between the conditions may have 
been due to the nature of the measure of control used. We used the personal 
control measure adapted by Chou and Parmer (2016) and created by 
Lachman and Weaver (1998). This instrument was initially designed to target 
two distinct aspects of perceived control: (1) Personal Mastery, an individuals’ 
sense of effectiveness in carrying out life goals; and (2) Constraints, their 
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sense of feeling constrained in their intentions. Such self-perceptions likely 
develop over long periods of time during interactions with others and are 
therefore potentially slow to change. Essentially this measure may tap more 
into trait perceived control. A more state based measure that targets 
perceptions of one’s immediate sense of control over choices, decisions and 
outcomes may be more vulnerable to short term manipulation via the Crick 
essay.  
Study 5 
In the last study reading the Crick essay failed to significantly impact control 
in the form of participants’ sense of having mastery and being free from 
constraints.   
The aim of this study 5 was to examine whether reading the Crick essays, can 
impact impacts participants’ sense of having a different form of control. 
Control, in this study being their capacity to make choices and decide on 
actions. In other words, the extent to which they feel that they are the true 
author of their actions.  This conceptualisation of control is closer to the 
understanding of free will undermined by the Crick essay. 
 
Method 
Participants 
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Participants were 115 U.S. residents (56% male; Mage = 37.14, SDage = 12.40) 
who completed an online survey through MTurk. Ten additional participants 
were excluded because of failing a basic attention check item. A sensitivity 
power analysis showed that our sample size had 80% power to detect 
medium effect sizes (f2 = 0.52, α = 0.05, two-tailed). 
 
Procedure and Materials 
Participants completed the following measures in order. The first two 
measures listed below (free will manipulation), were presented in random 
order between participants: 
Free will manipulation. Participants were presented with either a 
neutral passage about consciousness or a pro determinism, anti free will 
essay. These two passages were modified versions of the full stimuli used in 
Study 4 that had been shortened in order to increase participant engagement 
with the stimulus and focus the manipulation by removing references to 
religious notions of the soul and after life that only indirectly relate to notions 
of free will (see appendix 3). Both passages were preceded by a short 
biography of Francis Crick (Rigoni, Kühn, Sartori & Brass, 2011).  It has been 
argued that the inclusion of biographical information that emphasises the 
academic status of Frances Crick increases the impact of the stimuli on 
participants’ free will evaluations and moral behaviours (Schooler 2014). 
Before being presented with the passage, participants were advised that they 
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should carefully read it because they would be asked to provide a later 
summary of its subject.   
Control. In study 4 we used the measure of control from study 2 
(chapter 4). This measure had been used successfully to demonstrate that the 
documented relationship between free will beliefs and subjective wellbeing 
was due to free will beliefs covariation with sense of control. This measure of 
control (Lachman & Weaver, 1998; Chou et al., 2016) taps into participants’ 
perceptions of control in terms of their perceived mastery and freedom from 
constraints, perceptions central to the lay understanding of free will (Monroe 
& Malle, 2010; 2014). In Study 4 this measure of control did not prove 
susceptible to manipulation via the full Crick essay. 
For Study 5 then, we decided to utilise a measure of control more 
relevant to perceived decision making and control over actions. This 
conceptualisation of control is closer to the understanding of free will that is 
disputed by the Crick essay. Participants’ sense of having control was assessed 
using 3 questions. The first question (“To what extent do you believe that you 
are in control of your actions?”) and the third question (“To what extent do 
you believe that the decisions you make are determined by you?”) were 
created specifically for this research. The second question (“To what extent do 
you believe that you are free to choose whatever you want to do in your 
life?”) was adapted from Baumeister, Masicampo and DeWall  (2009) and has 
proven susceptible to manipulation from similar deterministic stimuli 
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Baumeister (2009). All three items loaded onto a single principal component 
(eigenvalue = 2.58, 86.08% of the variance accounted for) and the scale 
demonstrated acceptable internal consistency (α=.92). For each question 
participants indicated their level of agreement on a 9-point scale ranging 
from 1 (Not at all) to 9 (Entirely) with all other scale-points represented only 
numerically. Higher scores indicated a greater sense of control.   
Demographics. Participants reported their gender and age. 
Task Engagement. Participants were asked to read four sentences and 
identify the one that summarised the content of the essay or passage that 
they read.  
Results and Discussion 
Control item factor loadings and communalities are displayed in table 4. 
Participants who read the neutral text (N=56) reported greater levels of 
control (M =7.35, SD = 1.08) than participants (N=59) who read the 
deterministic text (M =6.60, SD = 1.74), t(98) = 2.80, p =.006, d =.53.  
Study 4 showed that a manipulation that undermined belief in free will 
while championing determinism resulted in participant’s reporting a reduced 
sense of having control over their actions and decisions.  
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Table 4. Scale Items, Principal Component Loadings, and Communalities for the 3-item control 
scale 
 
Scale items 
Component 
loading 
 
Communality 
1. To what extent do you believe that you are in control of 
your actions? 
2. To what extent do you believe that you are free to 
choose whatever you want to do in your life? 
3. To what extent do you believe that the decisions you 
make are determined by you? 
 
.942 
 
.919 
 
.923 
 
.886 
 
.845 
 
.851 
 
 
Discussion 
The studies in this chapter aimed to investigate whether participants’ sense of 
having control could be undermined by a text based manipulation (the Crick 
essay) that is typically used to undermine belief in free will. In study 4 the 
Crick manipulation failed to impact notions of control associated with 
people’s perceptions of having mastery and being free from constraints. Study 
5 established that a more focus version of the Crick manipulations can impact 
notions of control relevant to perceived decision making and control over 
actions. This conceptualisation of control is closer to the understanding of 
free will disputed by the Crick essay. The impact of the Crick  manipulation on 
free will beliefs, cognitions and attitudes has already been well established in 
88 
 
the literature (Lynn, Muhle-Karbe, Aarts & Brass, 2014; MacKenzie, Vohs & 
Baumeister, 2014; Rigoni, Kühn, Sartori & Brass, 2011; Rigoni, Wilquin, Brass & 
Burle, 2013; Vohs & Schooler, 2008). Studies 2 and 3 established that the 
relationship between free will beliefs and indicators of subjective wellbeing is 
in fact due to free will beliefs covariation with perceived control. It now seems 
plausible that the capacity of anti free will manipulations, to impact cognitions 
and attitudes, may also exploit fluctuations in perceived control rather than 
free will beliefs. To establish this, future research will need to demonstrate 
that the impact of anti free will manipulations, on the range of dependent 
measures so far tested, was indeed due to the mediating effect of perceived 
control rather than free will beliefs.  
In sketching out this future research it is also important to consider the 
limitations of the current study. Study 5 measured control in terms of 
participants’ perceptions of having the capacity to make choices and decide 
on actions. This conceptualisation of control was closer to the understanding 
of free will that is disputed by the Crick essay. This approach means that there 
is overlap between the language used in the manipulation and the language 
of the items used to measure control. This language overlap increased the 
likelihood that demand characteristics may have influenced participants‘ 
responses. However the overlap between the language of the Crick essay and 
the language of the measure of control used in study 5 does not appear to be 
greater than the overlap between the language of the Crick essay and the 
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language used in the multi item measures of free will used in the majority of 
free will research (see Paulhus & Carey, 2011; Rakos et al., 2008). Nevertheless 
these potential demand characteristics should be addressed. To that end we 
will attempt to design and test a better focused manipulation that can 
undermine perceptions of having free will without encouraging demand 
characteristics.  
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Next step 
In study 1 we confirmed past research demonstrating that perceptions of 
possessing choice/control and being free from constraints are at the heart of 
peoples’ free will beliefs (Monroe & Malle, 2010; 2014). In studies 2 and 3 we 
established that peoples’ sense of possessing choice and control underpins 
the relationship between free will beliefs and subjective wellbeing. As pro 
deterministic/anti free will messages can undermine free will beliefs we 
reasoned that these manipulations may also impact perceived control and 
subsequently indicators of subjective wellbeing.  Chapter 5 established that a 
modified (shortened) version of the Crick essay) impacted control beliefs 
relating to notions of having control over actions and decisions (study 5).  This 
modified version of the Crick manipulation was still quite broad and likely to 
prompt demand characteristics. We therefore set out to develop a more 
powerful, better focused yet implicit manipulation and compare its ability to 
undermine free will beliefs to that of the Crick essay. In chapter 6 we did not 
test the impact of our 2 manipulations on participants’ sense of possessing 
choice or control. Our reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, the impact of the 
(modified) Crick essay on perceived control was established in study 5. 
Secondly if our new TMS manipulation successfully undermines belief in free 
will in the current study it will be harnessed in a final study to impact socially 
relevant behaviour and life outcomes.  That final study will include a then 
validated TMS manipulation and have no need of a third (Crick) condition.  
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Chapter 6 
Study 6 
Creating a new manipulation of free will beliefs and testing its 
effectiveness against the paradigm standard text-based approach. 
 
Abstract 
The Crick essay manipulation is a written text used to undermine belief in free 
will and is one of the most commonly used manipulations in the free will 
literature. It was written as an essay and designed to be a multipronged attack 
on religious and mythical notions of the soul, free will and the afterlife and an 
endorsement of reductionist, scientific, deterministic accounts of human 
thought and decision making. The current research explored for the first time, 
how the Crick essay is actually understood by participants. In addition to this 
the capacity of the Crick essay to undermine free will beliefs were compared 
to a new manipulation that harnesses transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) 
to impact participants’ sense of being able to execute a volitional action 
(drinking form a bottle of water). Our findings demonstrated the unfocused 
and multi-faceted nature of the Crick essay and highlighted its potential to 
induce demand characteristics even when presented to the participants 
separately from the dependent measures. After controlling for pre 
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manipulation free will beliefs the TMS manipulation did not reduce post 
manipulation free will scores relative to controls. Nonetheless, a significant 
within condition reduction was observed between the pre manipulation and 
post manipulation scores in all three conditions. An examination of potential 
reasons for this, hinted at the possible utility for TMS (or other similarly 
intimidating procedures) to undermine free will beliefs if harnessed effectively. 
  
Introduction 
Presenting participants with deterministic texts that challenge their belief in 
free will can impact behaviour and attitudes (Vohs & Schooler, 2008; 
Baumeister, et al ., 2009; Alquist et al., 2013; Zhao et al.,, 2014). The two most 
widely used manipulations of free will beliefs were both introduced by Vohs 
and Schooler (2008). These are, 1) the anti free will essay from Francis Crick’s 
book ‘The astonishing hypothesis’ (Crick 1994) that is compared 
experimentally to a neutral passage on consciousness from the same book. 2) 
the set of 15 Velten (1968) style statements that either challenge free will, are 
pro free will or contain neutral statements. Both the Crick and Velten style 
manipulations are broad ranging simultaneously manipulating multiple 
concepts. It is currently unknown what exactly is being manipulated by the 
Crick essay. We will therefore explore what the Crick manipulation actually 
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means to lay participants in order to better understand which of the concepts 
manipulated is likely driving any observed effects. 
The lack of conceptual focus, along with replication issues (Giner-
Sorolla, Embley & Johnson, 2015) with the original study by Vohs & Schooler 
(2008) and difficulties with establishing a consistent effect (Schooler, 
Nadelhoffer, Nahmias & Vohs, 2014) led some researchers to construct new 
free will manipulations (Shariff, Greene,  Karremans, Luguri, Clark, Schooler & 
Vohs, 2014; Zhao et al., 2014; Monroe Brady & Malle 2017). All these 
examples use written texts and only partially reduce demand characteristics 
compared to the original Crick manipulation. We intend to manipulate free 
will believes in a manner that requires no direct mention of either free will 
beliefs or determinism.    
Free will beliefs are closely associated with perceptions of choice 
(Feldman, Baumeister & Wong, 2014) and relate to notions of possessing 
control (see studies 2 and 3 in chapter 4). Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation 
(TMS) is a technology that harnesses magnetic pulses to temporally (and 
harmlessly) interfere with the functioning of targeted brain regions. We will 
use TMS to impede participants motor functions while they attempt to 
execute a volitional action. Most ordinary people see free will as their capacity 
for making choices, that fulfils their desires, free from internal or external 
constraints Monroe and Malle (2010). Introducing an external source of 
control (via TMS) that constrains participants’ capacity to execute volitional 
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choices, should therefore undermine people’s sense of expressing and 
perhaps even possessing free will. 
Haggard and Clark (2003) used TMS to induce an involuntary motor 
action (finger movement) while participants were preparing to execute an 
intentional motor action (finger movement). By pre-empting participants’ 
volitional action via a similar, induced and unintentional action, Haggard and 
Clark (2003) undermined participants’ implicit sense of having causal 
ownership over that action (finger movement) and that actions outcome (an 
auditory tone). Our experiment followed from this work by targeting an 
explicit component of agentic action control. In other words, we sought to 
undermine participants’ conscious sense of being able to act freely towards a 
volitional goal. 
A particular strength of this manipulation is that we are directly 
influencing the expression of free will in the brain. Crucially the capacity for 
free will is seen, by laypersons, as largely a product of the physical brain. 
Monroe, Dillon and Malle (2014) asked participants to rate hypothetical 
agents’ capacities for qualities like free will and moral responsibility. The 
capacity for possessing free will was ascribed primarily to agents who were 
able to execute choices made via a physical human brain. For example, a 
human brain in a robot body was rated as possessing free will, as was a 
normal human being; by contrast, a human individual with a brain who was 
unable to use his thoughts to control his body was not rated as having free 
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will.  Participants were mostly ‘‘not sure” whether a thinking robot brain within 
a human body had free will. In another study, participants described the 
circumstances under which a person could lose their free will. Consistent with 
the lay-person’s definition of free will, 63% cited coercion as potentially taking 
away free will and 40% cited brain damage (Monroe & Malle, 2014). Of course 
laypersons also make appraisals of their own capacity for free will. It has been 
demonstrated that brain related illnesses like epilepsy (that compromise a 
person’s ability to execute volitional actions) can reduce sufferers’ belief in the 
idea that people have free will (Ent & Baumeister, 2014). Additionally, 
Shepherd (2012) demonstrated that free will ascriptions are linked to actions 
that are seen as caused by conscious choices. Indeed since Benjamin Libets’ 
pioneering work on the unconscious neural basis of volitional actions, 
scientifically based explanations for free will have linked it to conscious 
decision making and brain states (Libet, Wright & Gleason 1982; Libet, 
Gleason, Wright & Pearl, 1993).   
Taken together, research suggests that the physical brain, when 
described as an engine of choice, appears to have a central role in people’s 
understanding of what free will is, how it is created, executed and impaired. 
Concrete examples of free will interference, utilising neuroscientific methods 
and language (Nahmias, Coates & Kvaran, 2007) appear to offer a promising 
new way to manipulate participants’ perceptions of possessing and losing 
their free will.  
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In the current study, we compare the effect of our TMS manipulation 
(undermining participants’ ability to volitionally drink water) to the Crick essay 
in terms of the two manipulations relative ability to undermine belief in free 
will. While we cannot make any firm predictions as to which manipulation will 
influence free will beliefs more, we expect the TMS manipulation will prove 
less susceptible to demand characteristics than the paradigm standard, text-
based manipulation.  
To further reduce demand characteristics and to enhance the effect of 
the manipulation we will follow the advice of Schooler (2014) by presenting 
the IV stimuli and dependent measures to our participants as two separate 
pieces of research.  
Aims 
1 To test a more focused manipulation of free will beliefs and compare it to 
the Crick essay, the paradigm standard measure.  
2 To explore the paradigm standard Crick manipulation, its impact on free will 
beliefs and how it is understood by the participants who read it.  
Hypotheses 
1 Participants who have had TMS hinder a volitional action will report 
lower levels of perceived free will than participants in the neutral condition 
who have not undergone TMS.  
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2 Participants who have read the Crick essay will report lower levels of 
perceived free will than participants in the neutral condition. 
3 Participants who have undergone TMS will report different levels of 
perceived free will than participants who have read the Crick essay. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 102 UK residents (68% female Mage = 20.52, SDage = 3.65) 
recruited via the University of Essex participant pool. All participants who 
completed both parts of the research had their data included. An additional 
77 participants commenced the online pretest but did not progress to the lab 
session. Where participants repeated the pretest questionnaire (in order to 
change their timeslot), there first response was included in the data. A 
sensitivity power analysis showed that our sample size had 80% power to 
detect medium effect sizes for one way ANCOVA (f = 0.31; α = 0.05, two-
tailed); mixed ANOVA (f = 0. 29, α = 0.05, two-tailed); and t tests (dz = 0. 49, α 
= 0.05, two-tailed). 
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Procedure and Materials 
Online pretest and medication safety screening. Participants 
registered for the study by first providing informed consent to participate in 
(“a short social psychology questionnaire and a medical screening question 
for the TMS lab experiment.”). participants then completed the online pre-
test. This pretest was comprised of our standard questionnaire and a TMS 
medical screening question.  
For our standard questionnaire (administered during the online pre-
manipulation test and as a paper copy as the post-manipulation test) 
participants completed the following measures in order. 
Demographics. Participants were asked to provide their gender via tick 
boxes, their age via a slider and their ethnic background as written text. 
Belief in Free Will. We measured participants’ belief that they had free 
will (for the online pretest) using a single-item, graphical slider scale (“Using 
the slider: Please indicate the extent to which you believe that you have free 
will.”). The paper copy post-manipulation test question was identical to the 
pre-test, differing only in that the participants were invited to provide their 
level of agreement by placing a dash across the line. The scales ranged from 0 
(no belief in free will) to 100 (absolute belief in free will), and the starting 
position of the online slider was set to the mid-point of the scale. This 
measure has good convergent (see Study 1) and predictive validity (e.g., 
Feldman, 2016), and similar single-item scales have been shown to be 
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sensitive to experimental manipulations of free will beliefs (McKenzie, 2014) 
(also see studies 2 and 3).  
Opinions and beliefs. We sought to evade participant suspicion by 
embedding our variable of interest (free will beliefs) within a block of similar 
quasi-religious concepts. We did not intend to analyse these data. Participants 
were asked to rate their agreement to a series of questions (“I consider myself 
to be very religious.”, “The fact that we have souls that are distinct from our 
material bodies is what makes humans unique.”, “Human beings are an 
inherently spiritual race”). Participants indicated their level of agreement on a 
5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree to 5 strongly disagree). 
Participants (if willing) also provided us with their religious affiliation via a 
drop-down box (online pre-test) or by written text (paper copy post-test). 
TMS medication screening question. Participants were then asked to 
provide the name of any medications that they were currently taking or to 
indicate that they were not currently taking medication (“Are you taking any 
medications? Please list below or write NO MEDICATIONS”). No participants 
were excluded at this stage instead any medications that were not listed on 
the current TMS safety screening protocol were researched prior to the lab 
session. Participants were fully evaluated at the lab session and if deemed 
unsuitable for TMS were paid in full for their participation.  
Once the standard questionnaire and medication screening question 
had been completed participants registered online for the lab study.  
100 
 
Lab session 
Participants completed a second informed consent form and then undertook 
a full TMS medical screening. If eligible to participate they then moved to the 
testing stage.  
Testing stage. In the testing stage participants were randomly 
allocated into one of three conditions. Participants in the TMS condition 
received TMS designed to undermine their free will belief by interrupting their 
capacity to carry out a volitional task (drinking a glass of water).  
TMS and rTMS was delivered to the primary motor cortex (M1) via a 
figure of 8 coil. This targeted participants’ wilful control of their brachioradialis 
muscles and the various flexors and extensors that control the movement of 
the forearm, wrist and fingers. Participants were first asked which hand they 
typically use to drink with. Participants favoured hand was used in the 
experimental task with the TMS/rTMS stimulation applied to the contralateral 
M1 region.  
Single pulse TMS was used to establish a baseline active motor 
threshold and to pinpoint the correct site for stimulation in the experimental 
stage. The primary motor cortex (M1) is typically located two thirds of the way 
between the front of the ear and the longitudinal fissure). Stimulation begin 
with the output at 50% or 1 tesla (on a magstim® Rapid 2 machine) with the 
participant’s thumb and index finger lightly pressed together. Once the 
correct stimulation site was identified the active motor threshold was 
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established for each participant by reducing stimulator power in 5% steps 
until a motor response was evoked on approximately 50% of pulses.  
In the experimental stage the rTMS stimulator output began at 110% 
of the baseline threshold established for each participant and was raised to a 
maximum of 130% of baseline if necessary. On each stimulation participants 
received 1 burst of 9 pulses at a frequency of 10 Hz (giving a total duration of 
0.9 seconds). There was a minimum of 5 seconds between trials (in other 
words a 5 second inter train interval). These stimulation parameters lie within 
the recommended safe levels outlined by Rossi, et al. (2009) and Wassermann, 
(1998). This procedure was repeated until motor behaviour in the drinking 
task was suitably impeded with a maximum of 4 attempts (4 trains). Providing 
a maximum of 36 rTMS pulses in total.  
For the volitional task participants then drank a small amount of water from a 
soft, shatterproof plastic cup and were given a towel to protect them from 
getting wet from spillage. Participants were told that data from the procedure 
thus far would contribute to the re calibration of the machine, supposedly 
necessary for the next stage of rTMS. In reality no further rTMS took place and 
the pause in proceedings was used to justify the completion of the dependent 
measures (the standardised questionnaire). 
Participants in the neutral condition had an identical experience to 
those in the TMS condition (all instructions, screening and procedures) but, 
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before the TMS was due to start, were invited to fill in the standard 
questionnaire.  
Participants in the Crick condition had an identical experience to those 
in the TMS condition (all instructions, screening and procedures) but before 
the TMS was about to start they were invited to read the Crick essay (Crick 
1994) and to provide written responses to two questions (“What do you think 
was the main point of the essay?”, “What did you think of the writing style?”). 
they were then invited to fill in the standard questionnaire. 
In the Control and Crick conditions the initial delay in commencing with the 
TMS was justified by telling participants that time was needed to “calibrate 
and program the TMS Machine”. A similar justification was given in the TMS 
condition after the initial (and in reality only) TMS session. These delays were 
provided to justify the period in which the participants completed the 
dependent measures (outlined below).   
Dependent measures stage. Post manipulation, participants 
completed the post-test standard questionnaire (paper copy). While the TMS 
machine was supposedly being “calibrated” by the researcher. This bogus 
TMS calibration was displayed on a pc monitor next to the TMS machine. It 
took the form of a screen image similar in appearance to those on the TMS 
machine but with calibration equations and data input boxes. 
Participants were then invited to complete the standardised 
questionnaire (“There is still some time so would you please complete the 
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second half of David’s social psychology study, some of the questions may be 
different so please give it a fresh eye”). Participants were led to believe that 
the pre and post test questionnaire measures were for a different study 
conducted by a colleague called David who was keen to exploit the period of 
time left free during the lengthy TMS calibration.  
Post experimental interview. Participants were then probed for any 
suspicion of the relationship between the IV (Crick, TMS or Neutral) and DV 
(post manipulation free will scores) via a post experimental interview (please 
see appendix 4). The nature of the participants’ suspicions will also be 
included as they may identify the nature of the link between the IV and DV, 
perceived by the participants. In other words, these suspicions offer insight as 
to the nature of any demand characteristics that may drive findings from 
research utilising the Crick essays. All participants were then fully debriefed, 
paid and thanked.  
Content Coding of the Crick essay  
The primary author and an independent associate coded participants’ open-
ended responses to the questions regarding the point of the crick essay and 
its writing style. 8 categories emerged from the qualitative data after an initial 
read through of the first 15 responses. To be classed as ‘Pro Science’ 
participants must interpret the essay as championing science with phrases like 
“showing that science has the answers”.  When participants interpret the essay 
as arguing against or disproving religious beliefs or myths (e.g. “science has 
104 
 
disproven religious myths” or “that religion is wrong”) responses are coded as 
‘Anti Myth/religion’. Claims of the nonexistence of specific aspects of 
mythical/religious ideologies (e.g. ‘Souls’, ‘Afterlife’, ‘Free will’) were coded 
according to the term used, then sorted into the relevant column. ‘Anti Choice 
or Reductionist’ understandings of the essay view it as claiming that our 
choices are limited or controlled by our brains, genes, environment, DNA, or 
some other factor (e.g “we a do don’t choose as all our choices are made by 
our brains and neurons” ) these interpretations of the essay can either state 
that choices are constrained or just reduce human decision making down to 
biological neuronal processes. ‘Pro Free Will’ interpretations of the essay will 
state that the essay was arguing that free will exists.  
Finally, Interpretations of the essay that mention free will but do not claim 
that the essay was arguing in favour or against it, should be coded as ‘Free 
Will Neutral’ (see appendix 5 for coding instructions).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
105 
 
Results and Discussion 
Crick condition essay coding 
Category coding instructions are included in appendix 5 
 
Table I demonstrates that 23% of Participants reading the Crick essay viewed 
the essay’s principle focus as undermining free will, compared to 32% who 
saw the essay as a challenge to the idea of a soul. It is possible that 
participants who interpreted the essay as undermining the idea of the soul 
Table1. Content coding of participants understanding of the Crick essay. 
Coding category 
Percentage 
Coder 
Agreement 
Kappa of 
agreement 
Percentage of 
participants 
mentioning 
the category 
Pro Science 91 .77 20.6 
Anti Myth or Religion 94 .82 23.5 
Anti Soul 97 .93 32.4 
Anti Free will 88 .72 23.5 
Anti Afterlife 100 1 2.9 
Anti Choice or Reductionist 88 .74 32.4 
Pro Free Will 100 1 2.9 
Free will neutral 100 1 11.8 
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concluded from that that there must also be no free will. However, Monroe et 
al., (2014) demonstrated that hypothetical agents can be judged as 
possessing free will even in the absence of a soul. The notions of the soul and 
free will do not appear to be strongly related. What seems clear is that the 
Crick essay is not a focused manipulation of free will beliefs and a more 
focused manipulation should be developed.   
Suspicion and demand characteristics. The post experimental interview 
revealed that 11 (32%) of participants reading the Crick essay were suspicious 
overall with 6 (18. %) people thinking that the study was about free will, 4 
(12 %) thinking it was about the soul and 1 (3 %) concluding that the 
experiment was something to do with the essay.  This was despite the TMS 
session/Crick essay and dependent measures being presented as parts of 
(apparently) separate studies; although the act of probing may have 
encouraged suspicion. This finding supports the argument that demand 
characteristics may play a non-trivial role in findings where the Crick essay is 
used as a manipulation. 
We next checked for suspicion concerning the link between the 
manipulation and the dependent measure (post manipulation free will scores) 
for all three conditions. The post experimental interview revealed that for 
participants reading the Crick essay, 6 out of the 34 (17.6%) of participants 
successfully identified the link with free will Compared to 3 (8.8%) in the TMS 
condition and 2 (5.9%) in the control condition.  The TMS manipulation is less 
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prone to demand characteristics than the Crick essay even when the 
manipulation and dependent measures are presented to participants as two 
separate studies. To summarize, the Crick manipulation lacks focus and is 
laden with demand characteristics even when participants believe that the 
manipulation and dependent measures are separate studies (although this 
may not hold true when participants are not probed for suspicion). 
 
Main analysis 
Figure 1. Pre Manipulation, Post Manipulation and Adjusted free will scores 
with Error bars. Blue line represents the overall mean Pre Manipulation Free will 
(covariate).  
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While testing for the assumptions of ANCOVA we checked whether there 
were any significant differences between our 3 conditions pre-manipulation 
free will scores.  
A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant differences between the three 
conditions pre manipulation free will scores F(2,99)=1.76, p= .178 but there 
was a near significant difference between the TMS and Crick conditions 
t(66)=-1.83 p=.07  
We then conducted our main analysis, testing our three hypotheses by 
conducting a one way ANCOVA, with pre manipulation free will scores as a 
covariate. This revealed a significant main effect of condition on post 
manipulation free will beliefs, F(2,98 ) = 3.84,  p=.025, partial 
2 =.07. 
Planned contrasts revealed that, controlling for the covariate, 
participants in the Crick condition reported significantly lower belief in free 
will, following the manipulation, than participants in the Neutral condition. 
t(98) = -2.46, p=.01. By contrast, undergoing TMS did not result in 
significantly lower belief in free will compared to the Neutral condition t(98) = 
-0.08, p=.93, r =.008.   
A post hoc analysis was conducted with a Bonferroni adjustment made 
for the number of comparisons. There were no significant differences between 
the Crick and TMS conditions adjusted free will belief scores SE=3.66 p=.06. 
It appears then, that the main effect of condition (observed in the 
ANCOVA) was significant due chiefly to a post manipulation (adjusted mean) 
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difference between the TMS and Crick conditions. Hypothesis 2 was 
supported in that participants who read the Crick essay reported significantly 
lower levels of belief in free will than participants in the Neutral condition. 
Hypotheses 1 and 3 were not supported in that the TMS manipulation did not 
result in significantly lower free will belief, compared to the Neutral condition 
and free will beliefs did not differ significantly between the TMS and Crick 
conditions.  
Additional Analysis 
Figure 1 demonstrates that the post manipulation free will scores were lower 
than the pre manipulation scores for all three conditions including the control 
condition. We decided to investigate this within condition reduction in order 
better understand the TMS manipulations failure to significantly lower the 
adjusted post manipulation free will scores, compared to the neutral 
condition. 
We first conducted a mixed ANOVA on free will scores with time point 
(pre and post manipulation) as the repeated measures factor, and condition 
as the between subjects factor. This revealed a significant main effect of time 
point, F (1,99) = 32; p < .001), and a significant interaction between time point 
and condition, F (2,99) = 5.29; p < .001. We followed this up with t-tests for 
each condition, which revealed that participants in the TMS condition t(33) = 
3.06, p = .004, r = .47, the Control condition t(33) = 2.57, p = .015, r = .41, and 
the Crick condition. t(33) = 4.18, p < .001, r = .59, all reported significantly 
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reduced levels of post manipulation belief in free will, compared to their pre 
manipulation scores. For all conditions there was a statistically significant 
reduction in free will beliefs. The interaction appears to be driven by a greater 
increase in the reduction of free will beliefs in the Crick condition compared 
to the other two conditions.  
 
Discussion 
Our qualitative analysis found that the Crick manipulation lacks focus and may 
prompt demand characteristics. Regarding the quantitative data, the pre 
manipulation free will scores were not significantly different between the 
three groups. The ANCOVA revealed significantly lower free will scores for the 
Crick manipulation compared to the Neutral condition (when controlling for 
pre manipulation free will scores). Finally, exploratory t tests demonstrated 
statistically significant drops in free will belief between pre and post 
manipulation scores, for all three conditions.  
As such, although the ANCOVA revealed that only the Crick group 
showed significantly reduced free will in comparison to the control group, all 
three groups (including the control group) showed significant reductions in 
free will. What might have caused this reduction in free will? In the 
subsequent sections we discuss three possible explanations for this drop. 
Specifically we explore (i) the potential impact of group differences in free will 
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belief prior to the manipulation, (ii) the possibility that these drops reflect 
normal fluctuations in free will scores between the two sessions, and (iii) the 
possibility that the intimidating lab environment, and the prospect of TMS 
was enough to lead to a reduction in free will belief.     
Firstly, although there was no significant difference in free will beliefs 
between the different groups prior to the manipulation, we cannot rule out 
that the higher levels observed in the crick condition did not impact our 
findings. These somewhat higher pre manipulation scores in the Crick 
condition, would have left more room for potential reduction, either through 
genuine change, or through regression to the mean. Further research could 
investigate this possibility with a larger sample to reduce any potential group 
allocation bias.  
To explore the second possibility, namely whether the significant 
reductions observed for all three conditions, between pre and post 
manipulation free will scores were due to normal, daily fluctuations, or test re 
test effects, we looked back at our data from study 3. For the current study 
the average duration in days between participants’ online pre-test and their 
post manipulation lab test varied according to lab/participant availability 
(Mduration = 7.39, SDduration = 11.456). Study 3 (diary study) tested daily 
fluctuations in free will beliefs over a 2 week period using a similar single item 
graphical slider. Although free will beliefs fluctuated over time, t test analyses 
of all 7 possible one week test re test delay comparisons, demonstrated no 
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statistically significant differences (between days 1 and 8, days 2 and 9, days 3 
and 10 etcetera). As such, it is unlikely that either test re test effects or daily 
fluctuations could account for the significant reduction between pre and post 
manipulation free will beliefs, observed for all three conditions in the present 
study.  
Instead, perhaps simply being in an intimidating lab environment, 
surrounded by very imposing TMS equipment, feeling nervous and wishing to 
leave but feeling unable to (although note that participants were of course 
free to withdraw at any point), made participants feel constrained and less 
free. Evidence in support of this possibility comes from other studies where 
constraining or otherwise intimidating situations may have played a factor in 
undermining free will belief. For example, (Ent, 2013) evoked an involuntary 
eye blink responses from participants’ by directing puffs of air into their eyes 
with a bulb syringe. The researcher then triggered the pupillary reflexes of 
these participants by shining a penlight on the outside corner of each eye, 
then in between the eyes. These participants subsequently reported lower 
belief in free will than participants who simply executed a voluntary response 
by bouncing a ball between their dominant and non-dominant hands. This 
relationship was only observed for individuals low in trait reactance.  
Reactance (Brehm 1966; Miron & Brehm, 2006) is a person’s drive to resist 
perceived threats to their sense of being a free agent, able to behave as they 
choose. It could be that participants low in trait reactance (and therefore not 
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resistant to having their sense of freedom challenged) felt constrained and 
potentially intimidated in the involuntary eye blink condition. This may have 
driven their reduced perception of having free will relative to the voluntary 
response condition.   
Similarly, Laurene et al., (2011) reported lower endorsement of free will 
beliefs for incarcerated adolescents compared to non-incarcerated 
adolescents. These two studies combined with the knowledge that free will 
beliefs are essentially rooted in an individual’s sense of possessing choice and 
being free from constraints (Monroe & Malle, 2010; 2014; Study 1), suggest 
that placing participants in constraining, intimidating situations, where they 
feel that their choices are limited, may impact there sense of being free. This 
may reduce their endorsement of free will beliefs.     
 Returning to the present study, it is possible that the intimidating lab 
environment reduced participants’ sense of feeling in control and free. Such 
an effect may have been more pronounced in the Neutral and Crick 
conditions where participants completed their free will self-report dependent 
measures while still waiting (or so they believed) to undergo TMS, a 
potentially highly intimidating procedure. By contrast, in the TMS condition, 
the free will self-report was filled in after the first round of TMS and rTMS had 
been administered. Expressions of relief at discovering that the rTMS 
procedure was no big deal were observable on the faces of most participants 
as they sat and filled in there self-reported free will belief measure.  Many 
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participants stated that the procedure (TMS and rTMS) had been far less scary 
than they expected.  It seems plausible that the intimidating effect of awaiting 
TMS impacted participants to a greater extent in the Crick and Neutral 
condition than it did in the TMS condition. Further research could look to 
harness this type of setup against a more suitable control condition to 
confirm or discount these possible interpretations.  
Conclusions and suggestions for future research 
Of course, the only firm conclusion we can draw from the findings of the 
present study is that participants reading the Crick essay reported significantly 
lower belief in free will than Participants’ in the neutral condition (after 
controlling for pre manipulation free will scores), whereas participants 
undergoing the TMS manipulation failed to do so. It may simply be that the 
TMS manipulation was not successful at undermining participants’ belief in 
free will.  
Future studies should be mindful that placing participants in a stressful 
situation that makes them feel nervous and constrained may undermine their 
sense of having choice/control and possessing free will. This could be 
confounding in studies seeking to manipulate belief in free will. Future 
research could test for this potential effect and if established, should control 
for or perhaps exploit the impact of constraining participants’ perceived 
choices/control (via stress inducing situations), as a potential new 
manipulation of free will beliefs.  
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Our qualitative analysis of the Crick manipulation, confirmed that it lacks 
focus and potentially influences free will through demand characteristics. Here 
we attempted to develop a more focused, harder hitting manipulation to 
undermine free will beliefs without the demand characteristics inherent to the 
Crick essay. Future research could extend this by developing stress based 
manipulations that can be used online, facilitating both a test retest measure 
of free will beliefs and allow for a larger sample size to reduce group 
allocation bias, and increase the reliability of the effect sizes obtained.  
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Next step 
Study 1 confirmed that lay participants see free will as essentially their 
capacity to make unconstrained choices (Monroe & Malle, 2010; 2014, studys 
1 and 3). Studies 2 and 3 established that peoples’ sense of possessing choice 
and control underpins the documented relationship between free will beliefs 
and subjective wellbeing (Crescioni et al., 2015). As pro deterministic/anti free 
will messages can undermine free will beliefs, we reasoned that these 
manipulations may also impact perceived control and subsequently indicators 
of subjective wellbeing.  Chapter 5 established that a modified (shortened) 
version of the Crick essay could impact perceived control. This modified 
version was still broad and prone to demand characteristics. A new 
manipulation was needed. Study 6 demonstrated that although our TMS 
manipulation failed to undermine post manipulation free will beliefs (relative 
to the control condition) it did result in a significant drop between 
participants’ pre and post manipulation free will scores. In chapter 7 we aim to 
create a second new manipulation and see if it can modulate behaviour and 
undermine participants’ perceptions of being able to achieve life outcomes, 
by impacting their perceptions of having control.  
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Chapter 7   
Study 7 
Belief in hard determinism and its impact on perceptions of free will, 
control and self-efficacy and behaviour. 
 
Abstract 
Having confirmed that choice capacity is central to lay understandings of free 
will and establishing that perceived choice/control underpins the relationship 
between belief in free will and subjective well-being we wanted to see if anti-
free will manipulations could impact perceptions relevant to life outcomes, via 
perceived choice/control. In chapter 5 study 5 a modified version of the Crick 
essay successfully impacted perceptions of choice relevant to having control 
over one’s actions and decisions. In the current study we devised a new 
manipulator, consisting of a video showing a series of pictures and clips, with 
either a deterministic, or non-deterministic voice over. We aimed to see 
whether our new stimuli could impact perceptions of free will, self-efficacy 
and notions of control relative to both control over one’s decisions/actions 
and control over one’s life outcomes. This new manipulation successfully 
undermined belief in free will (despite never mentioning it) but failed to 
impact the other variables. An exploratory path analysis demonstrated that 
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when participants disagree with the deterministic video, they report higher 
levels of self-efficacy, indirectly via perceived control (demonstrating probable 
reactance effects). When they agree with the deterministic video, they report 
reduced self-efficacy via perceived control. We also offered participants an 
opportunity to cheat by falsely claiming to have heard of a fictional 
organisation in order to avoid completing a short written task. Surprisingly 
participants exposed to the non-deterministic lecture cheated more than 
participants exposed to the pro deterministic lecture. Theoretical explanations 
for these findings are then discussed and suggestions made for future 
research.  
 
Introduction 
Broadly speaking research into free will falls into three main areas. The first 
strand of research seeks to manipulate free will beliefs in order to impact 
socially relevant behaviour (Vohs & Schooler, 2008; Baumeister et al., 2009). 
The Vohs and Schooler (2008) results, whereby participants were induced to 
increase cheating behaviour through reading sentences or passages 
undermining free will, have often thwarted attempted replication (Giner-
Sorolla et al., 2015; Nadelhoffer, Shepard, Crone, Everett, Earp & Levy, 2019). 
Given the extensive use of text-based manipulations in previous research, the 
video manipulation created in the current study will follow some aspects of 
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these manipulators, while attempting to overcome some of their inherent 
problems (discussed in detail below).  
The second strand of free will research has proven more robust than 
the attempts to impact socially relevant behaviours by manipulating belief in 
free will. This second strand harnesses qualitative and correlation-based 
approaches in order to explore how people understand freely willed actions 
and the utility of free will beliefs to predict other psychological phenomena 
and life outcomes. For example, the ability to act freely has been linked to 
conscious decision making (Sheperd, 2012), and autobiographical narratives 
link free actions to moral behaviour, achieving goals, and high levels of 
conscious thought and deliberation (Stillman et al., 2011). Free will beliefs 
positively predict academic performance (Feldman et al., 2016) higher self-
reported life satisfaction, meaning in life and subjective happiness, self-
efficacy and reduced perceived life stress (Crescioni et al., 2015). Free will 
beliefs are linked to notions of moral accountability, predicting attitudes 
toward punishment (Rakos et al., 2008). Reading about others immoral 
behaviour has been shown to increase free will beliefs, mediated by the desire 
to punish. (Clark et al., 2014). Perceived choice plays a pivotal role as blame 
judgments appear to draw primarily from a belief that the agent had a choice, 
acted intentionally and was the sole cause of their actions, rather than a belief 
that the agent had free will (Monroe, Dillon & Malle, 2014). The relationships 
between free will, moral responsibility and life outcomes appears to draw 
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upon overlap between free will and perceptions of choice and control (see 
Monroe, Dillon & Malle, 2014: Monroe,  Brady, Malle 2016; and studies 2 and 
3 of chapter 4).  
The third strand debates the nature of free will and in doing so sets the 
requirements for its existence. Some scientists embrace a definition of free will 
drawn from philosophical debates. This definition sees free will as a property 
of the human soul or consciousness that is able to make choices immune to 
the causal influences of past events or the current processing of the biological 
brain. Because this version of free will appears to be at odds with scientific 
understandings many researchers have become skeptical of its existence 
(Cashmore, 2010; Greene & Cohen, 2004). Some, like Harris (2012), have 
become almost evangelical about spreading an anti-free will gospel to packed 
theatres full of enthusiastic disbelievers (Harris 2013). This understanding of 
free will, drawn from the philosophical tradition, runs contrary to the 
definition employed by the vast majority of laypersons who view free will as 
simply their capacity for choice that fulfils their desires, free from internal or 
external constraints. (Monroe & Malle, 2010; Monroe, Dillon & Malle, 2014) 
also see study 1 (chapter 3) and study 3 (chapter 4). These two competing 
definitions have led to considerable confusion in the current research when 
free will, as operationalised by scientists in the form of broad ranging 
manipulations and multiple item measures (see chapter 2), are contrasted with 
the understandings of participants, who simply see free will as their capacity 
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to make unconstrained choices (Monroe & Malle, 2010). This complexity has 
been greatly exacerbated by many researchers’ assumption that lay 
participants see free will and determinism as incompatible (see chapter 2 and 
chapter 3 study 1). These issues have added to the general challenges 
inherent to research of this type. These challenges warrant addressing.  
Key issues to address 
The current research aims to address two key theoretical and methodological 
issues that we feel have been largely overlooked in the current literature. 
These involve demand characteristics and the multifaceted nature of 
manipulations.  
Demand characteristics. Much of the research in this area harnesses 
the Crick essay to undermine belief in free will (Crick, 1994).  By explicitly 
stating that free will does not exist the Crick essay alerts participants to the 
intentions of the manipulation, introducing the potential for a complex 
interchange between demand characteristics and manipulation effects.  The 
current study will not employ any mention of free will and will seek to 
minimise any overlap between the language used in the manipulations and 
the language used in the dependent measures.  
Multi-faceted manipulations. The Crick essay also contains attacks on 
the idea of religion and notions of the soul and afterlife; notions tangential 
but not essential to understandings of free will and determinism.  Anti-
religious claims might impact participants differently than claims about pure 
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determinism, thus introducing a second manipulator. Anti-religious claims 
should therefore be excluded. Similarly, Crick’s use of high concept ideas 
explained with low frequency language should be replaced with a more down 
to earth style, aimed at maximising understanding and minimising 
intimidation. The key elements to include are those fundamental to the 
deterministic accounts espoused by most modern commentators, as this will 
provide ecological validity and mirror people’s real experiences of exposure to 
and engagement with, deterministic thinking. The current study will attempt 
to create a new more focused manipulation that, in tandem with our 
experimental design, minimises demand characteristics. 
Building a better manipulation of determinism. When building our 
new manipulation of deterministic (and perhaps free will) beliefs, we decided 
to revaluate the process from the ground up with an eye to the strengths and 
weaknesses of the current manipulations. It was felt that a video with a voice-
over would be the most engaging and accessible medium to communicate 
interesting yet oftentimes intimidating deterministic arguments.   
Study 1 measured cheating by inviting participants to provide 
marketing feedback to a fictional organisation or be dishonest by claiming to 
have already heard of them. Although there were issues with the design of the 
experiment that made an analysis of cheating inappropriate, it still yielded 
valuable cheating data.  
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Of the 61 participants for whom we received response data, 18 (29.5%) 
cheated. 34 (55.7%) did not cheat and 9 (14.8%) gave non appropriate 
answers that could not be coded as cheating or non cheating. There were no 
signs of participant suspicion. With a baseline cheating rate of approximately 
30% this appears to be a practical and subtle method of measuring 
participants’ tendencies to cheat by being dishonest.  
Also as part of study 1, we validated our two new single item slider 
measures of free will and scientific determinism by comparing them to the 
already well validated free will and scientific determinism subscales of the 
FAD-Plus (Paulhus & Carey, 2011). These comparisons provided evidence that 
our single item slider measures were targeting their desired constructs. 
Participants did not see free will and determinism as incompatible when 
responding to our single item measures, but a modest relationship was 
observed between our single item measure of lay free will and scientific 
determinism -.236 (p=.02) as measured by the FAD-Pluss.   
As discussed extensively in chapter 2 the assumption of lay incompatibility 
permeates much of the current research and assumes that a change in one 
variable (perhaps free will) reliably equates to an equal and opposite change 
in the other (scientific determinism). As discussed above, the Crick Essay, an 
often used free will manipulation, appears to touch on free will and 
determinism, as well as religion. Here we aim to overcome this by focusing on 
only determinism. By deliberately targeting and promoting only belief in 
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determinism and recording the impact on free will beliefs we will be able to 
measure the extent to which participants see hard determinism and lay 
concepts of free will as incompatible. This approach will reduce the likelihood 
for potential demand characteristics that occurs when manipulations state 
that free will does not exist and then askes participants about the existence of 
free will, as a dependent measure.  
In studies 4 and 5 we assessed the extent to which the Crick essay can 
be used to manipulate different measures of control. In Study 4, this 
manipulation failed to influence our measure of Mastery and Constraints 
(Chou and Parmer, 2016); a measure of control that draws upon participants’ 
sense of being able to achieve goals while being free from constraints. In 
contrast, study 5 showed Author of Actions; a measure of control that likely 
probes participants’ sense of having control over their actions, decisions and 
life choices, was undermined by reading the Crick essay.  For the current study 
we will endeavor to build a pro determinism manipulator that can impact, free 
will, both forms of control and influence an indicator of participants 
perceptions of being able to achieve important life outcomes. One possible 
candidate would be participants perception of self-efficacy (Bandura 1977)  
Self-efficacy. Perceived self-efficacy is concerned with judgments of 
how well one can execute courses of action required to deal with prospective 
situations (Bandura 1982). It involves “beliefs in one’s capabilities to mobilize 
the motivation, cognitive resources, and courses of action needed to meet 
125 
 
given situational demands” (Wood & Bandura, 1989, p. 408). Factors such as 
levels of perseverance with a difficult task, levels of effort invested, and even 
weather challenges are undertaken, can all depend on the individual’s 
perceptions of personal self-efficacy for that particular task. The notion of 
General self-efficacy is more trait like, describing an individual’s perceptions of 
themselves as able to bring about positive outcomes across a variety of often 
work based domains (Judge, Erez & Bono, 1998; Chen, Gully & Eden, 2001),  
Self-efficacy is an ideal dependent measure with real-world utility for 
predicting positive health outcomes (Conner & Sparks, 2005) and educational 
attainment (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara & Pastorelli, 1996). Crucially self-
efficacy also has a lack of conceptual overlap with determinism. That is to say 
determinism, when understood properly, lacks any implications for self-
efficacy, as an individual’s capacity to achieve goals is not increased or 
decreased according to a deterministic account; it is simply set. According to 
determinism the universe will unfold in a predetermined fashion, with the 
individual predetermined to succeed or fail at a given task. The effort they 
make and the talents they have are predetermined to be either adequate or 
inadequate in terms of achieving that task.  Determinism does not add or 
detract from the individuals’ ability to achieve goals. A failure to fully 
understand this is required for participants to view determinism as 
blocking/limiting their capacity to execute choices and influence life 
outcomes. Educational level may moderate the impact of the manipulation on 
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the dependent measures, with better educated participants potentially more 
able to comprehend determinisms lack of real implications. Alternatively, 
better educated individuals may better understand the deterministic 
argument, increasing the impact of the manipulation. We therefor make no 
prediction for the direction of this effect. The lack of true conceptual overlap 
between determinism and self-efficacy facilitates the use of a multi item 
measure of self-efficacy, whose wording has no obvious overlap with the 
language used in the deterministic manipulation itself. This should minimize 
demand characteristics.  
Chapter 4 demonstrated across two studies that the capacity for free 
will beliefs to predict life outcomes is due to free will beliefs being primarily 
based on perceptions of having choice and control. Study 2 demonstrated 
that when entered simultaneously into a multiple regression, sense of 
personal control (mastery and constraints) better predicted satisfaction with 
life and perceived stress than free will beliefs, and emerged as the only 
significant predictor. In the daily diary study (study 3) sense of personal choice 
and control (slider measures), better predicted daily stress and daily 
depression than Free will beliefs. The rational for these 2 studies was based on 
findings of Monroe et al. (2017) who demonstrated that perceived choice 
capacity not free will beliefs underpinned ascriptions of moral responsibility 
for a hypothetical agent who committed an immoral act.  
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For the current study we therefore predict that both forms of personal 
control (see studies 4 and 5) will better mediate the impact of experimental 
condition on self-efficacy than our measure of free will beliefs.  But what form 
should an enhanced deterministic manipulation take? What can we draw from 
the Crick essays? What should we discard and what should we add to build a 
deterministic manipulation that encapsulates the contemporary 
understanding of determinism and could influence perceptions key to 
personal achievement in the real world? 
Study 6 explored the relative utility of the Crick essay to undermine 
belief in free will compared to a new TMS manipulation. Participants also 
provided information on their understanding of what the main message of 
the Crick essay was. 32.4% responded in a manner that sees the Crick essay as 
arguing that our choices are limited or controlled by our brains, genes, 
environment, DNA, or some other factor, 32.4% viewed Crick as a challenge to 
the idea of a soul and 23.5% viewed it as primarily an attempt to undermine 
free will. Importantly the Crick essay manipulation incorporates both anti free 
will and pro determinism elements. The video lecture on determinism that we 
created specifically for this current study, is pro determinism and does not 
include any statements denying the existence of free will. It is a pro 
determinism manipulation not an anti free will manipulation.  
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The video lecture includes the following elements from the Crick essay and 
modern accounts of determinism. 
• A Mechanical cause and effect model of the universe from the big 
bang until now.  
• Reductionism of all thoughts and feelings to brain processing.  
• Brain self/consciousness dualism. 
• Brain chooses then generates you (your conscious self), a causal order 
argument. 
• Brain scans can predict our choices before we know them. 
• Brain decisions can be controlled by scientists without participant 
awareness. 
• Conscious choice is an illusion. 
• Your future is set and predetermined; you cannot change it. 
The video lecture on determinism will exclude the following potential 
confounds inherent in the Crick (1994) essay. 
• Low frequency intimidating language. 
• Claims of no afterlife. 
• Religion is wrong and for the uneducated. 
• Souls do not exist. 
• We are pro science and anti-myth. 
• Any direct references of free will that promote demand characteristics 
and prevent testing for participant Incompatibilism. 
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Determinism condition 
The final script will focus on the key conceptual elements of the Crick essay 
for modulating determinism (see appendix 6). The script will be narrated over 
a series of visual images by a reader that is not observable on the video. The 
script described the participants’ feelings, thoughts and choices as merely 
products of cause and effect processes that started at the big bang and 
progressed inexorably until now. It explains that ultimately all our decisions 
and future life outcomes are fixed and inevitable. We, as in our consciousness, 
do not actually make decisions. Rather our brain (described in terms of an 
external causal agent) makes all of our decisions for us and then imposes 
them on us. Brains are solely the product of the predetermined interactions of 
physical atoms meaning that the decisions they make are also predetermined. 
The brains decisions can be predicted and even influenced by modern 
science.  
Mindful of Schooler’s (2014) attempt to ensure that participants were 
aware of the eminence of the scientists quoted, we referenced the work of the 
same eminent scientists in both conditions. Including a reference to Albert 
Einstein a scientist whose stature is universally recognised. 
Neutral/non-deterministic condition.  
The control condition presents a non-deterministic account. It used the same 
visual feed as the determinism video but had a different narrated content. The 
non-deterministic script (appendix 6) describes the achievements of modern 
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science in crafting theories that unravel the mysteries of the universe and the 
human brain. It goes on to outline the hard problem of human consciousness, 
wondering if science will solve it. It is scientific, explaining how science is 
steadily adding to our knowledge of how the brain came to be but does not 
champion hard determinism in relation to consciousness. Table 0 shows the 
main elements of the deterministic video lecture and how the non-
deterministic consciousness video lecture differs. 
 
Table 0. The contrasting themes covered in the deterministic and consciousness 
videos. 
Determinism Consciousness 
Mechanical causation from 
the big bang until now, 
including all mental 
processing and conscious 
thought in the past present 
and future. 
Mechanical causation is explained for 
physical objects only. Deterministic 
causation is not applied to mental 
processes related to consciousness. The 
hard problem of consciousness is explained 
as a challenge that science aims to tackle, 
but may never solve.  
Reductionism of all human 
experiences, thoughts and 
feelings to brain processing.    
Explains brain processing’s relevance to 
memory and decision making but not all 
human experience. Brain processing 
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contributes to consciousness, but a 
mystery remains.  
Brain self/consciousness 
dualism.  We are our 
consciousness but are brains 
are separate and in charge.  
We have conscious awareness; we are not a 
separate consciousness. 
The brain chooses and only 
then generates consciousness 
in a causal, temporal 
hierarchy. 
Our brains contribute to consciousness but 
no causal order between brain and self is 
implied. There is no delay between brain 
processing and experience.  
Brain scans can predict 
choices. 
Neutral: not covered 
Brain decisions can be 
controlled without participant 
awareness. 
Neutral: not covered  
Conscious choice is an 
illusion. 
Neutral:  
Your future is set and 
predetermined.      
Neutral: not covered 
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Aims 
This current study has 3 main aims. 1) To construct an enhanced manipulation 
of belief in determinism that addresses some of the theoretical and practical 
limitations of the stimuli typically used. 2) To see if that manipulation can 
undermine people’s perceptions of having free will control and self-efficacy 
and potentially even encourage cheating. 3) To establish that an individual’s 
sense of perceived control better mediates the impact of determinism on 
perceived self-efficacy than their free will beliefs. In carrying out these aims 
we will attempt to address several key issues currently limiting work in this 
field and draw on the findings from studies 1-6.  
Hypotheses  
H1 Participants exposed to a deterministic argument will report lower 
perceived self-efficacy than participants watching the consciousness video. 
H2 Participants exposed to a deterministic argument will report lower belief in 
free will than participants watching the consciousness video.  
H3 Participants exposed to a deterministic argument will report lower belief in 
Control (Mastery and Constraints) than participants watching the 
consciousness video.  
H4 Participants exposed to a deterministic argument will report lower 
perceived Control (Author of Actions) than participants watching the 
consciousness video.  
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H5 The measures of Control (Mastery/Constraints and Author of Actions) will 
better mediate the relationship between experimental condition and 
perceived self-efficacy than free will beliefs.  
H6 a) The relationship between experimental condition and each of the 4 
outcome variables (as tested in hypotheses 1-4) will be moderated by 
participants’ Agreements with the lecture, with relatively high agreement 
predicting lower levels of all 4 criterion variables for participants in the 
deterministic condition. 
H6 b) The relationship between experimental condition and each of the 4 
outcome variables (as tested in hypotheses 1-4) will be moderated by 
participants’ educational level (2 tailed). This hypothesis is bidirectional as It is 
not known whether participants with a relatively high education will be more 
likely to accept the deterministic message or feel more confident to reject it.  
H7 Participants exposed to a deterministic argument will cheat as often as 
those in a control condition. 
H8 If (contrary to the prediction of hypothesis 7) participants in the 
determinism condition cheat at a higher level than participants in the control 
condition, perceptions of control will better mediate the relationship between 
experimental condition and cheating than free will beliefs. 
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Method 
Participants  
Participants were 213 U.S. residents recruited through the MTurk web service 
(55% male; Mage = 40.31, SDage = 11.08). 154 additional participants were 
excluded because of duplicate IP addresses (n = 9), failing basic attention 
check items (n = 4), failing to watch the entire video (n=32), failing to 
complete at least 90% of the questionnaire (n=30). Failing to answer the task 
engagement question correctly by identifying the general argument 
presented in the video (n=45), participated in the research on a device with a 
screen smaller than 10-inch (n=34). A sensitivity power analysis showed that 
our sample size had 80% power to detect “small to medium” effect sizes for 
independent samples t-tests (d = 0. 38, α = 0.05, two-tailed); moderation 
analysis (f2 = 0.04, α = 0.05, two-tailed); and Binary logistic regressions (w = 
0.19, α = 0.05, two-tailed). 
Procedure and Materials 
Participants completed the following measures in order. The first two 
measures listed below (determinism/free will manipulation) participants were 
randomly assigned into one of the two experimental conditions: 
Determinism/free will manipulation. Participants were presented 
with either a neutral non-deterministic, voice-over video lecture about 
scientific progress into understanding consciousness or a deterministic video 
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lecture championing the idea that everything, including our choices and 
thoughts are all pre-determined.  
The deterministic video was designed to include the following pro 
determinism elements (inherent in the original Crick Manipulation): Neuro 
reductionist arguments that reduce all human thoughts, choices and feelings 
down to processing in the brain. Arguments that suggest that our choices are 
predetermined by our brain. Arguments that promote a dualistic relationship 
between us (our consciousness) and the brain. Claims that unconscious 
processes make our decisions for us. We decided to exclude any potentially 
confounding elements of the Crick essay such as arguments that seek to 
undermine religious notions of the afterlife, the soul and any direct mention 
of free will.  
The following elements will be included as they are inherent to many 
accounts of determinism (see Harris 2013 for an example of some of them). 
Our choices are predetermined by mechanical causation from the big bang 
until now. Brain self/consciousness dualism suggesting that we are our 
consciousness, our brain is external to the self and exerts control over us. Our 
Brain’s decisions can be controlled without our awareness. Statements that 
conscious choice is an illusion. Arguments that our future is set and fixed.      
 It has been argued that the inclusion of biographical information that 
emphasises the academic status of Frances Crick increased the impact of the 
stimuli on participants’ free will evaluations and moral behaviours (Schooler 
136 
 
2014). We therefore make reference to the eminent scientists whose research 
we cover in our video lectures and included references to Albert Einstein in 
both videos, a scientist whose eminence is well known. 
The non-deterministic control condition will echo the topic of the 
paradigm standard Crick text (Vohs & Schooler 2008) by addressing the 
challenges inherent to the study of consciousness. The control condition will 
use exactly the same video as the deterministic condition (apart from the 
caption by Albert Einstein espousing his engagement with the subject matter) 
but will have a different narrated script. 
The consciousness video outlines scientists’ ability to investigate our universe 
and highlights some successes, before explaining the challenges of 
addressing the hard problem of consciousness. It avoids agreeing with or 
disputing any of the deterministic conclusions made in the pro determinism 
video remaining neutral on the subject by suggesting that the hard problem 
of consciousness may not be solved.    
Both videos are matched for length and sound quality and utilise 
identical visual tracks with the exception of a caption referring to Albert 
Einstein’s positive endorsement of the subject matter that differs by condition. 
Before being presented with the passage, participants were advised that they 
should listen carefully to the lecture because they would be asked to provide 
a later summary of its subject.   
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Links to the video lectures are below. 
Deterministic video = https://youtu.be/T1zomfUuFyY   
Non deterministic, consciousness video = https://youtu.be/1Gjp5NjSPS4 
Participants then completed the following measures in order, starting with the 
three measures likely to represent the Lowest demand characteristics:  
 Self Efficacy. Participants’ sense of confidence in being able to 
achieve lifegoals was assessed using the New General Self-Efficacy Scale 
(Chen, Gully & Eden, 2001) The NGSE is comprised of 8 items designed to 
measure non-specific aspects of life satisfaction (e.g.,“ In general, I think that I 
can obtain outcomes that are important to me”; “I believe I can succeed at 
most any endeavour to which I set my mind”). This scale represents a single 
factor. Is highly related to yet distinct from self-esteem measuring a construct 
related to motivational factors across work contexts. The NGSE has high 
Content validity with 97% of items sorted as representing general self-efficacy 
in a validation study and superior predictive validity to some similar 
instruments.  Importantly the individual items in this scale do not use wording 
that echoes any of the assertions put forward in either video. This was 
intended to reduce potential demand characteristics.    
Belief in Free Will. We measured participants’ belief that they had free 
will using the same single-item, graphical slider scale used in study 6 (“Using 
the slider: Please indicate the extent to which you believe that you have free 
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will.”). The scales ranged from 0 (No belief in free will) to 100 (Absolute belief 
in free will), and the starting position of the online slider was set to the mid-
point of the scale. This measure has good convergent (see Study 1) and 
predictive validity (e.g., Feldman, 2016), and similar single-item scales have 
been shown to be sensitive to experimental manipulations of free will beliefs 
(McKenzie, 2014).  
Control (Mastery and Constraints). Participant’s sense of having 
control in the form of personal mastery and freedom from constraints was 
measured using the same items as study 3. On this occasion participants 
indicated their level of agreement on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (Strongly 
disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree) with higher scores indicating a greater sense of 
control (3 items were reverse coded). This 1-5 scaling echoes Lachman and 
Weaver (1998) original use of the unmodified the scale and offers more 
reliable/consistent presentation during online research. 
Control (Author of Actions). Participants sense of being the true 
author of their actions and possessing control over their decisions was 
identical to study 4 with the only change made, a reduction of the number of 
scale points. This was done to ensure a better quality of presentation to 
participants testing online. For each question participants indicated their level 
of agreement on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Entirely) with 
all other scale-points represented only numerically. Higher scores indicated a 
greater sense of control.   
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Demographics. Participants were asked to report their gender and 
age.  
Educational level. Participants were asked to report their educational 
level via an 11-item multiple choice question.  
Task Engagement. To ensure that the video had been watched and 
comprehended, participants were asked to read four sentences and identify 
the one that summarised the content of their video.  
Agreement with argument (Moderator): To tap into participants pre-
existing beliefs and potentially identify resistance to the manipulation. 
Participant’s reported their level of agreement with the video via a single-
item, graphical slider scale (“Using the slider: Please indicate the extent to 
which you agree with the argument presented in the video”). The scale ranged 
from 0 (Completely Disagree) to 100 (Completely Agree) and the starting 
position of the online slider was set to the mid-point of the scale. 
Cheating opportunity. Participants were then given an opportunity to 
cheat by making a demonstrably false claim. This was an identical cheating 
task to study 1 except the name of the fictional institution was made even 
more obscure. The task instructions read “This research has been sponsored 
by the Moamrasilia Trust. If you had not previously heard of the Moamrasilia 
Trust please give us 2 or 3 sentences describing how you feel we might better 
share our research findings with members of the public like you. OR If you 
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had previously heard of the Moamrasilia Trust please just simply write the 
words 'I had heard' in the box below”. 
The name Moamrasilia Trust was fictional (no similarly named 
organisation appeared on internet searches). Participants who responded 
“have heard” were therefore coded as cheating.  
Outliers and exclusions: Participants will be excluded if they fail to 
meet one of the following: 1 Failing to correctly answer the attention check 
questions in the Likert measures. 2 Failing to watch the whole of the video (as 
indicated by the Qualtrics timing questions). 3 Failing to complete at least 
90% of the questionnaire. 4 Failing to answer the task engagement question 
correctly by identifying the general argument presented in the video. 5 
Suspected repeated participation in the experiment (as indicated by repeated 
IP addresses). 6 failure to participate in the research on a required device (“a 
Full PC or full Mac with a 10-inch screen or larger, no phones please”). 
Planned analysis 
In step 1, assuming the assumptions are met, a series of independent samples 
t-tests will compare the effects of experimental condition on participants’ self-
reported Self-efficacy (H1), Free will beliefs (H2), Control (Mastery and 
Constraints) (H3) and Control (Author of Actions) (H4).  
Step 2 will test H5. Path analysis will be used to confirm that perceived 
Control (both measures) better mediates the effect of condition on Self-
efficacy than Free will beliefs.  
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Step 3 will test H6 (a,b). Linear regression will be used to explore 
whether the effects of condition on Free will, Control (Mastery and 
Constraints), Control (Author of Actions) and Self-efficacy, are moderated by 
either participants’ Agreement with the video lecture or their Educational 
level. 
Step 4 will test hypothesis 7. Logistic regression and Bayesian 
equivalence testing will be used to explore any impact of experimental 
condition on cheating (a two tailed hypothesis). If (contrary to hypothesis 7) 
experimental condition modulates cheating behaviour, hypothesis 8 will then 
be tested, with path analysis used to confirm that the relationship between 
condition and cheating behaviour is better mediated by perceived control 
than free will beliefs. 
Results  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. Table 2 presents, correlations and alpha 
reliabilities among the measures. As expected, all measures correlated 
significantly and positively. Table 3 presents these correlations as within 
condition measures.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for all measures separated by condition; 
Determinism condition in bold font. 
   Measures            Mean                          (SD) 
142 
 
1. FWB 76.07 81.65 (22.46) (19.61) 
2. Self Efficacy 4.23 4.08 (.56)       (.67) 
3. Control M+C 4.05 3.87 (.61)       (.86) 
4. Control Author 3.97 4.12 (.75) (.78) 
5 Agreement 37.34 79.70 (27.24) (17.37) 
6 Education 7.05 7.17 (1.65) (1.85) 
 
Note. Control (M+C) = Control (Mastery and Constraints), Control (AA) = Control (Author of 
Actions). 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlations among measures.  
   Measures  Mean     (SD)     1.     2.     3.    4. 5. 
1. Free will 79.16     (21.07)    --     
2. Self Efficacy 4.15       (.62)  .23**   (.92)    
3. Control M+C 3.95       (.76)  .37**   .71**   (.82)   
4. Control A A 4.05       (.77)  .71**   .42**   .54**  (.87)  
5  Agreement 60.81     (30.68)  -.09   -.10   -.15*  -.08 -- 
6  Education 7.12       (1.77)   .05   .08   -.07  -.02 .02 
Note. Control (M+C) = Control (Mastery and Constraints), Control (AA) = Control (Author of 
Actions). When applicable, alpha reliabilities are presented in parentheses along the diagonal.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01.  
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Table 3. Correlations for main measures for each condition separately; Determinism condition in bold font.                        
Measures  Free will Self-Efficacy Control (M+C) Control (A A) Agreement 
Free will    --   --         
Self-Efficacy  .195 .297**  (.90)  (.93)       
Control (M+C)  .350** .429**  .717** .702**  (.74)  (.86)     
Control (A A)  .719** .692**  .362** .485**  .442**  .629**   (.81)  (.92)   
Agreement  -.595** .243** -.259* .233*  -.345**  .106  -.506  .155      --     -- 
Education  .177 .007  .225* .001  .149 -.185*  -.506** -.136   -.220*  -.250** 
Note. Control (M+C) = Control (Mastery and Constraints), Control (AA) = Control (Author of Actions). 
 When applicable, alpha reliabilities are presented in parentheses along the diagonal.  * p < .05 ** p < .01.   
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Step 1  
T tests  
In step 1 of the analysis, a series of independent samples t-tests explored 
whether exposure to the deterministic video (compared to the non 
deterministic video)  
would undermine participants’ self-reported Self-efficacy (H1), Free will beliefs 
(H2), Control (Mastery and Constraints) (H3) and Control (Author of Actions) 
(H4).  
In line with the prediction of (H2), on average, participants watching the 
deterministic video reported lower levels of Free will belief (M = 76.07, SE = 
2.30), than participants who watched the non-deterministic consciousness 
video (M = 81.65, SE = 1.80), t(211) =-1.93, p = .02 (one tailed).  
Contrary to the prediction of H4, the levels of Control (Author of 
Actions) reported by participants who watched the deterministic video (M = 
3.97, SE = 0.07) were not significantly lower than participants who watched the 
non-deterministic consciousness video (M = 4.12, SE = 0.07) t(211) =-1.41, p 
=.08 (one tailed). 
Contrary to the predictions of H1 and H3 participants who watched the 
deterministic video reported higher levels of Self-efficacy and Control 
(Mastery and Constraints). As we had directional hypotheses for these 
variables, this amounts to neither of these measures being significantly 
influenced by the video manipulator.  
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Exposure to a deterministic video lecture successfully undermined 
belief in free will compared to a non-deterministic video lecture. There were 
no significant between condition differences for the other three dependent 
measures. 
Step 2  
Parallel mediation analyses 
For step 2 of our analysis we intended to conduct two parallel mediation 
models in order to test the predictions of H5 that, perceived Control (both 
measures) would better mediate the effect of condition on Self-efficacy than 
free will beliefs. However, our failure to find an effect of the video 
manipulation on self-efficacy in step one of our analysis prompted us to first 
explore the moderating role of participants agreement with the video lecture 
and their educational level before exploring the predictions of H5. 
Step 3 
Moderation analyses 
We next tested the prediction of H6 (a) and (b), that the impact of condition 
on Free will, Self-efficacy, Control (Mastery and Constraints), Control (Author of 
Actions), would, be moderated by either (a) participants’ Agreement with the 
video lecture or (b) their Educational level. Eight ordinary least squares 
multiple regression analyses were conducted via SPSS and the (Hayes 2017) 
process macro v3.3 for SPSS Model 1. Variables were mean centred prior to 
the construction of products. To assess the moderation of condition on each 
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of our 4 outcome measures by agreement and education, we tested the 
interaction between condition and each moderator on each of the 4 variable 
(see Tables 4 and 5). A significant interaction would provide evidence of 
moderation. Where the interaction terms were significant, the conditional 
effects of X on Y at the 16th 50th and 84th (Hayes 2017) percentiles of the 
moderators were calculated (also presented in Tables 4 and 5, where 
appropriate).  
 
Table 4. The effect of experimental condition on the 4 criterion variables 
moderated by participants’ Agreement with the video lecture.  
Agreement 
Variable FW SE MC AA 
Interaction  
b=-.03, t(209) 
= -6.26, p <.001 
b=-.01, t(209) 
= -3.60, p <.001 
b=-.01, t(209) 
= -2.66, p <.01 
b=-.02, t(209) 
= -4.44, p <.001 
High      30.95 
b=-1.42, t(209) 
=- 7.43, p <.001 
b=-.25, t(209) 
= -1.60, p =.11      
b=-.31, t(209) 
= -1.64, p =.10 
b=-1.00, t(209)  
= -5.38, p <.001 
Average  9.19 
b=-.76, t(209) 
= -5.27, p <.001 
b=.06, t(209) 
= .53, p =.60 
b= -.03, t(209) 
= -.21, p =.83 
b=-.54, t(209)  
= -3.89, p =.001 
Low      -39.81 
b=.74, t(209) 
= 2.85, p <.01 
b=-.76, t(209) 
= -3.61, p <.001 
b=.61, t(209) 
= 2.34, p =.02 
b=.49, t(209) 
= 1.94, p =.053 
Note. Variables were mean centred prior to the construction of products. High, Average and 
Low represent the 16th 50th and 84th percentiles of the mediator, message 
Agreement. Significant results are displayed in green with results that failed to reach 
significant in red. 
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Table 5. The effect of experimental condition on the 4 criterion variables 
moderated by participants’ Educational level. 
Education 
           FW                SE MC AA 
Interaction  
b= .07, t(209) 
= .99, p =.32 
b=.08, t(209) 
= 1.54, p =.12 
b=-.14, t(209) 
= 2.35, p =.02 
b= .12, t(209) 
= 1.98, p =.05 
High 1.8826 
  b = .43, t(209) 
 = 2.83, p =.005 
b=.08, t(209) 
= .50, p =.61      
Average  .88 
  b = .29, t(209) 
= 2.53, p =.01 
b=-.04, t(209) 
= -.35, p =.73 
Low -2.1174 
  b= -.13, t(209) 
= -.78, p =.44 
b = -.40, t(209) 
= -2.43, p =.01. 
Note. Variables were mean centred prior to the construction of products. High, 
Average and Low represent the 16th 50th and 84th percentiles of the moderator, level 
of Education. Significant results are displayed in green with results that failed to 
reach significant in red.  
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Figure 1. Free will, Self-Efficacy, Control (Mastery and Constraints), Control 
(Author of Actions) moderated by participants’ level of Agreement with the video 
lecture. Green arrows represent the between condition comparisons that 
reached statistical significance. At low agreement the effect of condition on 
Control (Author of Actions is significant at p= .053 or bellow w=40.43 (see 
green dotted line). 
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Figure 2. Control (Mastery and Constraints), Control (Author of Actions) 
moderated by participants’ Educational level.  Green arrows represent the 
between condition comparisons that reached statistical significance. 
 
Table 4 and Figure 1 and demonstrate that the moderating effect of 
participant agreement was significant for all criterion variables. In the 
subsequent sections each of these results will be briefly described. 
 
Impact of condition at high message agreement on free will and 
control Author of Actions. The predictions of H6a only focus only on the 
impact of the manipulation at high levels of Agreement with the video lecture. 
Table 4 and figure 1 demonstrate that H6 a) was supported for the variables 
Free will belief and Control (Author of Actions). Significant interactions were 
observed meaning that the relationship between experimental condition and 
these 2 outcome variables was significantly moderated by participants’ 
Agreement with their lecture.  More specifically, this means that, compared to 
participants exposed to the non-deterministic lecture, exposure to the 
deterministic lecture, predicted significantly lower belief in Free will and 
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Control (Author of Actions), but only for those who agreed with their video 
lecture. This was true at both average W=9.19 (mean centred) and relatively 
high W=30.95 (mean centred) levels of message Agreement. Put another way, 
exposure to the deterministic video (compared to the non-deterministic 
video), predicted reduced Free will belief and perceived Control (Author of 
Actions) for those at average and relatively high Message Agreement.  
Impact of condition on free will and Control (Author of Actions) at 
low message agreement. Other relationships were tested in addition to the 
assumptions of H6 a). these relationships concerned the impact of condition 
on the outcome variables at low message agreement. At relatively low levels 
of agreement W=-39.81 (mean centred) exposure to the deterministic video 
lecture (compared to the non-deterministic video on consciousness), was 
associated with significantly higher belief in Free will. In other words, those 
who disagreed with determinism reported greater belief in Free will than 
those who disagreed with non-determinism.  
The impact of condition on Control (Author of Actions) did not reach 
the threshold for statistical significance at low message agreement but came 
close at (p = .053).  We therefore conducted a floodlight analysis.  The 
Johnson–Neyman statistics revealed that for the 14.5 percent of data points 
equal to or lower than W=-40.34 (mean centred) exposure to the deterministic 
lecture (compared to the non-deterministic lecture on consciousness) 
predicted significantly higher levels of perceived Control (Author of Actions). 
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Put another way, low Agreement, for those exposed to the deterministic video, 
predicted higher Free will belief and Control Author of Actions (relative to the 
non-deterministic condition).  
Overall then, it seems that for both Free will beliefs and Control (Author 
of Actions) the mediating effect of message Agreement acts in a similar 
fashion. Agreement with the video for those in the deterministic condition, 
predicted lower levels of Free will belief and perceived Control Author of 
Actions (compared to agreement in the non-deterministic condition). 
Disagreement with the video for those in the deterministic condition, 
predicted higher levels of Free will belief and perceived Control Author of 
Actions (compared to disagreement with the video in the non-deterministic 
condition).  
The variables Free will belief and Control (Author of Actions) display 
notable similarities when visually inspecting their interaction charts and in 
terms of their identical significant relationships at both ends of the moderator. 
This suggests that they may be drawing upon similar concepts.  
Impact of condition at high message Agreement on Self efficacy 
and Control Mastery and Constraints. Table 4 and figure 1 demonstrate that 
H6 a) was not supported in regard to the variables Self-efficacy and Control 
(Mastery and Constraints). Although significant interactions were observed for 
both variables the effects of condition on these variables was not significant at 
high levels of participant Agreement (a requirement of H6 a).   
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Impact of condition on Self efficacy and Control Mastery and 
Constraints at low message agreement. Other relationships were tested in 
addition to the assumptions of H6 a). At relatively low levels of message 
Agreement, exposure to the deterministic video lecture predicted significantly 
higher Self Efficacy and Control (Mastery and Constraints) compared to 
exposure to the non-deterministic video lecture. This finding mirrors the 
results for Free will and Control (Author of Actions). Therefore, disagreement 
for participants in the deterministic condition, predicted increases in Free will 
belief, Self-efficacy, and both measures of control (compared to disagreement 
for participants in the non-deterministic condition). Disagreement with 
determinism appears to be associated with higher scores in all four criterion 
variables whereas disagreement with non determinism appears to be 
associated with lower scores.  
The moderating role of Educational level. Table 5 and figure 2 
demonstrate that the moderating impact of Educational level was significant 
only for the two measures of Control. The predictions of H6 b did not specify 
the direction of responses at low or high levels of the moderator. Table 5 and 
figure 2 demonstrate that H6 b) was supported in regard to the variables 
Control (Author of Actions) and Control (Mastery and Constraints) with 
significant interactions observed. For participants with an average .88 (mean 
centred) and relatively high 1.88 (mean centred) level of Education, watching 
the deterministic video lecture resulted in higher levels of Control (Mastery 
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and Constraints) compared to those participants who watched the non-
deterministic lecture on consciousness. Finding higher ratings of Control 
(Author of Actions) for those with a relatively high education could be an 
indication of participant reactance. Reactance (Brehm 1966; Miron & Brehm, 
2006) is a person’s drive to resist perceived threats to their sense of being a 
free agent, able to behave as they choose. Reactant participants have been 
known to not only resist the intended manipulation but to even respond in a 
manner, opposite to the intended demands of the manipulation. For example, 
compared to those reading the neutral text, participants high in trait reactance 
reported lower belief in determinism after reading the pro determinism/anti 
free will text (Ent, 2013).   
Our finding, that those with a relatively high education reported higher 
ratings of Control (Author of Actions) in the deterministic condition 
(compared to those with a relatively high education in the none deterministic 
condition) suggests reactance. Better educated participants seem to have 
responded to the challenge to their perceived freedom to choose by claiming 
even greater ability to freely choose. We will re visit this topic in the discussion 
section.  
For participants with a relatively low level of education -2.12 (mean 
centred), watching the deterministic video lecture resulted in significantly 
reduced Control (Author of Actions) compared to those who watched the 
non-deterministic lecture on consciousness. 
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H6 b) was not supported in regard to the variables Free will belief and 
Self-Efficacy as no significant interactions were observed.   
 
Step 4  
Cheating behaviour 
Step 4 of our analysis tested hypothesis 7. Logistic regression was used to test 
for any between condition differences in cheating behaviour. We then planned 
to confirm the expected null result with Bayesian equivalence testing.  
Binary logistic regression tested the prediction of H7 that there would 
be no impact of condition on cheating behaviour. The Model was significant 
(X21, N = 212) =5.125 p=.02. The Nagelkerke pseudo R2 indicated that the 
model accounted for 4% of the total variance. Contrary to the prediction of 
H7, participants exposed to a non-deterministic video lecture on 
consciousness cheated more than participants exposed to a video lecture 
championing determinism. Table 6 presents the Partial regression coefficients, 
Wald test, odds ratio [Exp(B)] and 95 % confidence intervals for the odds ratio 
for experimental condition. 
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Table 6. Binary logistic regression results. 
   Measures      b SE-b Wald df Exp (B) 95% CI Exp (B) 
Condition -.824     .376   4.806 1 .439 .210- 210 
Constant -.1.110     .214   26.877 1 .330           
Note. The dependent variable was labelled Cheated, with cheated (1) as the target category 
and not cheated (0) as the reference category. The predictor, condition was coded with 
determinism (1) and non deterministic consciousness (0) as the reference.  
 
A parallel mediation path analysis was conducted, via the Hayes (2017) 
process macro v3.3 for SPSS model 4, to test the predictions of H8 that, 
perceived Control (both measures) better mediates the effect of condition on 
cheating behaviour than Free will beliefs. Contrary to the predictions of H8 
when compared in a parallel mediation model neither Free will beliefs (b=-.07) 
[CI]  -.2590  to .0398 or perceived Control (Mastery and Constraints) (b=-.05) 
[CI] -.2008 to .0354 mediated the impact of condition on cheating. The same 
true when Free will beliefs (b=-.11) [CI] -.3788 to .0246 and Control (Author of 
actions) (b=-.06)[CI] -.0450 to .2870 mediated the impact of condition on 
cheating.  
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Exploratory conditional process analysis 
In step 1, exposure to the deterministic video significantly reduced free will 
belief but failed to significantly reduce the other three dependent measures. 
In step 3 participant Agreement successfully moderated the impact of 
condition on all 4 criterion variables. The impact of condition on the 4 
criterion variables was better observed when moderated by message 
Agreement. We therefore decided to run our two parallel mediation analyses 
(from step 2) but with the addition of participant Agreement moderating the 
impact of the manipulation on Self-efficacy (direct pathway) and the two 
mediators (indirect pathways).  
Two separate ordinary least squares path analysis with their products 
mean centred were conducted via the (Hayes 2017) process macro v3.3 for 
SPSS Model 8 and following the procedure from Hayes 2017 for conditional 
process analysis (see figure 3 model 1 and figure 4 model 2).  Model 1 
assessed the impact of the manipulation on Self-efficacy directly and 
compared the relative utility of the 2 mediators, Free will belief and Control 
(Author of Actions) to mediate the impact of Condition on Self-efficacy. Model 
2 was identical but with Control (Mastery and Constraints) replacing control 
(Author of Actions) as the second mediator. In both models participant 
Agreement with the video lecture moderated the impact of the manipulation 
on Self-efficacy (direct pathway) and the two mediators (indirect pathways).  
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Figure 3. Model 1, a conditional process model testing the relative utility of Free will belief and Control (Author of Actions) to mediate the impact of Condition 
on Self-efficacy. Paths 𝑎1, c’, and 𝑎2  were moderated by message Agreement. Significant coefficients are coloured green, non-significant are in red. 
                                                                                Model 1, Author of Actions V Free will 
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Figure 4. Model 2, a Conditional process model testing the relative utility of Free will belief and Control (Mastery and Constraints) to mediate the impact of 
Condition on Self-efficacy. Paths 𝑎1, c’, and 𝑎2  were moderated by message Agreement. Significant coefficients are coloured green, non-significant are in red.     
Model 2, Mastery and Constraints V Free will 
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We first tested the ability of Free will beliefs and our two measures of Control 
to mediate the impact of condition on Self-efficacy. Model 1 (figure 3) and 
model 2 (figure 4) demonstrate that, once moderated by message Agreement, 
both measures of Control better mediated the impact of experimental 
condition on Self-efficacy than Free will beliefs. The index of moderated 
mediation was significant for the conditional indirect effect mediated by 
Control (Author of Actions) (𝑎3𝑏= -.01) [CI] -.0158 to -.0038 (Model 1) and the 
conditional indirect effect mediated by Control (Mastery and Constraints) 
(𝑎3𝑏= -.001) [CI] -.0143 to -.0016 (model 2). By contrast both pathways 
mediated by Free will belief did not reach significance (𝑎3𝑏= .004) [CI] -.0004 
to .0089 (model 1) and (𝑎3𝑏= .002) [CI] -.0013 to .0053 (model 2).  
Overall then, when moderated by participant Agreement, the two measures of 
Control mediated the impact of Condition on Self efficacy to an extent that 
was significantly significant. There was no significant role for free will beliefs.  
We also explored the direct effect of condition on self-efficacy. In 
model 1 the direct effect of experimental Condition on Self-efficacy 
controlling for the two mediators, Free will beliefs and Control (Author of 
Actions), was significant (C’= .28, t(211) = 2.55, p=.01) at the mean level of the 
moderator (message Agreement). This counterintuitive positive effect 
indicates that participants exposed to the deterministic video lecture reported 
higher levels of Self-efficacy than participants exposed to the non-
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deterministic video lecture. This result might reflect the fact that participants 
are acting in a reactant manner by reporting increased self-efficacy after an 
attempt to undermine their perception of being able to freely exercise choice 
and exert control. We will return to this possibility in the discussion.  
We next looked at the differences between our two measures of 
control. As outlined above, once moderated by participant agreement, both 
measures of control significantly mediated the impact of condition on Self 
efficacy in their respective models. But the two measures of Control did so in 
different ways.  
In model 1, with Control (Author of Actions) acting as M2 the overall 
conditional indirect effect of condition on Self-efficacy was significant and 
negative at both average b= -.22, SE=.08, [CI]-.3887 to -.0779, and relatively 
high b=-.41, SE=.10, boot [CI] -.6417 to  -.2336, levels of the moderator 
(message Agreement).  
This means that when focusing on those participants that agreed with the 
content of the videos, those in the deterministic condition showed reduced 
Self-efficacy compared to those in the non-deterministic condition. This 
relationship happened via people’s perceived Control (Author of Actions), with 
high agreement with determinism predicting reduced Control   𝑎2= -1.00, 
t(209) = -5.38, p < .001 and Control predicting reduced Self efficacy 𝑏2 = .41, 
t(207) = 5.89, p <.001. In model 1 then, Agreement with determinism appears 
to predict reduced perceived Self-efficacy by impacting people’s perceptions 
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of having Control. Perceptions of having Control then impact perceived Self-
efficacy.  
Turning our attention now to model 2, we see that the manipulation 
impacts self-efficacy differently. In model 2, with Control (Mastery and 
Constraints) acting as M2 the overall conditional indirect effect of Condition 
on Self-efficacy was significant and negative at relatively high levels of 
Agreement b= -.18, boot SE= .10 [CI] -.3829 to -.0010 but also significant and 
positive at relatively low levels of Agreement b=.35,  boot SE= .18, [CI]= .0102 
to .7356. Put another way, people in the deterministic condition who agreed 
with the video lecture, reported lower levels of Self-efficacy, than those in the 
non-deterministic condition who agreed with the video lecture. When 
participants disagreed with the video lecture the opposite was true with those 
exposed to the deterministic lecture reporting increased Self-efficacy. These 
relationships happen via people’s perceived control (Mastery and Constraints). 
Low agreement with determinism (compared to low agreement with non-
determinism) predicted increased Control  𝑎2= .61, t(209) = 2.34, p = .02 and 
perceived Control predicted reduced Self efficacy 𝑏2 = .58, t(207) = 13.55, p 
<.001.  
The inclusion of the indirect pathways results in a conditional direct 
effect that is significant and positive at relatively low levels of the moderator, 
message Agreement, for both model 1 c’= .65, t(209) = 3.29, p = .001 and 
model 2 c’= .45, t(209) = 2.88, p < .01.  
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Put another way, across both conditional process models, people in the 
deterministic condition who disagreed with the content, reported higher 
levels of Self-efficacy, than those in the non-deterministic condition that also 
disagreed with the content. These findings of low agreement with 
determinism predicting increased Self efficacy, (relative to the non 
deterministic condition) may be the result of participants lay incompatibilism, 
with those who disagree with determinism likely to be free will believers. Free 
will believers will likely also score highly on the correlates of free will, 
including self-efficacy. We will return to this subject later.  
 
Discussion 
In the current study we aimed to construct an enhanced manipulation of 
belief in determinism that addresses some of the theoretical and practical 
limitations of the stimuli typically used, and to explore how this new 
manipulator affects individuals’ belief in free will, sense of personal control, 
and self-efficacy. We developed a new video with either a deterministic or 
non-deterministic voice over. We found that this video impacted individuals’ 
belief in free will but had no significant effect on their sense of control or self-
efficacy. Nonetheless, when including message agreement as a moderator, we 
found a pattern of results which suggested that all three of these outcome 
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variables were influenced by the manipulator, dependent on level of 
agreement.  
Creating and testing a new manipulation. We constructed and 
tested an enhanced manipulation of deterministic beliefs. The deterministic 
lecture was designed to contain only elements pertinent to modern popular 
accounts of determinism while removing many of the potentially confounding 
influences inherent in the Crick essays and Velten (1968) manipulators 
currently used. The non-deterministic lecture on consciousness was designed 
to represent a neutral condition. However, the moderation analysis points to 
the possibility that it functioned more as a non-deterministic condition, that is 
to say, something closer to a pro free will condition, rather than a true neutral 
condition. The fact that we strove to make this condition non-deterministic, 
combined with participants tendencies to believe in free will (Sarkissian et al., 
2010), might have resulted in this condition reducing deterministic beliefs in 
our study. For this reason, we refer to it as the non-deterministic condition 
rather than the neural condition.  
What is the nature of our two measures of control? Across the 
various analyses conducted in this study, we observed marked similarities 
between our measures of free will belief and our measure of control (Author 
of Actions) and between our measures of Control (Mastery and Constraints) 
and Self-efficacy. This is highlighted by the strong correlations between these 
pairs of measures and further reinforced by the moderation analysis. A visual 
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inspection of the interaction charts (Figure 1) demonstrates this point.  When 
moderated by message Agreement, the effect of condition on Free will beliefs 
was significant at all three levels of the moderator with 2 out of the three 
comparisons situated above the zero point of the mean centred interaction. 
These Characteristics were mirrored by Control (Author of Actions) admittedly 
with the comparison at low agreement significant only at (p = .053) or below 
w= 40.34. By contrast the effect of Condition on Self-efficacy was significant 
only at low agreement, with the 2 nonsignificant comparisons occurring 
above the zero point of the mean centred interaction. The impact of 
Condition on Control (Mastery and Constraints) mirrors these characteristics. 
This combined with the high pattern of correlations between these measures 
(see table 2) suggests that our measures of Free will beliefs and Control 
(Author of Actions) overlap conceptually as do the measures of Self-efficacy 
and Control (Mastery and Constraints). It has been well established that lay 
concepts of free will centre around the ability to make choices free from 
constraints (Monroe & Malle, 2010; 2014 studies 1 and 2) this finding 
suggests that lay free will intuitions draw more on notions of choice related to 
being in control of ones actions and decisions than to notions of choice 
related to having mastery and being free from constraints.   
Low agreement with determinism and lay incompatibility.  
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A clear pattern was observed when the impact of condition on the 4 outcome 
variables was moderated by message agreement (steps 3 and 4). We argue 
that these findings are best interpreted through the lens of lay 
incompatibilism. 
We find across all 4 moderation analyses (step 3) that at low message 
agreement participants in the determinism condition score significantly higher 
on all 4 outcome variables than participants in the non-deterministic 
condition. Although the impact of Control (Author of Actions) achieved 
p=.053 and was significant =< W=-40.34).  
Similarly, at low message Agreement the conditional direct effect for 
both models 1 and 2 are positive and significant, even after controlling for 
Free will beliefs and both measures of Control.  Participants in the 
Deterministic condition who disagreed with the content of their video lecture 
reported higher levels of Self-efficacy than participants in the Non-
deterministic condition who disagreed with their lecture. The conditional 
indirect effect of Condition on Self-efficacy via Control (Mastery and 
Constraints) was also significant and positive at low message Agreement for 
model 2. 
Taken together these findings demonstrate a clear pattern, with those 
who disagree, in the Deterministic condition, reporting higher levels of Free 
will, Control (both measures) and Self efficacy (than those who disagree, in the 
Non-deterministic condition).  
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One likely explanation for this is rooted in lay incompatibility. Those 
who disagree with determinism are likely to be free will believers, and 
therefore likely to score higher on measures of free will and its correlates 
(control and self-efficacy) than people who disagree with non-determinism. 
Those individuals, who reject the non-deterministic account, are likely staunch 
determinists who are inclined to believe less in free will and its correlates 
(control and self-efficacy).  
Put more simply, people who disagree with determinism believe more 
in their capacity for free will, control and self-efficacy than individuals who 
disagree with non-determinism. People who disagree with non-determinism 
embrace determinism and are less inclined to believe that they have free will 
and control. This impacts their sense of self efficacy.  
This explanation assumes that participants who are very strong 
believers in either stance, are less likely to be affected by the video messages. 
An alternative explanation would be that part of this effect may be due 
to the impact of participant reactance prompting some participants in the 
deterministic condition to claim greater free will, control and self-efficacy as a 
response to our attempt to undermine them. Indeed, findings consistent with 
reactance were observed for the conditional process (model 1) where control 
Author of Actions served as the second mediator (𝑀2). Here we observed a 
significant positive direct effect of condition on self-efficacy. Participants in 
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the deterministic condition reported significantly higher belief in self efficacy 
than those exposed to the non-deterministic account.  
We will return to this issue in the general discussion and explore ways 
in which future research may help to further elucidate the role of reactance in 
free will belief manipulations.  
 
High agreement with determinism. At low levels of message 
Agreement, it is impossible to discern the extent to which prior beliefs/lay 
incompatibilism, in tandem with trait reactance, drives the increase in the 4 
criterion variables and to what extent any manipulation effect is opposing that 
increase. However, the impact of condition on our 4 criterion variables can 
also be explored at high levels of participant Agreement.  
When focusing only on those participants that agreed with the content 
of the videos, those in the Deterministic condition reported reduced beliefs in 
Free will and Control (Author of Actions) compared to those in the Non-
deterministic condition.   
At average and relatively high levels of message Agreement the conditional 
indirect effect of condition on Self efficacy via Control (Author of Actions) was 
negative and significant for model 1. This means that (relative to participants 
in the Non deterministic condition who also agreed) Agreement with the 
video lecture in the deterministic condition predicts reduced perceived 
Control (Mastery and Constraints), this in turn impacts perceived Self-efficacy. 
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As far as we are aware, finding that agreement with a deterministic message 
predicts reduced perceived Self-efficacy via perceived Control, represents a 
new contribution to the literature.  
An alternative explanation, might attempt to attribute these results to 
the overlap between the wording of the deterministic video lecture and the 
wording of the question items in Control Author of Actions. The demand 
characteristics inherent in this overlap might lead those participants who were 
keen to please the researchers to both agree with the videos and report 
reduced perceived Control (Author of Actions). This explanation seems less 
likely due to the broad, multifaceted nature of the video lectures and the 
decision to position the measures most susceptible to demand characteristics 
last in the order of presentation. Additionally, the between condition effect 
observable at high agreement, is also contributed to by the moderating effect 
of message agreement on those in the non-deterministic condition. As can be 
seen in in Figure 1, the moderating effect of message agreement on Control 
(Author of Action) constitutes both a decrease in Control as agreement 
increased in the deterministic condition, but also an increase in Control as 
message agreement increased in the non-deterministic condition. While the 
first part of this effect might be due to demand characteristics, this seems 
extremely unlikely for the second part (the increase with agreement in the 
non-deterministic condition) since overlapping language between the 
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wording of Author of Actions and the wording of the non-deterministic video 
is almost zero. 
Demand characteristics cannot be completely discounted however and 
future research should endeavour to reduce demand characteristics even 
further, perhaps by exploiting one of the more implicit measures of control 
that have been used successfully after an anti-free will manipulation (Rigoni et 
al., 2011; Lynn et al., 2014). 
Society may well be marching towards an increasingly deterministic 
worldview with more and more causally based theories employed to explain 
human thoughts, feelings, behaviours and the complex systems that humans 
navigate to achieve our life goals. Any potential impact of deterministic belief 
on perceived Self-efficacy (via perceived Control) could have important real-
world implications.  
This research suggests that beliefs that attribute all human thoughts 
and behaviour to prior events and brain states while describing all future 
outcomes as fixed, may impact perceived self-efficacy more than accounts 
that leave open the possibility that human conscious experience and future 
outcomes are unknown.  
Determinism, Free will and Incompatibilism. In step 1 we tested to 
see if our new hard hitting pro deterministic manipulation would impact Free 
will beliefs at the level of the mean. In doing so we tested whether 
participants see determinism (as conceptualised for our study) as 
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incompatible with their lay understandings of what it means to have free will. 
Exposure to a deterministic video lecture (compared to a non-deterministic 
video lecture on consciousness) successfully reduced belief in Free will. This is 
despite neither lecture containing any reference to free will, instead 
modulating concepts relevant to choice, control, neuro reductionism and 
uncertainty. Participants viewed this hard-hitting form of determinism as 
incompatible with belief in free will. To the best of our knowledge finding that 
a purely deterministic argument, that contains no mention of free will, can 
undermine belief in free will represents a new contribution to the literature.  
The role of Free will beliefs and perceived Control. We wanted to 
demonstrate that perceived Control (both measures) would better mediate 
the effect of Condition on Self-efficacy than Free will beliefs. To achieve this 
moderation was required. Once message Agreement assumed the role of 
moderator, the two measures of Control provided conditional indirect effects 
that were significant in both models. Free will beliefs failed to provide 
conditional indirect effects that were significant in either model. Therefore, in 
both models 1 and 2 perceived Control better mediated the impact of 
condition than Free will beliefs (once message Agreement was introduced as 
moderator). In studies 2 and 3 (chapter 4) measures of control better 
predicted subjective wellbeing than free will beliefs. Here, once Control (both 
measures) were entered into the models, there was no role for Free will beliefs 
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in predicting Self-efficacy.  This is despite the effect of condition significantly 
impacting Free will beliefs when compared at the level of the mean in step 1.  
Only the indirect pathway (model 1) mediated by Control (Author of 
Actions) was significant at high agreement in terms of both the 𝑎2 path and 
the overall indirect effect.  As we have argued in a previous paragraph, this 
measure seems to draw on notions of control over one’s decisions and 
choices. We felt that this conceptualisation is similar to the lay understanding 
of free will (Monroe & Malle, 2010).  Agreement with determinism does not 
impact Self efficacy via Free will beliefs it does impact Self-efficacy via notions 
of being in control of one’s decisions and choices. This suggests that future 
research seeking to explore the relationship between belief and Self-efficacy 
should manipulate perceived control by modulating belief in hard 
determinism rather than attempting to undermine free will belief. 
Our finding suggests that the previously documented relationship 
between free will beliefs and self-efficacy (Crescioni et al., 2016) may, like the 
relationship between free will belief and subjective wellbeing, be 
epiphenomenal, drawing on the covariation of free will beliefs and perceived 
control (see studies 2 and 3 in chapter 4). An important distinction must be 
drawn however between the two pieces of research. In the present study we 
compared Agreement with determinism and how it impacts Self efficacy via 
control whereas in studies 2 and 3 we used multiple regression to compare 
the predictive utilities of free will beliefs and perceived control in predicting 
172 
 
subjective wellbeing, regardless of participant agreement with determinism or 
non-determinism.   
The impact of determinism on cheating. Contrary to the predictions 
of H7 and H8 exposure to a non-deterministic lecture on consciousness 
produced significantly more cheating than exposure to a deterministic lecture. 
This finding runs contrary to the early literature. In that when findings have 
been significant exposure to determinism typically leads to increases in forms 
of antisocial behaviour (Vohs & Schooler, 2008; Baumeister, 2009). Finding the 
opposite runs counter to the literature but is broadly in line with a finding that 
saw exposure to a message supporting neural determinism, result in less 
vindictive behaviour, (female participants only) (Caspar, Vuillaume, Magalhães 
De Saldanha da Gama & Cleeremans, 2017) and belief in free will predict 
acceptance of economic inequality (Mercier, Wiwad, Piff, Aknin, Robinson, & 
Shariff, n.d). Other researchers have found no substantial evidence linking free 
will beliefs to moral behaviour (Crone & Levy, 2018).   
Limitations and suggestions for future research. Efforts were made 
to reduce demand characteristics by presenting a deterministic account that 
does not mention free will and minimised, where possible, the language 
overlap between the manipulation and the dependent measures. In a previous 
section we acknowledged that our efforts to remove all demand 
characteristics might not have been completely successful but also why we do 
not believe that they drove the observed effects. Further steps should also be 
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taken to reduce potential demand characteristics in any follow up study. To 
help reduce demand characteristics, future studies should follow the advice of 
Schooler (2014) and split the manipulation and dependent measures into two 
separate parts that the participants believe to be unrelated. We doubt that 
experienced MTurk workers would fall for such a strategy when employed 
online. These framing effects did not lead to a successful replication of Vohs 
and Schooler (2008) when employed online by Nadelhoffer et al. (2019). These 
framing effects are likely best employed in a lab setting where participants 
can be moved between rooms and researchers (counterbalanced) to fully sell 
the illusion of two separate unrelated studies. Any follow up to this current 
study will follow this approach and perhaps also employ a measure of 
participant suspicion to further probe demand characteristics. 
Message agreement when used as a moderator allows us to 
differentiate between those who disagree with determinism and are 
potentially reactant, from those who agree and are unlikely to be reactant. 
However, although reactant participants are likely to express their 
disagreement, disagreement does not guarantee reactance. The effect of 
reactance would need to be accounted for in order to quantify the true effect 
of lay incompatibilism. This was not achieved in our study. Similarly at high 
agreement we cannot discern what portion of the observed effect is due to 
participants simply agreeing with the deterministic/nondeterministic videos 
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because they already held those views, and what portion is due to a 
manipulation effect bringing their views into alignment with the video lecture.  
 Future research should strive to further disentangle these 
relationships, perhaps by also including the measure of trait reactance 
employed successfully by (Ent, 2013) and by measuring participants pre 
manipulation beliefs.  
A measure that taps into participants’ belief in determinism could also 
be employed although such a measure would likely induce substantial 
demand characteristics and would best be presented after key dependent 
measures. We created a broad ranging deterministic manipulation for this 
study. The measurement of post manipulation belief in determinism may best 
be handled by a range of individual slider measures that tap the individual 
constituents of our broad ranging manipulation. This would allow us to see 
what aspects of the manipulation were effective and what aspects of the 
manipulation predicted dependent measures, such as perceptions of self-
efficacy and behaviour.  
Our non-deterministic condition ended up functioning as something 
closer to a pro free will condition, rather than a true neutral condition. Future 
studies should include a third, true neutral condition that avoids any stance 
(even a neutral one) on any topic relevant to determinism.  
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Conclusion 
The current research project succeeded in its aim to construct an enhanced 
manipulation of belief in determinism that addresses many of the theoretical 
and practical limitations of the currently used stimuli. This manipulation 
successfully undermined perceptions of Free will but not Control or Self-
efficacy. Cheating was modulated although not in the predicted direction. The 
impact of potential reactance was discussed and its differing impacts on 
measures of Free will, Control and Self-efficacy explored. Suggestions to 
control for/disentangle reactance effects in future research were proposed. 
Overall, the current study demonstrated that belief in determinism can predict 
self-efficacy and that this relationship acts directly and via perceived control 
but not via free will beliefs.   
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Chapter 8  
General discussion 
 
In chapter one we provided an overview of the literature and introduced some 
of the methods used to investigate free will beliefs and their impact on 
behaviour, cognitions and life outcomes. 
In chapter two we outlined some of the limitations in the current 
literature and proposed strategies for improvement. They are as follows. Many 
researchers have assumed that lay participants see free will and determinism 
as incompatible. This has led to anti free will manipulations that contain both 
anti free will and pro deterministic statements in the same condition, and to 
the inappropriate combination of subscales that measure free will and 
determinism, despite those subscales documented independence. These free 
will measures were already broad, with free will subscales that include 
questions relating to choice, control over life outcomes, moral responsibility 
and direct references to free will. (see Rakos et al., 2008; Carey & Paulhus, 
2013). Including anti free will statements in a manipulation and measuring 
their impact with free will subscales that include questions that directly ask 
about free will, can only heighten demand characteristics. 
When broad ranging manipulations are used and their impact is 
measured using broad ranging free will subscales, it’s hard to know what 
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aspect of the broad manipulations actually impacted cognitions and 
behaviours. This, combined with contested free will definitions required the 
introduction of single item measures that target only the individual’s lay 
concepts of determinism and free will (see Feldman, 2016; McKenzie, 2014 for 
examples of single item measures of free will). These single item measures of 
free will and determinism should be used to gauge the impact of new better 
focused manipulations that target only belief in free will and determinism. In 
terms of these multi item free will measures we suspect that it is the questions 
tapping perceptions of choice and control that are responsible for these 
measures ability to predict indicators of subjective wellbeing. We were also 
keen to create a new simpler online measure of cheating.   
To address these issues, we aimed to achieve the following: (1) Confirm 
past research showing that lay free will concepts centre around participants’ 
perceptions of having the capacity for unconstrained choice.  (2) Create and 
begin validation of new single item measures of free will and determinism. (3) 
Check to see if participant’s see the concepts tapped by these new measures 
of free will and determinism as compatible or incompatible. (4) Create and 
test a new quick and simple measure of cheating that can be used online. (5) 
Test our suspicion that it is concepts relating to choice and control that 
underpin the ability of free will beliefs to predict subjective wellbeing. (6) 
Beguin exploring whether the manipulation of perceived choice and control is 
a better way of exploring the impact of belief on life outcomes. (7) If 
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necessary, create a better focused manipulation of free will beliefs that 
minimises demand characteristics and test its effectiveness in impacting 
perceptions relating life outcomes. To address these questions we conducted 
the following research. 
Overview of research  
The above aims were addressed over the course of the 7 studies conducted 
for this research project. In chapter 3, study 1 confirmed past research by 
demonstrating that perceptions of possessing choice in the face of external 
constraints (with an element of forethought) form the core of lay persons free 
will beliefs (Monroe & Malle 2010; 2014). We began the validation of our new 
single item slider measures of free will and scientific determinism. We tested 
the assumption of lay incompatibility for those slider measures and added to 
the studies challenging the assumption of lay incompatibility regarding the 
free will and scientific determinism subscales of the fad plus (Paulus & Carey, 
2011). These results and past findings (Paulhus & Carey 2011; Feldman et al., 
2014) suggested that better focused manipulations of free will and 
determinism should be developed that do not include anti free will and pro 
deterministic elements in the same experimental condition. Also in study 1 
our new measure tested for cheating by providing participants with an 
opportunity to skip a task by making a dishonest claim. This measure 
demonstrated a good baseline level of cheating and was taken forward to the 
final study.  
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We reasoned that as free will beliefs predict indicators of subjective 
wellbeing (Crescioni et al., 2015; Li et al., 2017) and lay concepts of free will, 
centres around perceived choice (Monroe & Malle 2010; 2014 and study 1), it 
could be this overlap, between perceptions of choice and control (inherent to 
lay free will understandings), that underpins the relationship between free will 
beliefs and indicators of subjective wellbeing.  In chapter 4, Studies 2 and 3 
demonstrated that this was indeed the case. We also reasoned that as the text 
based manipulations have been shown to (sometimes) impact free will beliefs 
and behaviour, this relationship could also be drawing on perceptions of 
choice and control. That is to say that text based manipulations such as the 
Crick essay, may also impact perceptions of choice and control undermining 
them, and in turn impact cognitions and socially relevant behaviour. 
To test this, we first wanted to see if the Crick essay could impact 
perceived control. In chapter 5 study 4 the full version of the Crick essay failed 
to impact control beliefs relating to possessing mastery and being free from 
constraints. However, in study 5 a modified, better focused, version of the 
Crick essay successfully undermined control beliefs relating to notions of 
having control over one’s actions and decisions. We suspected that this 
modified version of the Crick essay still retained some of the limitations of the 
original by lacking focus and directly mentioning free will. Clearly, we needed 
to develop a more powerful, better focused yet implicit manipulation of belief 
in free will.   
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Study 6 aimed to construct a new better focused yet implicit 
manipulation and compare its ability to undermine free will beliefs to that of 
the Crick essay. Our new manipulation harnessed transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS) to undermine participants’ perceptions of possessing free 
will by impacting their    ability to execute a volitional action (drinking a glass 
of water). Participants reading the Crick essay reported significantly lower post 
manipulation free will scores (controlling for the pre-manipulation scores) 
than participants in the neutral condition. The TMS manipulation failed to 
significantly reduce free will beliefs compared to the neutral condition. 
Although the TMS manipulation did not successfully impact free will 
beliefs, compared to the neutral condition, a comparison of participants pre-
and post manipulation free will scores highlighted significant within condition 
reductions for all three conditions. We explored research that hints at a 
potential explanation for why a statistically significant reduction was observed 
in participants pre-and post-manipulation free will scores in the neutral 
condition. This explanation centres around context effects. Specifically, we 
argued that the intimidating effects of awaiting to undergo TMS may have 
undermined participants sense of feeling free. This effect would have exerted 
its influence predominantly in the Crick and neutral conditions.  
In study 6, Participants in the Crick condition also reported their 
perceptions of what the main points of the Crick essay was. Their responses 
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further demonstrated the unfocused nature of the Crick essay and highlighted 
its potential to induce demand characteristics. 
For study 7 we decided to try a different approach that would allow 
large scale data collection without needing to bring participants in to the TMS 
lab. We decided to follow the recommendation of Schooler et al. 2014 and 
create a manipulation that was broad ranging and hard-hitting. We did not 
attempt to employ framing effects by deceiving the participants into believing 
that the manipulation and dependent measures were parts of separate studies 
as this strategy had not been successful for Nadlehoffer et al. (2019) when 
used online.  
In study 7 we designed and tested a second new manipulation in the 
form of a pro deterministic and a nondeterministic video lecture. This new 
manipulation successfully undermined belief in free will (despite never 
mentioning it) but did not directly undermine belief in self efficacy or our two 
measures of control. Unsurprisingly message agreement moderated the 
impact of condition on all 4 criterion variables and education level moderated 
the impact of condition on our 2 measures of control. Our exploratory analysis 
explored the impact of condition on self-efficacy, both directly and via free 
will beliefs and control; with these relationships moderated by message 
agreement. As expected, both measures of control better mediated the 
impact of condition on self-efficacy than free will beliefs.  When participants in 
the deterministic condition disagreed with the content of their video, they 
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demonstrate incompatibilist tendencies (and possible reactance effects, 
(Brehm 1966) by reporting higher levels of the 4 criterion variables. When they 
agreed with the deterministic video, they reported lower levels of free will and 
control over their actions and decisions. This effect was not observed for 
participants sense of having mastery and being free from constraints. 
Agreement with determinism also predicted lower self-efficacy indirectly via 
participants sense of having control over their decisions and actions. 
Surprisingly participants exposed to the non-deterministic lecture 
demonstrated significantly more cheating than participants exposed to the 
pro deterministic lecture.  
Our findings and their contribution to the literature.  
Just how broad ranging are anti free will/pro deterministic manipulations? In 
study 6 (chapter 6) participants self-reported understanding of the Crick essay 
(Crick, 1994), demonstrated for the first time just how wide ranging and 
unfocused this manipulation is. Participants saw the Crick essay as 
simultaneously attacking religious ideology, undermining free will beliefs, and 
promoting deterministic arguments. As most modern anti free will/pro 
determinism manipulations appear to be equally broad ranging, better more 
focused manipulations should be developed. We will return to that subject 
later. 
Items designed to measure free will and determinism appear to be 
equally broad ranging (see chapter 1) potentially lacking the focus necessary 
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to pick apart the relationships between lay notions of free will and potentially 
confounding, overlapping or secondary concepts such as choice, control and 
moral responsibility. We aimed to create more focused single item measures 
that would help us test these relationships.  
Single item measures have grown in popularity over the timescale of 
this research project. They have demonstrated good convergent (Schooler et 
al., 2014) and predictive (e.g., Feldman et al., 2016) validity, and single-item 
free will measures have been shown to be sensitive to experimental 
manipulations of free will beliefs (MacKenzie et al., 2014; Nahmias et al., 
2014; Monroe et al., 2017). In study 1 We successfully created and began 
validation on a new slider measure of free will and new slider measure of 
scientific determinism.  
The single item free will measure that directly mentions free will was 
designed to elicit only the individuals lay free will concept rather than 
imposing the researchers understanding on the participant. Our new slider 
measure of free will successfully predicted indicators of subjective well-being 
before participants ratings of control were entered into the model in study 2 
(chapter 4). This measure also proved to be susceptible to a pro determinism 
manipulation (study 7 in chapter 7). In study 6 (chapter 6) it also proved 
susceptible to a manipulation that contained both anti free will and pro 
deterministic elements (Crick essay) and our new implicit TMS manipulation 
(when pre and post manipulation free will scores were compared). Our single 
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item free will measure demonstrated convergent validity, correlating positively 
with the free will subscale of the FAD-Plus (Paulhus and Carey 2011) in study 1 
(chapter 1), both measures of control  and self-efficacy (study 7 chapter 7) 
and a measure of divergent validity via its negative correlation with the 
scientific determinism subscale of the FAD plus. We therefore see the 
development and testing of our single item measure of free will as a modest 
but potentially useful contribution to the literature. 
Our single item measure of scientific determinism demonstrated some 
convergent validity by correlating positively with the scientific determinism 
subscale of the FAD plus (Paulhus and Carey 2011).  We did not decide to use 
this measure in future studies as we felt that while a single item measure of 
free will can tap directly into the lay beliefs of a given individual (whatever  
that might be), a single item measure of determinism can only fail to capture 
the complexity and breadth of contemporary deterministic arguments. In 
every day life we encounter deterministic arguments wrapped up in common 
narratives. Narratives about the influence of genetic inheritance and 
childhood environment on personality, narratives that celebrate the ability of 
scientific causal principles to explain all human behaviour. These accessible 
every day narratives may be better expressed by multi item measures of 
determinism such as the FAD-Pluss (Paulhus and Carey 2011) or to tap more 
philosophical understandings of determinism, the free will inventory 
Nadelhoffer et al., (2014). However, as we will discuss later, if the impact of 
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determinism on cognitions and behaviours is to be better explored new 
instruments will need to be developed that can delineate between the various 
types of deterministic belief.  
Study 1 tested our new single item measures of free will and scientific 
determinism and compared them to their well validated multi item 
counterparts from the FAD-Pluss. There was no consistent reliable relationship 
displayed across both measures of free will when compared to both measures 
of scientific determinism. Although our study was limited to 80% power to 
detect medium effect sizes or greater, our findings concur with previous work 
that had 80% power to detect small effects (Paulhus & Carey 2011). These 
findings are in line with other research suggesting that lay participants do not 
always see free will and determinism as incompatible (Nahmias, Morris, 
Nadelhoffer & Turner, 2006; Nichols, 2006; Nichols & Knobe, 2007; Murray & 
Nahmias, 2014; Shepherd, 2012). So although a certain amount of lay 
incompatibilism may exist it lacks sufficient reliability to warrant experimental 
manipulations such as the Crick essay and Velten (1968) style manipulation 
(introduced by Vohs and schooler 2008 and discussed in chapter 2) that 
include both anti free will and pro deterministic messages in the same 
condition. Researchers should also avoid the practice of combining free will 
and deterministic subscales that were designed to measure separate 
constructs (see Lynn, Van Dessel & Brass, 2013; Rigoni, Wilquin, Brass & Burle, 
2013 for examples). We acknowledge however that in some of the examples 
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just cited researchers’ interest was less in free will as a concept and more in 
the extent to which the participants perceived themselves to have intentional 
control. 
What are lay free will beliefs? Across studies 1 (chapter 3) and 3 
(chapter 4) we conducted 2 qualitative analysis of participants free will 
definitions. In general, Lay participants ascribed to a psychological rather than 
metaphysical definitions of free will centring around perceived Choice 
capacity and freedom from constraints. This confirmed past research by 
Monroe and Malle 2010; 2014). In addition to directly asking people to define 
their free will beliefs, we used our better focused single item measure of lay 
free will to investigate which factors correlate with lay free will belief. This 
could then provide new insight into participants’ underlying conceptions of 
free will. In study 7 (chapter 7) we compared this slider measure of lay free will 
beliefs to 2 measures of choice/control that were designed to emulate the 
underlying concepts that free will beliefs tap. In study 7 (chapter 7) our new 
measure of free will beliefs correlated more highly with a measure of control 
relevant to perceived decision making and control over actions (.71**) than 
with a measure of control relevant to people’s perceptions of having mastery 
and being free from constraints (.37**). These relationships remained 
consistent regardless of experimental condition.  
Lay concepts of free will  require choices to be free from constraints 
(Monroe & Malle, 2010; 2014 and studies 1 and 2). The qualitative free will 
187 
 
definitions provided by participants in studies 1 and 2, demonstrated that 
these constraints are largely external in nature, predominantly representing 
constraints on choice from others. Finding that free will ratings more closely 
match understandings of control relevant to decision making and control over 
actions than to personal mastery and freedom from constraints, would seem 
to suggest that perceived constraints were less important. We suspect 
however that when participants are asked to “Please indicate the extent to 
which you believe that you have free will” (as with our single item slider 
measure) they may draw on perceptions of their own capacity to make 
choices and decisions. However, when asked “please explain in a few lines 
what you think it means to have free will” (as with the qualitative free will 
definitions questions) participants may draw on real world scenarios involving 
others, increasing the role of perceived constraints. This last observation is of 
course speculative but warrants further investigation. An investigation to 
explore the differing elements of choice and control that underpin lay free will 
concepts could involve the creation of a specific instrument. A second strand 
of research could involve priming participants with either a social scenario 
(likely to promote cognitions centring around potential constraints from 
others) or a non-social scenario (likely to promote cognitions around 
individuals control over their capacity to make decisions and choices).  One 
obvious difference between the language we use to explain the core concept 
of lay free will belief and that of Monroe and Malle, (2010) is that we discuss 
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lay free will belief in terms of perceived capacity for control while they see it 
as the capacity to make choices that fulfils desires, free from constraints. We 
see these conceptualisations as very similar in that to us, a choice that is not 
constrained by others equates to a successful act of control.  
Does perceived control underpin the relationship between free will 
beliefs and life outcomes? The most widely used measures of free will beliefs 
appear to be broad ranging including items measuring morel responsibility, 
choice and control (see Paulhus and Carey 2011; Rakos et al., 2008 and 
chapter 2). We suspected that it was this element of perceived choice/control, 
inherent in both these measures of free will, that was responsible for 
predictive utility for free will beliefs to predict indicators of subjective 
wellbeing (Crescioni et al., 2015; Li et al.,2017). In a published paper, studies 2 
and 3 (chapter 4) demonstrated that our single item measure of lay free will 
beliefs had the same utility as the multi item measures, for predicting 
indicators of subjective wellbeing. However, when our measure of lay free will 
beliefs was entered into a model simultaneously with a measure of control, 
only perceived control successfully predicted life outcomes. There was no 
remaining role for free will beliefs in predicting subjective wellbeing, beyond 
free will’s covariation with perceived control. This was true of both trait 
measures of free will and control (study 2) and daily state measures (study 3). 
Finding that it is the element of choice control within free will beliefs that 
predicts subjective wellbeing is a new contribution to the literature. These 
189 
 
findings could be refuted or confirmed using new or existing data by 
conducting a factor analysis on the items from the free will subscale. If distinct 
factors emerge withing the free will subscale centring around choice/control 
and moral responsibility, these factors could be split into discreet variables 
and these variables used to predict subjective wellbeing or other myriad life 
outcomes associated with free will beliefs (Crescioni et al.,2015; Li et al.,2017). 
The role of perceived control in anti free will manipulations. In the 
previous section we described how the overlap between free will beliefs and 
notions of possessing choice and control (key elements of most widely used 
free will measures) is responsible for the utility of free will beliefs to predict 
subjective wellbeing. Chapter 2 also outlines the breadth of the Crick essay 
and Velten style manipulator, introduced by Vohs and schooler, (2008). As 
with the correlation-based studies, we suspected the ability of these often 
used manipulations may be better understood by their impact on perceptions 
of control rather than their impact on free will beliefs. We further theorised 
that we may even be able to impact cognitions relevant to the appraisal of 
subjective well-being by targeting perceived control with the Crick essay.  
To begin this line of enquiry we first tested the impact of the Crick 
essay on perceived control. To our surprise the Crick essay was not able to 
impact control beliefs pertaining to participants sense of having mastery and 
being free from constraints (Chou et al., 2016). This conceptualisation of 
control had proven successful in study 2 (chapter 4) in demonstrating that 
190 
 
free will belief’s capacity to predict subjective wellbeing is based on free will 
beliefs covariation with perceptions of choice and control. After modifying 
and focusing the Crick essay it successfully impacted notions of control 
relevant to perceived decision making and control over actions. Finding that 
an often used free will manipulation can also impact perceptions of control 
was new to the literature; although it must be stated that this manipulation 
was only successful in its modified (abridged) form that contains only key 
sections from the original but does not add any new text.  Even in its modified 
form the Crick essay explicitly stated that free will does not exist, risking 
substantial demand characteristics. Participants qualitative evaluations of the 
Crick essay (study 6 chapter 6) confirmed that the Crick essay risks demand 
characteristics and demonstrated the Crick essay’s broad and unfocused 
nature. 
This line of reasoning prompted us to create two new manipulations, 
designed to better target/undermine perceptions of choice control and free 
will without the tendency to prompt demand characteristics that may be 
inherent to the current text based manipulations (see study 6 chapter 6).  
Manipulation 1, TMS  
In study 6 (Chapter 6) we aimed to undermine free will beliefs by impacting 
participants ability to execute a volitional act (drinking a glass of water). This 
approach had the advantage of being language free, impacting free will by 
undermining participants ability to control their own mental processing and 
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ultimately their bodies. The obscurity of this manipulation led to reduced 
participant suspicion compared to the Crick essay even when participants 
were extensively probed for awareness. Although the TMS manipulation failed 
to reduce free will beliefs relative to the neutral and Crick conditions a 
statistically significant reduction in free will beliefs was observed between 
TMS participants pre-and post-manipulation scores. One possibility, backed 
up by some previous literature (Ent, 2013; Laurene et al., 2011) is that 
participants anxiety at being placed in a stressful lab environment (while 
awaiting TMS) may have disproportionately lowered the post manipulation 
free will scores of participants in both the Crick and neutral conditions. Future 
research could both test for and capitalise on this effect. In a potential study, 
participants could be asked to complete self-report measures of free will and 
choice/control in the comfort of their own home. One group of those 
participants would retake the self-report measures in the comfort of their own 
home (no intimidation condition). A second group would come into the 
University and retake the self-report measures in the comfort of the 
psychology department waiting room (low intimidation condition). The final 
group would be asked to retake the self-report measures while sitting in the 
intimidating TMS lab surrounded by the full range of intimidating TMS 
equipment and expecting to have to complete a TMS experiment.  
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Manipulation 2, video lectures 
For study 7 (chapter 7) we wanted to create a manipulation that was focused, 
targeting just determinism, yet following the recommendation of schooler et 
al. (2014) also broad, enlisting a wide range of popular deterministic 
arguments (see Harris, 2012; 2013). To reduce demand characteristics and test 
for lay Incompatibilism we manipulated determinism yet measured free will 
beliefs, control and self-efficacy. This manipulation took the form of a 
deterministic video lecture and a non deterministic lecture on consciousness.  
The deterministic lecture successfully undermined free will beliefs without 
mentioning free will, which we believe to be a new contribution to the 
literature yet failed to undermine perceived control or self-efficacy. 
Participants who agreed with this deterministic video also reported reductions 
in control relevant to perceptions of being in control of their choices and 
decisions. Agreement with the deterministic lecture predicted reduced Self-
efficacy but only indirectly via participants sense of having control over their 
decisions, choices and actions We believe this finding to be new to the 
literature. 
This research project succeeded in its aim to construct an enhanced 
manipulation of belief in determinism that addresses many of the theoretical 
limitations of the text based approaches typically used such as the (Crick, 
1995) and Velten (1968) style manipulations. However, as we will discuss 
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bellow this manipulation may have been too powerful and too challenging 
prompting reactance effects (Brehm (1966).  
The impact of reactance and demand characteristics and how best 
to manage them. Reactance (Brehm 1966; Miron & Brehm, 2006) is a 
person’s drive to resist perceived threats to their sense of being a free agent, 
able to behave as they choose. People’s understanding of what it means to 
have free will includes an element of not being constrained in their choices 
(Monroe & Malle, 2010; 2014). Such perceptions are also likely fundamental 
to peoples’ sense of identity and challenges to these perceptions, via pro 
deterministic manipulations aimed at undermining belief in free will, are likely 
met with reactance from participants.  Researchers have begun to note the 
importance of managing/reducing potential reactance when manipulating 
participants free will beliefs (Protzko, Ouimette & schooler, 2016; Schooler, 
2014). Measures of trait reactance have successfully moderated the impact of 
an anti free will/pro determinism manipulation on pro social behaviours, with 
those scoring high on trait reactance proving significantly more helpful after 
reading an anti free will/pro determinism text, than participants exposed to a 
neutral text (Ent, 2013). 
In study 7 reactant participants appeared to not only resist the 
intended manipulation but to even respond in a manner, opposite to the 
intended demands of the manipulation, A significant main effect was 
observed for the direct effect of condition on self efficacy (model 1 study 7), 
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with participants in the deterministic condition reporting higher levels of self 
efficacy than those exposed to non-determinism.  The capacity for pro 
deterministic manipulations to prompt reactance had been documented in 
the literature. For example, compared to those reading the neutral text, 
participants high in trait reactance reported lower belief in determinism after 
reading a pro determinism/anti free will text (Ent, 2013).  
Study 7 (chapter 7) adds to these findings, demonstrating that broad 
ranging, hard hitting pro deterministic manipulations can prompt reactance 
that must be controlled for. In our view this requires the employment of two 
strategies. Firstly, the framing effects introduced by Schooler et al. (2014) 
should be incorporated into the research design. Framing effects involve a 
form of harmless deception, whereby the manipulation and the dependent 
measures are presented to participants as parts of two separate studies. This 
approach has proven successful for Vohs and Schooler (2008) in the lab and 
has been partially successful (manipulating free will beliefs but not cheating) 
online (Schooler et al., 2014). Other researchers have not found that these 
framing effects lead to successful manipulations of free will belief and 
cheating when used on line (Nadelhoffer et al., 2019). The second strategy, 
successfully employed by (Ent, 2013) is to include a measure of trait reactance 
(Hong & Faedda, 1996). We suspect that the deterministic, anti free will 
manipulation that we introduced in study 7 was so challenging to participants 
that it would prompt a reactant response even in those who are not 
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necessarily high in trait reactance. Paradoxically then our manipulation may 
prove more successful if weakened. We will also continue to include a 
measure of message agreement that allows us to predict outcomes using 
participants agreement with deterministic/none deterministic content, as a 
proxy for their views.  
If measures to reduce or control for reactance prove unsuccessful then 
correlation based approaches could be used but these also come with 
challenges. The most significant of these being that better educated 
individuals are more likely to have prior learning of the various strands of hard 
determinism. Such well educated individuals are likely to be smart enough to 
score highly on measures of self-efficacy and perceived control. The 
challenges of controlling for this may prove to be considerable. Additionally 
researchers would need to measure participants knowledge of the various 
elements of hard determinism in order to discover which elements of 
deterministic beliefs predict self-efficacy (study 7 chapter 7), subjective 
wellbeing (Crescioni et al., 2015; Li et al., 2017) and educational achievement 
(Feldman et al., 2016) etc. 
For now, the manipulation of deterministic beliefs may prove more 
fruitful than correlation based approaches, here again the challenge of 
recording participants deterministic belief without prompting demand 
characteristics is a considerable one. In study 7 (chapter 7) we did not record 
196 
 
deterministic beliefs due to our concern over prompting demand 
characteristics. Instead we measured control and free will.  
The modest negative correlation between our single item measure of 
lay free will beliefs and the multi item measure of scientific determinism from 
the FAD-Plus (Paulhus and Carey 2011) (study 1) gave us confidence that our 
pro determinism lecture would undermine belief in free will. In study 1 we 
wanted to demonstrate that the Free will and scientific determinism scales of 
the FAD-Plus did not negatively correlate in order to demonstrate that 
combining these scales together was unwise. We also wanted to see if our 
single item measures of free will and scientific determinism would also display 
a negative relationship in order to add weight to the argument that belief in 
free will is not always incompatible with belief in determinism. (Nichols & 
Knobe, 2008, Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer & Turner, 2006). We did not 
assume that our single item measure of lay free will would not correlate 
negatively with the scientific determinism scale of the fad plus. Indeed, the 
modest but significant negative relationship between our single item measure 
of lay free will belief and the scientific determinism scale of the FAD-Plus led 
us to incorporate similar arguments into our deterministic video lecture.  
Returning to study 7, we decided to record the impact of determinism 
on measures of control because it was determinisms capacity to impact 
control that was of interest rather than beliefs in determinism per se.  
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In future studies we aim to create a series of single item measures that 
tap the various constituents of our broad deterministic manipulation. To 
control for demand characteristics, we must first identify participants likely to 
be susceptible to them.  Demand characteristics can lead to a number of 
undesirable effects. Of most relevance to research in this field is the potential 
for participants to figure out the intentions of researchers and provide the 
responses that they think the researcher is seeking. This wish to please could 
be used to identify participants who responded to the manipulations by 
giving what they perceived to be the ‘correct response’. One strategy could be 
to use demand characteristics to identify demand characteristics by asking 
whether participants allowed their beliefs about the researchers’ intentions to 
colour their responses. Demand characteristics could be explained to 
participants as a form of ‘Participant kindness’, from those participants 
‘intelligent enough to deduce the researcher’s intentions’. This strategy should 
encourage those participants keen to please the researcher, to please the 
researcher by self reporting on any ‘helpful’ responses that they were 
consciously aware of giving.  
The impact of determinism/non determinism on cheating 
Vohs and Schooler (2008) were the first to report that manipulating free will 
beliefs could increase cheating behaviour. Their study was conducted in the 
lab. We aimed to create and test a new quick and simple measure of cheating 
that can be used online. In study 1 chapter 1 this measure demonstrated a 
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good bassline level of cheating.  In study 7 (chapter 7) exposure to a non-
deterministic video lecture resulted in significantly more cheating than 
exposure to a pro determinism video lecture. This result was unexpected both 
in terms of finding a significant between condition difference and in terms of 
the direction of the effect.  
A successful manipulation of cheating via a pro deterministic/anti free 
will manipulation contradicts the majority of the literature that has seen most  
attempts to replicate Vohs and Schooler (2008) fail (Giner-Sorolla et al., 2015; 
Nadelhoffer et al., 2019; van den Brink, 2016); despite a likely publication bias 
in favour of successful replications over unsuccessful attempts. Schooler et al. 
(2014) has reported some successes in replicating the findings of Vohs and 
Schooler (2008) but these successes were inconsistent. Our finding, that 
participants in the non deterministic condition cheated more could be down 
to our decision to manipulate only determinism while not mentioning free will 
beliefs. This explanation seems unlikely however as our pro determinism 
manipulation did impact free will beliefs.  
In study 7 participants exposed to a non-deterministic account cheated 
more (by making a false claim, in order to avoid providing a short written text) 
than participants exposed to a pro deterministic account. This finding is new 
to the literature however there are examples in the literate where exposure to 
deterministic arguments has reduced behaviour that many would consider 
antisocial. For example Caspar et al. (2017) found that participants exposed to 
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the Crick essay manipulation displayed less vindictive behaviour by 
administering fewer electric shocks to a confederate.  This only held true for 
female participants. In another study believing in free will has been shown to 
predict acceptance of economic inequality (Mercier, n.d). Due to the lack of a 
third experimental condition it is impossible to say whether the deterministic 
video lecture reduced cheating or the non deterministic video lecture 
increased cheating. It is challenging to find president or explanation for either 
possibility. 
 In so far as the manipulation successfully impacted cheating our 
cheating measure proved a success.  However, it is possible that some 
participants may have felt aggravated by the deterministic video lecture. This 
could have led them to feel less inclined to assist the researcher by providing 
the requested information. They may have chosen instead to falsely claim that 
they had heard of our fictional organisation rather than offer the requested 
marketing feedback. Such effects are a risk to any cheating measures where 
the participants are required to perform a task for, or claim reward from, a 
researcher as a test of cheating. Please see Nadelhoffer et al. (2019), Schooler 
et al. (2008), Schooler et al. (2014), van den Brink et al. (2016) for examples of 
the various tasks that have been used to demonstrate cheating behaviour 
after an anti free will/pro determinism manipulation. Of course a tendency for 
participants to cheat more in the anti free will/pro determinism condition 
would have diminished, not increased the experimental effect found in study 
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7. Although not an issue in study 7 this scenario highlights the need to 
introduce framing effects by telling participants that the manipulations and 
dependent measures are parts of separate studies. If successful, framing 
effects should reduce the likelihood of any potential irritation with researchers 
who challenge closely cherished beliefs, being carried over to the dependent 
measures.  
Conclusion 
Current free will manipulations and measures are overly broad containing 
elements relevant to free will, choice/control and moral responsibility. This 
breadth has made it difficult to discern just how (and indeed if) free will 
beliefs impact cognitions, beliefs and behaviours.  
First we confirmed past findings demonstrating that perceptions of having 
choice and being free from constraints are central to lay understandings of 
free will. We then looked at correlation based research using our new better 
focused, single item measure of lay free will to demonstrate that it is the 
element of choice control within free will beliefs that predicts indicators of 
subjective wellbeing.  
We then turned our attention to the area of research that aims to 
impact behaviours and beliefs by modulating belief in free will. We theorised 
that often used free will manipulations are actualy impacting cognitions 
beliefs and behaviours by undermining perceived choice. We demonstrated 
that an abridged version of one such manipulation (the Crick essay), does 
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indeed undermine perceptions of control relevant to decision making and 
control over actions. However, these text based manipulations lack focus and 
prompt demand characteristics so we developed 2 new manipulations that 
address those limitations.  
Our TMS manipulation led to a significant reduction between 
participants pre and post manipulation scores. Our video lecture manipulation 
was designed to modulated deterministic belief. It demonstrated lay 
incompatibility by successfully undermining free will belief but perceived 
control and self-efficacy were not impacted. We also created a new online 
cheating measure. To our surprise exposure to a deterministic argument led 
to less cheating than exposure to a non-deterministic argument.  
We also conducted exploratory work. Agreement with determinism 
(compared to non determinism) predicted reduced free will beliefs and 
reduced perceptions of control relevant to decision making and control over 
actions. We found evidence suggesting that relative belief in determinism may 
undermine self efficacy via its impact on self control and that perceived 
control better mediates the impact of relative belief in determinism on self-
efficacy.  These exploratory findings are tentative, more work is needed to 
establish that deterministic beliefs impact cognitions beliefs and behaviours 
and self-efficacy by undermining perceived control. The combined evidence 
from this research project suggests that this work should harness a broad 
hard hitting deterministic argument while controlling for participants 
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reactance and demand characteristics. Once the capacity for deterministic 
belief to impact cognitions beliefs and behaviours has been established new 
tools should be developed to discern which aspects of deterministic belief 
undermines perceived control.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Appendix chapter 3 
 
Appendix: 1 
 
Coding instructions for lay free will definitions. 
The categories of decision/choice, following desires and overcoming internal 
and external constraints drew heavily on the coding instructions from Monroe 
and Malle (2010). The other categories were novel.  
Philosophical= A statement that alludes to the philosophical debate around 
free will and determinism and suggests that free will offers people some kind 
of immunity from causation. Free will definitions that are coded as 
philosophical should describe some ability of the individual to make decisions 
or act without the constraints of the causal laws that produce both our 
universe and our physical brains. 
Control= directly mentioning the word “control” or “controlling”  or 
“controlled”. etc. 
Choices = directly mentioning the word “choice” or “choosing” etc. 
Decide = Directly mentioning the word “decide” or “deciding” or “decision” 
etc. 
Action = Directly mentioning the word “act” or “action” or “acting” etc. 
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Future plans = Statements that refers to future outcomes. Possible examples 
would be “choose my own course in life” or “bring about the outcomes I 
want”. This is more a matter of understanding meanings than simple word 
identification. 
Following desires= Statements that demonstrate peoples wish to express 
themselves. Statements such as “doing what you want” or “acting as I 
please” “freedom to be me” “freedom to believe what I want” are 
examples of people following their desires. 
Overcoming constraints = Statements that refer to a person's ability to resist 
external or internal influences on behaviour such as physical limitations or 
social demands. This includes coercion or pressure from others and can be 
expressed by statements like  “Not being forced by others” or “without 
anyone stopping you from doing it” or no one can make you” or “not 
needing permission”  
Awareness of consequences to actions = Statements that demonstrates an 
awareness that actions may lead to reactions/consequences from others. 
Mentioning “responsibility” or “be prepared to accept the consequences” 
or “do whatever you want just don't harm another person”. 
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Appendix: 2 
Free will definitions that were coded as philosophical. 
 
1. Having the freedom to make decisions without it being predetermined 
for you 
2. My actions have not been pre determined, nor has the outcome of any 
follow on effect been predermined 
3. I think it's an invalid philosophical concept, but most generally mean it 
in the sense of either: a) an individual being responsible for his/her 
actions; b) choices not being either strictly determined by prior causes, 
or random. 
4. To be able to decide on a choice without having been forced into a 
decision beforehand by some unforseen force 
5. Where one's thoughts are non-physical in origin and can alter things 
without predetermination 
6. Free will means not to be able to ascribe a person's or an animal's 
choice(s) to any external factor by a rational-mechanical way of 
causation. 
7. I have free will when I'm able to make my own decisions without things 
being predetermined! 
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Appendix chapter 5 
Appendix: 3  
Modified (shortened) version of the anti free will essay from The 
Astonishing Hypothesis by Francis Crick (1996) used in Study 5 
  
Anti free will condition  
Please carefully read and consider the essay on the following page, which was 
written by Francis Crick. 
Francis Crick is the British physicist and biochemist who collaborated with 
James D. Watson in the discovery of the molecular structure of DNA, for which 
they received the Nobel Prize in 1962. He is the author of What Mad Pursuit, 
Life Itself, and Of Molecules and Men. Dr. Crick lectures widely all over the 
world to both professional and lay audiences, and is a Distinguished Research 
Professor at The Salk Institute in La Jolla, CA. Dr. Crick’s essay (on the next 
page) comes from The Astonishing Hypothesis. 
 
Please read the following short essay carefully because you will be asked 
to summarize its details later in the survey. 
The essay is not long, so please read it before continuing. 
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“You,” your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your 
sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior 
of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules. Who you are 
is nothing but a pack of neurons.  
Most people take free will for granted, since they feel that usually they are 
free to act as they please.  Three assumptions can be made about free will.  
The first assumption is that part of one’s brain is concerned with making plans 
for future actions, without necessarily carrying them out.  The second 
assumption is that one is not conscious of the “computations” done by this 
part of the brain but only of the “decisions” it makes – that is, its plans, 
depending of course on its current inputs from other parts of the brain.  The 
third assumption is that the decision to act on one’s plan or another is also 
subject to the same limitations in that one has immediate recall of what is 
decided, but not of the computations that went into the decision. 
So, although we appear to have free will, in fact, our choices have already 
been predetermined for us and we cannot change that. One’s self can attempt 
to explain why it made a certain choice.  Sometimes we may reach the correct 
conclusion.  At other times, we will either not know or, more likely, will 
confabulate, because there is no conscious knowledge of the ‘reason’ for the 
choice.  This implies that there must be a mechanism for confabulation, 
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meaning that given a certain amount of evidence, which may or may not be 
misleading, part of the brain will jump to the simplest conclusion. 
 
Control condition (consciousness)  
Modified (shortened) version of the essay on consciousness from The 
Astonishing Hypothesis by Francis Crick (1996) used in Study 5 
 
Please carefully read and consider the essay on the following page, which was 
written by Francis Crick. 
Francis Crick is the British physicist and biochemist who collaborated with 
James D. Watson in the discovery of the molecular structure of DNA, for which 
they received the Nobel Prize in 1962. He is the author of What Mad Pursuit, 
Life Itself, and Of Molecules and Men. Dr. Crick lectures widely all over the 
world to both professional and lay audiences, and is a Distinguished Research 
Professor at The Salk Institute in La Jolla, CA. Dr. Crick’s essay (on the next 
page) comes from The Astonishing Hypothesis. 
 
Please read the following short essay carefully because you will be asked 
to summarize its details later in the survey. 
The essay is not long, so please read it before continuing. 
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Psychologists have shown that common sense ideas about the working of the 
mind can be misleading. When psychology began as an experimental science, 
in the latter part of the nineteenth century, there was much interest in 
consciousness. It was hoped that psychology might become more scientific by 
refining introspection until it became a reliable technique. 
The American psychologist, William James, discussed consciousness in his 
work ‘The Principles of Psychology’ (1898), and described five properties of 
what he called “thought”. Every thought, he wrote, tends to be part of 
personal consciousness. Thought is always changing, is sensibly continuous, 
and appears to deal with objects independent of itself. In addition, thought 
focuses on some objects to the exclusion of others. In other words, it involves 
attention. Of attention he wrote, “It is the taking possession by the mind, in 
clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible 
objects or trains of thought. It implies withdrawal from some things in order 
to deal effectively with others.” 
Unfortunately, since James, a movement arose in academic psychology that 
denied the usefulness of consciousness as a psychological concept. This was 
partly because experiments involving introspection (which involves thinking 
about what one is thinking) did not appear to be leading anywhere and partly 
because it was hoped that psychology could become more scientific by 
studying behavior that could be observed unambiguously by the 
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experimenter. This was called the Behaviorist movement. It became taboo to 
talk about mental events. All behavior had to be explained in terms of the 
stimulus and the response. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
227 
 
Appendix chapter 6 
 
Appendix: 4  
Post experimental interview form (Suspicion checker) 
 
Name…………………………………………… 
Email address………………………………. 
 
Debriefing Questions 
1. Do you have any questions about the experiment? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
2. Was the purpose of the experiments clear and did all aspects of the 
procedure make sense? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
3. People react to things in different ways. It would be helpful to hear 
about your feelings and reactions to the experiment, the reasons for 
your responses and so on. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………..……………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
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4. Was any aspect of the procedure odd, confusing or disturbing? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………... 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………... 
5. Do you think there may have been more to the experiment than meets 
the eye? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………... 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………... 
What do you think the purpose was of the experiment? What do you 
think we wanted to learn about? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 
6. In psychology research we sometimes need to use deception, that is, 
we occasionally mislead people about the purpose of our research or 
aspects of the procedure. This is often necessary if we are to 
understand how people think and behave in the real world. Do you 
think there was any element of deception in the present study? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………..……………...…. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………...… 
 
N or S 
 
 
229 
 
Appendix:  5 
Content coding for participants’ responses to the meaning of the Crick 
essay. 
 
Pro science:     Column name = Pro_Science 
To be classed as pro science participants must interpret the essay as 
championing science with phrases like “showing that science has the 
answers”.   
 
Anti myth or Religion:  Column name = Anti_Myth_or_Relegion 
When participants interpret the essay as arguing against or disproving 
religious beliefs or myths (e.g. “science has disproven religious myths” or “that 
religion is wrong”) responses are coded as Anti myth/religion.  
 
Anti myths Column names = Anti_Soul   Anti_Afterlife   Anti_Fee_Will 
Claims of the nonexistence of specific aspects of mythical/ religious ideologies 
(e.g. Souls, Afterlife, Free will) should be coded according to the term used 
and sorted into the relevant column.  
 
Anti choice or reductionist:  Column name = Anti_Choice_or_reductionism 
Anti choice or reductionist understandings of the essay view it as claiming 
that our choices are limited or controlled by our brains, genes, environment , 
DNA, or some other factor (e.g “we a do don’t choose as all our choices are 
made by our brains and neurons” ) these interpretations of the essay can 
either state that choices are constrained or just reduce human decision 
making down to biological neuronal processes.  
 
Pro free will: Column name = Pro_Free_WIll 
Pro free will interpretations of the essay will state that the essay was arguing 
that  free will exists.  
  
Free will neutral: Column name = Free_Will_Nutral 
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Interpretations of the essay that mention free will l but do not claim that the 
essay was arguing in favour or against free will should be coded as free will 
neutral.  
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Appendix chapter 7 
 
 
Appendix: 6 
Voice over scripts for video lectures.  
Deterministic condition (deterministic video lecture) 
Like Einstein, most modern scientists believe in the theory of Determinism. 
Determinism teaches us that everything that happens in the universe was 
determined (meaning caused to happen) by events that happened before. 
This includes all of our choices.  Your conscious self does not actually make 
your choices rather your brain makes all your decisions for you and then 
generates your consciousness experiences. So, although you feel like you 
consciously make choices, those choices were all determined by your brain. 
The choices that your brain makes were all pre-determined and inevitable. 
Let me take you through the science in a few simple steps. The science of 
Determinism draws on the fact that we live in a cause and effect universe. 
Living in a cause and effect universe means, Firstly, that nothing can happen 
without being caused. So everything that happens must have been caused to 
happen.  The first domino can only fall if it is caused to, perhaps by a finger 
pushing it or it being knocked or shaken. Secondly, things that happen then 
cause other things to happen. So the first domino falling caused the next 
domino to fall. An action will always lead to consequence even if that 
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consequence is just the final domino lying flat rather than being upright. 
Everything that happens in the universe has causes, and things that happen 
then cause other things to happen. 
Think of snooker balls bouncing off each other. Each ball only starts moving 
as a result of being struck and then that ball goes on to strike other balls, also 
moving them. These balls then collide with other balls and this cause and 
effect process continues.  
Importantly, if someone knew the exact position and angle of movement of all 
the snooker balls at the start of their interaction, it would be possible to 
calculate their interactions from then on. Even if the balls somehow kept on 
moving for a thousand years, their eventual position would be inevitable, 
fixed. Their eventual position could be said to have been pre-determined, 
because once those balls were set in motion the mechanical cause and effect 
nature of our universe means that there was only ever one way that the final 
arrangement of balls was going to turn out. That is determinism in a nutshell. 
 
The universe, although vastly bigger and more complex than a snooker table, 
works in exactly the same mechanical cause and effect way. In 1814 The 
famous mathematician Pierre-Simon Laplace realised that if we knew the 
position and movement of every particle and atom at the start of the universe, 
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just after the big bang, we could “theoretically” predict everything that those 
atoms were going to do from that point on.  
 
We could “theoretically” predict exactly how those atoms would move, 
interact and combine to form stars, planets, life forms, and eventually you, 
your DNA, your brain and every event that will happen to you in your lifetime. 
We would know your past, your present and your future because your future 
is set, fixed and inevitable. Just like the snooker balls, once the atoms that 
make up our universe were set in motion there was only one way that the 
universe was ever going to turn out. And guess what, you are a part of that 
universe so that includes you.  
That is because your brain is entirely physical in nature, a product of our 
physical universe, processing information via the physical movement of atoms 
and molecules.  So, just like everything else in the universe, your physical 
brain, the way it processes information and even the decisions it makes were 
entirely pre-determined (caused) by prior events stretching all the way back to 
the big bang. Even your conscious experience is a pre-determined product of 
processing in your physical brain because your brain generates your 
consciousness. 
Therefore, from the beginning of the universe 13.82 billion years ago, every 
thought and feeling that you were are going to have and every choice and 
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decision that you are ever going to make was fixed, inevitable, predetermined 
to happen in just one way. From the formation of the universe you were 
always going to be where you are right now watching this video, thinking 
exactly what you are thinking now. 
So how do we know that our thoughts, feelings and decisions are all made by 
our brain and are predetermined. Could they not be driven by our 
consciousness somehow? Scientists like Benjamin Libet have proven that our 
consciousness does not actually make our choices, rather our brain makes our 
decisions for us and only then generates our conscious experience of making 
that decision. Our feeling of consciously making a decision is just an illusion.  
brain Even when you feel like you are making a complex decision by carefully 
weighing up multiple options your brain is generating your conscious 
experience of the process a fraction of a second after it does the actual 
processing. ultimately your consciousness is a mere bystander observing brain 
processing that was all predetermined and inevitable. 
Our brains really do make our decisions for us. Research shows that advanced 
brain scanners can now observe your brain making a decision to move your 
hand, seconds before you even become consciously aware of that decision. In 
other research brain stimulation devises have actually controlled what hand a 
person chooses to move while the person remained completely unaware that 
they have been influenced. 
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All of our thoughts, feelings, decisions and even our conscious experiences of 
making those decisions were fixed, predetermined and inevitable from the 
moment of the big bang. Everything that is going to happen to you and every 
decision you are ever going to make in the future is also set. There is nothing 
that we can do to change that and anything that we try do any any seemingly 
random action or new behaviour, well that was also pre-determined. We are 
like movie characters half way through a film, we may not know the ending 
but ultimately our script has already been written.   
To conclude then, modern science supports Determinism. Determinism 
teaches us that we are not really in control of our choices, decisions and 
actions. Rather all our thoughts, feelings and decisions are made, not by our 
consciousness, but by our brains. All of our brains decisions were pre-
determined from the moment of the big bang and are completely inevitable. 
Our past present and futures are predetermined and fixed. 
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Non deterministic condition (consciousness video lecture) 
Over the decades leading Scientists like Einstein have steadily added to our 
understanding of the universe. From its beginnings, to the formation of its 
galaxies, stars and planets, to the eventual development of complex life, the 
brain and even some aspects of human behaviour, scientists have been able 
to steadily fill in the blanks to reveal a clearer picture of our existence. One 
issue, however, both tantalises and frustrates human inquiry and although 
some progress has been made, the question of how we actually experience 
human consciousness may prove our most elusive mystery. 
 
Let me take you through our scientific progress in a few steps. All scientific 
theories draw on the fact that we live in a cause and effect universe. This 
means that when things happen, they often go onto cause other things to 
happen. So, the first domino falling causes the next domino to fall. Actions 
lead to consequences and if the nature of the relationships involved are 
known, we are able to make predictions about what will happen next. We will 
know for example that if the dominoes are positioned correctly, pushing the 
first one will lead to all of the dominoes eventually falling in a predicable 
fashion. We can predict the future and ask testable questions “or hypothesis” 
based on what we know about the objects involved and the laws of physics 
that govern their interactions. 
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Think of snooker balls bouncing off each other. Each ball starts to move move 
as a result of being struck and then goes on to strike other balls, also moving 
them. These balls then collide with other balls and this interaction continues 
in a predictable fashion. 
The trillions of atoms in our universe interact with each other much like the 
snooker balls. On a small scale they act according to the laws of quantum 
mechanics, on a larger scale, classical physics. Over time, these rules help us 
anticipate how these atoms will interact. Like balls on a table their behaviours 
can be predicted. At both the tiny micro atomic level and the larger (macro 
level) of snooker balls, planets and people, science has successfully explained 
much of how our universe has developed and science can make predictions, 
allowing us to anticipate events and control our environments. 
From Georges Lemaître discovery that our gigantic and expanding universe, 
was in fact forged in the fierce fires of the big bang to Laplaces’ explanation 
for how our solar system formed from a cloud of swirling gases. From theories 
dedicated to explaining the inconceivably small interactions taking place at 
the strange quantum level, to theories explaining vast macro events, like the 
interactions of stars, planets and supernovas. 
Theories have been developed that can explain how our universe brought 
forth first our world then, life forms, and eventually you, your, millions of cells 
your brain, and all of the aspects that make up our modern world. Science has 
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yielded exciting new technologies, like computers able to accurately model 
physical interactions, creating simulations like this one and calculating the 
complex probabilities necessary for modelling events at the quantum level. 
We can model the behaviour of cells and, to some extent, even the workings 
of the Human brain.  
Scientists have had great success providing explanations for how our brains 
process information when encoding memories and making decisions. Perhaps 
the ultimate mystery still eludes scientists however. This mystery, known as 
the hard problem of consciousness, asks just how our capacity to consciously 
feel and experience came about. This may prove to be our universe’s ultimate 
mystery. Research using brain scanners has mapped the networks activated 
during conscious experiences, the so-called neural correlates of 
consciousness. 
 
but how atomic matter born in the fires of the big bang contributes to the 
conscious experiences that so fascinated the likes of Einstein, remains largely 
a mystery. In other words the thorny issue of just how and even if processing 
in our physical brain is sufficient, by itself to allow us to consciously 
experience, things like pain and love, this hard problem of consciousness, still 
remains the ultimate goal for many scientists. 
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The first step in answering the hard problem lies in deciding whether 
consciousness is solely the property of our physical brain or is produced 
elsewhere. Scientist Benjamin explored the role of the human brain in 
consciousness, his research findings have been replicated on multiple 
occasions and dozens of similar scientific studies have clearly established an 
important role for the human brain in generating our rich conscious 
experience of our world. 
Research therefore suggests that consciousness is at least partially dependent 
on things happening in our physical brain. Conscious activity appears to be 
related to the activation of specific regions within the brain as well as the 
synchronous activity of networks of brain cells. This means that for us and the 
Einsteins of this world consciousness, draws upon brain processing. 
Processing that is now becoming researchable via new advanced brain 
scanners that can produce research charting the interactions and timings of 
these consciousness relevant brain networks. Other recent research now 
exploits the newest generation of brain stimulation devices to explore how 
inhibiting the brain’s regions involved in consciousness, impacts experiences 
and behaviour.  
many eminent scientists have contributed to our understanding of the 
universe. Thanks to them science is steadily unravelling the processes that 
turned atomic matter into planets capable of supporting life forms capable of 
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high-level intelligence. Yet only our remarkable gift for consciousness allows 
us to truly experience, on a profound personal level now it actually feels to 
truly live in the complex and amazing universe, that scientists investigate. 
Consciousness allows us to not only make art, like movies, but also to truly 
appreciate its beauty as far more than mere machines. 
To conclude then, Scientists have long pondered human consciousness. 
Consciousness allows us to experience our universe in a remarkable way. 
Processing in the brain appears to contribute to this ability. Scientists are 
exploring consciousness, but we may never solve the hard problem of 
consciousness. Just how and indeed if, our universe brought forth our ability 
to consciously experience our world, solely from processes in the brain. 
 
  
